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PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE 17TH CENTURY

Polish contemporary research perspective

edited by
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INTRODUCTION

The formula of *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric*, which alludes to the medieval *trivium*, allows the periodical to publish a wide variety of social science resources and essays, enabling to use different methods and approaches to study a number of issues, symbolically brought under the *trivium*.

For the last ten years, *Studies* have been published in two separate editions – as an annual journal and as a book with a common theme running through each volume; hence a double referencing system for the journal and the book series. Using this formula, *Studies* published items on the methodology of social sciences, the philosophy of language, articles and essays on the history of ideas. Since 2006 two distinct profiles of the periodical have been formed – formal-logical and socio-philosophical which made it possible to increase the frequency of editing, now the periodical appears twice a year and the ambition of its editors is to convert Studies into a quarterly.

The present volume entitled *Philosophical and Social Thought of the 17th century. Polish contemporary research perspective* perfectly fits into the profile of the journal and the intention of editor is to present a large scope of research problems of this region taken up in several academic centers in Poland. Our country has great traditions in this domain. More and more polish researchers especially the younger generation are engaged in this subject which resulted in several valuable publications and translations of classical texts in the last decade. Since 2005, within the cycle of annual all-Polish scientific conferences there has been going on a systematic exchange of thoughts between researchers of this singular century of great philosophy constituting a turning point for our civilization. The first one concerning the philosophical and social thought of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century took place in Białystok, the next one devoted to the philosophy of Leibniz was organized by Wrocław philosophical circle. In 2007 the initiative was taken by the Catholic University of Lublin and the host of this year's Conference

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on philosophy of the 17th century in the context of its later implications was Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań.

The content of this volume does not reflect the whole scope of research problems of our country. It is however rather representative of the domain described by the title of the volume. The authors present classic philosophical problems: ontological, epistemological, ethical as well as texts concerning aesthetics, linguistic philosophy and legal philosophy. We hope that this publication in English will contribute not only to popularization of polish research in the domain of philosophy and social thought of the 17th century abroad but it will also promote a large international debate for which there is always place in the columns of *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric*.

Halina Święczkowka

STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 15 (28) 2009

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WAS SUÁREZ ESSENTIALIST?

1. The origin of problem

In the history of the realistic philosophy Étienne Gilson was the first who said that Francis Suárez was, if not simply an essentialist, then at least he paved the way to essentialism. He writes in his work *L'être et l'essence*:[1] "One may wonder [...] whether essentializing of being of which we were witnesses did not provoke a disintegration of the first philosophy and, through the separation, of the natural theology, and the science of Being as Being from the first philosophy based on the abstract notion of being as being did not dissociate the ontology pure from any contact with the being actually existing. Francis Suárez himself did not go so far, but he made his way in this direction and he has certainly influenced greatly the intellectual movement which inevitably conducted to that ultimate dissociation." The Gilson's views concern the problem of the possibility or the impossibility of metaphysics. The problem of the validity of metaphysics became very important, since the classical metaphysical system has been questioned by Kant in his *Critic of the pure reason*. In order to solve this problem, Gilson took into consideration the concept of being as the object of metaphysics. He analyzed the views of many philosophers, intending to prove which of

[1] Paris 1948, p. 141: "On peut se demander, notamment, si l'essentialisation de l'être à laquelle nous venons d'assister, n'a pas eu pour effet de provoquer la rupture de la philosophie première et, en dissociant la théologie naturelle, science de l'Être en tant qu' Être, d'une philosophie première axée sur la notion abstraite de l'être en tant qu'être, de libérer une Ontologie pure de toute compromission avec l'être actuellement existant. François Suárez n'est pas lui-mème allé jusque-là, mais il s'est angagé dans cette voie, et son influence est certainement pour beaucoup dans le mouvement qui devait conduire à cette dissociation finale." Gilson published his book also in English, under the title: *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto 1949 and 1962. But the text in these different editions is not identical.

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them has worked out a genuine metaphysics. In his opinion such a metaphysics must take into account what is the most fundamental and primary in the reality. It must be the existence or inexistence of which depends the existence or inexistence of all the rest. Gilson affirms that in the history of metaphysics St. Thomas Aquinas was the only who has solved correctly the problem of metaphysics, because he stressed the fundamental element of being: its actual existence.[2] Whereas it was Suárez who was outstanding among philosophers neglecting existence. More, because of his great impact on the future development of the western philosophy, he was, in Gilson's opinion, the most dangerous philosopher.

This Gilson's view on Suárez' would-be essentialism has been shared by M. Gogacz, who wrote: "The essentialism leads, for the most part, to idealism. Suárez' metaphysics misguides essentialism."[3] M. A. Krąpiec OP expressed his opinion not so radically. He wrote in his *Metaphysics*: "The philosophical systems which treated the concept of metaphysical being as the most undetermined, extensive and predicating of all essences (Parmenides, Plato, Avicenna, Duns Scot, Suárez, Wolff), formulated the tautological, barren principles of identity. [...] These formulations were logically correct indeed, but they supposed erroneously that their subject and predicate have materially and formally the same meaning and present the same aspect of reality, i.e. being conceived as essence."[4]

There are also some defenders of Suárez. Adam Aduszkiewicz has expressed his positive opinion on Suárez in his studies: *Od scholastyki do ontologii* [From scholastic to ontology]. He presented the philosophical output of Suárez against the background of his scientific activity. Doctor Eximius was active in the time when philosophy began to recover from the crisis caused by Ockham and the Ockhamists. They thought that the metaphysics is nothing but an intellectual contrivance. So they acknowledged many metaphysical concepts as superfluous (the famous Ockham's razor). Suárez, while agreeing with Ockham and the other nominalists that things exist as individuals, tried nevertheless to prove that we are able, thanks to our intellectual activity, to grasp the things in their essential aspects. Aduszkiewicz writes: "Suárez aims in his arguments at the conclusion that the inner coherency of the true sentences allows us to be sure that their objective

[2] É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 2 ff.

[3] M. Gogacz, *Istnieć i poznawać* [To exist and to come to know], Warszawa 1969, p. 80.

[4] M. A. Krąpiec OP, *Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu* [Metaphysics. Introduction to the Theory of Being], Opera omnia, vol. 7, Lublin 1995, p. 96.

contents present, in their proper domain, the eternal truths. This certainty renders well founded belief that it is possible to know discursively things in themselves. Therefore inclusion of Suárez among the metaphysical essentialists seems overhasty. The reason of this fact was the supposition that Suárez, like the former metaphysicians, in his teaching presents the conception of an ontic structure which elucidates the existence of the real being. Whereas Suárez leaves the task of elucidation of coming to be of the concrete things to the lower disciplines."[5] Suárez in the first place – writes Aduszkiewicz – will prove, that it is possible to elaborate "such intellectual presentation of a real thing which can be said to grasp the necessary and immutable aspects of being something real. It is clear that such a presentation becomes a definition describing the essence of a thing. It is nothing surprising that the existence has been described by Suárez as an additional predicate complementing the structure worked out by the intellect, the structure thanks to which the thing itself becomes accessible to the human intellect."[6] We can add to the A. Aduszkiewicz's opinion a comment that the prevailing trend in the fifteen century philosophy likes somewhere to the nowadays style of postmodern philosophizing. Both now and then call in question the eternal truths and stress the role of the individuals as well as of free will decisions. One tries to found ethics on the consent of many, not on the human nature.

Also Marius Schneider OFM stands for Suárez in his voluminous paper: *Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suarez* [The would-be Philosphical Essentialism of Suárez].[7] He argues the Gilson's point of view on Suárez as unjust. I will sum up the Schneider's opinion later in my paper.

2. The notion of essentialism

Before we answer the question, whether Suárez is really essentialist, we must know, what essentialism is like. In order to define the notion of essentialism, I refer to the formulas presented in the PEF [General Encyclopedia of Philosophy], vol. 3, where the entry "Essentialism" has been elaborated by Henry Kieres:[8] "Essentialism – the view which proclaims the cognitive

[5] A. Aduszkiewicz, *Od scholastyki do ontologii. Dwa studia* [From Scholastic to Ontology. Two studies], Warszawa 1995, p. 56.

[6] Ibidem, p. 55.

[7] M. Schneider, *Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suárez*, "Wissenschaft und Weisheit" 24 (1961) p. 40–68.

[8] *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii* [General Encyclopaedia of Philosophy], vol. 3, Lublin 2002, p. 220–222.

(and therefore also) ontological predominance of essence of being (*essentia*) over its existence (*esse*, *existentia*). Essentialism deliberately disregards the existence when it tries to explain the reality. It reduces it to qualification void of content of an individual being, qualification which contributes nothing essential to its content and – consequently – to the notion of being, because the essence being realized in a concrete or grasped *in abstracto* is the same essence. Or it maintains that the existence of a concrete being is derivative of an essence – preexisting in the intellect of God or objectively – and it is a result of the necessary (non contradictory) arrangements of traits proper to all beings which constitute the so called modes of existence (*modi existentiae*). Essentialism reduces being to its form – essence, and turns the philosophy to aprioristic similar to an art of speculation." The essentialism was reborn toward the end of the twentieth century as the neoessentialism. Andrew Wawrzyniak so describes this trend: "Neoessentialist notion of being consists, broadly speaking, on giving content to the act of being which is limited by its essence, so that both existential as well as formal actuality is contained in the act of being."[9]

To the most influential exponents of neoessentialism belongs the German Jesuit J. B. Lotz. He essays to combine the thomistic and suarezian ontology. Doing so he discerns two kinds of composition in the beings: the mental, with a base in a thing, of *quidditas* and *existentia* and the real one of *essentia* and *esse*. When we ask if a being subsists, we mind its existence. This takes place on the pre-metaphysical level. Whereas the composition: *essentia – esse* occurs in the domain of the metaphysical cognizance. In the connection with this "relatively to the distinction between the *existentia* and *esse*, we grasp also the distinction between *quidditas* and *essentia*. *Quidditas* is a determined content which can get an existence (*existentia*) and consists in a restricted grade of a content void potency limiting the esse which is a perfection and is somehow a matter for the form of esse."[10]

3. Suárez' standpoint

Suárez has presented his standpoint the most distinctly in the Disputation I, *On the nature of metaphysics*, in the section 1, *The object of meta-*

[9] A. Wawrzyniak, *Nowsze tendencje esencjalizujące w neoscholastyce* [New essentialistic trends in the neoscholastic], "Roczniki Filozoficzne" KUL, 14 (1966) fasc. 1, p. 98.

[10] Cfr J. B. Lotz, *Ontologia*, Barcelona 1962, p. 205–207.

physics.[11] Suárez criticizes there different opinions which propose, one after other, six possible objects of metaphysics: mental beings, accidental beings, God, immaterial beings, being as divided into ten categories and substance as such. Last of all he proposes his own opinion, namely that the adequate object of metaphysics is being as being. It contains both God and other immaterial substances as well as material substances and accidents. Instead, the mental and accidental beings are excluded from it (n. 26). Then Suárez analyses in the Disputatio II the notion of being as such. So he asks in the section 1: Has being as such in our mind unique formal notion common to all beings? Before he answers this question, he precises the sense of the words: "formal" and "objective" (n. 1). The formal notion got its name because "it is the definitive form of mind or because it formally presents to the mind a thing known, or at least because it is in fact an internal and formal term of mental conception, where through it differs, so to say, from the objective notion. The objective notion means a thing or a content which is properly and immediately known, i.e. is presented by the formal notion. For ex. when we conceive a human being, the notion in our mind is named formal concept, while a human being known and presented by this action is named objective concept." Whereas there are so many formal objects, as many are the human beings, knowing the objective concept of being as being is unique, though it is relatively to the single beings, ambiguous (n. 9).

In the section 5 he continues to analyze the notion of being as such in its objective aspect. This section is the most important and pivotal for the solving our problem. Suárez begins his analyze by the classic scholastic distinction between *ens* as participle and *ens* as noun (n. 3).[12] Being [*ens*] then as participle (derived from the verb *sum* – I am) designs the act of existence as done, i.e. something actually existing. Whereas being as noun designs formally the essence of thing which it already possesses or can possess. It designs therefore the existence (*esse*) itself, not as actually done, but as possible to exist. The being in this second sense is divided into ten categories and is extratemporal.[13] Being as participle "is something actually existing, i. e. having a very act of existence or an actual reality different from a potential one which is actually nothing. [...] Therefore being can have one

[11] F. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, in: F. Suárez, *Opera omnia*, vol. 25, Paris 1866, p. 2 ff.

[12] He owes this distinction to Fonseca (4 *Metaph.* ch. 2, qu. 3, section 2), what he himself acknowledges.

[13] In order to confirm this opinion Suárez quotes a text of St. Thomas Aquinas from *Quodlibetum* 2, ch. 3, that "the name 'being' done to a thing to which such a being (*esse*) belongs, designs so the essence of a thing and is divided into 10 categories."

formal and objective notion common to all beings actually existing, because they are similar to each other and converge in the actual existing (*esse*) and being (*entitate*)" (n. 4). "Next, if a being is conceived as noun, then its sense consists in having the real essence, i.e. not fictitious or imaginary, but true and apt for real existing" (n. 5). The phrase: "apt for the real existing" can suggest that the essence itself, separated from the existence is also object of metaphysics. In this sense in fact the essentialist thomism evolved. One defined in it being as what exists or can exist. But question is whether a possibility alone, i. e. non contradiction, suffices to treat something as a being, Gilson was right in accusing Suárez of essentialism. Therefore just now we stay in front of the most important problem in our debate to solve: What is a real essence like? This question includes two other questions: What is essence like? (point 6) What is real essence? (point 7) We are interested most of all in the second question. Suárez says at first what the real essence is not. Essence cannot be what is contradictory and what is only a mind's contrivance. Positively Suárez defines the real essence as a principle or root of the real actions or effects in the domain of efficient as well as of formal and material causes. In other words, the real essence is which can be created by God and constituted in existence (*esse*) of actual being. To sum up, "we can say only that the real essence is which itself is apt to being or to real existing."[14] The criterion of this aptitude is the presence of essence in an existing being. Let us stress the aspect of essence's efficiency. We will see later that the ideas alone, even in the God's intellect, are not recognized by Suárez as real.

The next problem which arises here is the question, whether these two grasps of being, i.e. as participle and as noun, can be somehow put together. Suárez answers the question in the point 9. "Being, in this double aspect, does not mean a double sense of being sharing some common sense or common notion, but means the concept of being more or less distinct. Since the being as noun (*vi nominis)* designs what has a real essence, leaving out of account through abstraction overlooking the actual existence, but without denying or excluding it. The being as participle means the real being itself which have a real essence together with the actual existence. This way it designs the concept of being as more restraint. [...] In the first place "being" seems to design a thing having the real and actual existence (*esse*) as a participle of the verb "be" (*essendi*) and then it is translated in order to more precisely design what has a real essence."[15] From this follows that being

[14] F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. II, *De essentia* entis, sect. 4, n. 7, p. 89.

[15] Ibidem, n. 9, p. 90.

as participle, according to Suárez, has priority over being as noun. Which proves again that our Philosopher is well-disposed towards the existentialism. Still more important is the point 11, where Suárez excludes from the domain of being as noun, being in potency. Though being as noun disregards the existence, it does not deny it. On the contrary, the being in potency does deny the existence. Therefore one cannot say that God is a being in potency. But one cannot say the same even about the creatures which exist. From this follows that the Suárez' metaphysics does not concern what can come to be, but has yet not come, for evidently it does not exist. On the contrary, the metaphysics can deal with the essence of things when their existence is not denied but only overlooked or postponed. It is allowed also to deal with the essences of what does not yet exist, but what will exist in the future, because it is not a time what is here the most important, but only the state of the reality under investigation.

4. Some objections raised by É. Gilson

Marius Schneider proposes to consider and evaluate three Gilson's opinions concerning the metaphysics of Suárez:

1. General evaluation of Suárez' philosophy,
2. Interpretation of Suárezian concept of being,
3. Gilson's opinion on Suárez view concerning the distinction between essence and existence.

Ad 1. The Gilson's opinion on Suárez is negative, though he handles his critic in velvet gloves. First he praises him saying that he was "a sober, well-ordered and uncommonly clear mind."[16] "It seems that Suárez was the first who went in for the whole metaphysics and not for one of its parts in this objective and systematic way. More, doing it he stated precisely the philosophical terminology received from the 'School' with such a strictness and perspicuity in so high degree which we do not find by his predecessors."[17] On the other hand Gilson finds the *Disputationes* to be unhandy philosophical intermezzo in the Suárez' theological activity.[18] This is not quite true.

[16] É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 96.

[17] "Suarez semble avoir été le premier à traiter la métaphysique et non plus seulement telle ou telle de ses parties, sous cette form obiective et systématique, mais il s'est trouvé conduit, en le faisant, à préciser le vocabulaire philosophique reçu dans l' École, avec une rigueur et une clarté qui ne se rencontrent pas au même degré chez ses prédécesseurs." *L'être et l'essence*, p. 142.

[18] É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 96.

Gilson himself remarks that "in the Preface to his Metaphysical Debate Suárez modestily introduces himself as a theologian who, to facilitate his own work, has felt it advisable to lay down once and for all the philosophical principles of which he makes use in his theological teaching. In fact Suárez enjoys such a knowledge of medieval philosophy as to put to shame many modern historians of medieval thought.."[19] Gilson omitted the significant phrase: "what he in the domain, several years since, as young teacher, worked out and taught."[20] Notwithstanding of the words of praise, Gilson blames Suárez for that he did not exploit rightly his knowledge of medieval authors.[21] He tries to prove this negative opinion in the next points of his critics.

Ad 2. Gilson starts to evaluate the Suárezian concept of being with a presupposition that all attempts of philosophizing without recognizing the existence as distinct act, failed.[22] Gilson strives to prove that the concept of being used by Suárez does not correspond with the facts. He identifies being as noun (*ens ut nomen*) with the possible essence and, consequently, he ascribes to Suárez identifying of the possible being with the actual one.[23] M. Schneider noticed that Gilson has changed in his arguments the sense of authentic text of Suárez. Doctor Eximius namely does not writes that the being as noun designs the real essence, but that it designs what possesses a real essence.[24] The concept of being is indeed abstract, but the intellectual knowing of the being's quiddity is for Suárez conscious grasping of the nature of an existing being. This knowing grasps what in reality is common or similar.[25]

Gilson once more accuses Suárez of essentialism when he interprets the distinction between the being as participle and as noun. He writes: "What Suárez means by the last expression is that actually existing being represents a restricted area of being in general which, as has just been said, includes both possible and actual being. This is a statement which necessarily implies that both possible and actual being are the same being and, furthermore, that actual being is a particular case of being at large. Exactly:

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[19] Ibidem, p. 99.

[20] F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, *Proëmium*.

[21] É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 99.

[22] Cfr. Ibidem, p. 202.

[23] Cfr. É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 97.

[24] M. Schneider, *Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suarez*, op. cit., p. 32. Cfr. F Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. II, sect. 4, n. 5 and 9.

[25] F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. II, sect. 2, n. 16.

actual being is being in general, taken in one of the cases when it actually exists."[26] The French text is more emphatic. The last sentence of it reads: "Shortly, being is essence and the whole reality of essence consists in its aptitude to exist." I understand by this that Gilson refers to *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, II, sect. 4, n. 8 (because this is hinted in the footnote), where Suárez considers a difficulty (*dubitatio*) concerning the common concept for being as participle and as noun, but does not present there his own solution. Whereas he proposes his own opinion in the point 11 where he states that "being as noun does not design being in potency when it is contrary to actual being privatively or mere negatively, but designs only being as it expresses a real essence, what is quite other case. Because, whereas the privative abstraction differs from the negative one, being as noun, though it privatively expresses being possessing a real essence, yet it does not add a negation, i.e. a statement on not having actual existence, while such a negation or lack of it is done in a potential being. Therefore one should not identify, as does Gilson, being purely possible with being as noun, and in virtue of this impute to Suárez an opinion which is not his own, but of his opponent.

Gilson commits another one misinterpretation of the Suárez' mind, when he identifies *essentia realis* with *possible*. Suárez' view is, as we have seen above, that real essence is identical with this aspect of existing being which is left after mental disregard of existence. But disregard is not the same as negation. From the field of the real essences Doctor Eximius excludes chimerical contrivances and plays of our imagination, because they never exist.[27] Suárez gives also name "thing" (*res*) or "something" (*aliquid*) to what has a real essence. Whereas he identifies with nothing so called possible beings and even ideas in the intellect of God. And nothing is not able to be an object of metaphysics.[28] These misinterpretation discarded, we can ascertain that the Gilson's arguments which should prove essentialism of Suárez, are far from convincing. Now we have to consider the third Gilson's objection concerning the status of the distinction between essence and existence.

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[26] É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophres*, op. cit. p. 98.

[27] Cfr F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. II, sect. 4, n. 5.

[28] Cfr M. Schneider, *Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suárez*, op. cit., p. 55–57. F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. II, sect. 4, n. 9 and 11; Ibidem Disp. XXXI, sect. 3, n. 1.

5. Essentialism and the problem of distinction between essence and existence

M. Gogacz considers as a most grievous error of Suárezian metaphysics, the negation of the real distinction between essence and existence in the beings. In his opinion, Suárez "looks at the reality as at the sum of different, contingent beings, created by the first Being just as individuals concrete not subsistent, particular beings. Because of such their ontic status, according to Suárez, the composition of act and potency is not necessary to them. It must be in them no factor which would make the act imperfect. They are just from the beginning singular and constitute the whole contingent being. Suárez evidently identifies the existence with being."[29]

Paradoxically, this interpretation of the Suárez' metaphysics seems to prove the thesis that he is rather existentialist than essentialist, contrary to what Gogacz wrote a few lines above. Using the style like this, M. Gogacz wrote further that Suárez "rejecting the theories which state the inner composition of being, he deprives being of the ontic factor differentiating beings, and treating them as contingent acts of existing, he bases his affirmation already on the factors inaccessible to metaphysics."[30] Also this sentence would suggest, in my opinion, that Suárez is an existentialist, because normally under the phrase "factor differentiating beings" one understands essence and Suárez should, as M. Gogacz suggests, deprive the being of it. We can presume that saying about "factors inaccessible to metaphysics" Gogacz minds God's act of creation. But one speaks about this act just in the theodicy which is the most metaphysical philosophical discipline. This debate leads us to the conclusion that Suárez in fact treats the essence and existence on a par, though he accords to the essence more place in his metaphysics than to the existence, because one can say more about essence than about existence which allows only to be affirmed.

It is difficult to prove the real composition of the contingent beings of essence and existence as of two distinct metaphysical factors. M. A. Krąpiec treats this matter on the 14 pages (353–367) of his *Metaphysics*. The argument from the plurality of beings is the most convincing. The argument proceeds in the following terms: Existence itself does not differentiate beings. They owe their variety to their essences, to their quiddities. Because the pluralism is something real, the factors which explain it, must be also

[29] M. Gogacz, *Istnieć i poznawać* [To be and to come to know], Warszawa 1969, p. 80. Cf. also the footnote 2.

[30] Ibidem, p. 81.

real. Notwithstanding this, Suárez admits only the mental distinction between essence and existence with a foundation in a thing. This foundation consists in a fact that the contingent beings have been created. Without act of God's will the essences in God's mind were left undone. The act of creation gives existence to these essences. The commentators (as M. Gogacz and M. A. Krąpiec) are unanimous in saying that the explication from outside is insufficient. We should agree with them in this matter, I think. After all, it seems that the problem of distinction between essence and existence is not related necessarily to the question of the would-be essentialism of Suárez. Anyway, he acknowledged the real existence of beings possessing their own essences which besides their specific elements, proper to each of them, have too the traits common to the other individual things.

Gilson sees in the Suárez' doctrine concerning the distinction between essence and existence a confirmation of his own interpretation of Suárez' philosophy. He is persuaded that *actualis essentia*, according to Suárez, is identical with the eternally actual possible essence. It became existing through the act of a cause. Without this, it was only potential (possibilis).[31] Contrarily to this, Suárez affirms that after separating existence from essence which is offered to a creature through some efficiency, the essence in itself is nothing.[32] Let us ask why Suárez rejects just the real distinction between essence and existence? He does it for fear to make them independent realities which secondarily would be combined together in a whole. Suárez this way comments the opinion rejecting the real distinction: "One compares the actual essence which is called *in actu exercito* with the actual essence that exists. Thus this sentence affirms that existence and essence, taken as abstracting and omitting i.e. as in potency, differs from the actual essence as nothing from something. I take this statement, so explained, as quite true. In short, it occurs so, because no thing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in its essence of real and actual being through something different of it. For if two things differ as being from being, each of them proves to be a being as differing from each other and consequently, not through that something formal and intrinsic."[33]

"Suárez rejects the real distinction, because he understood well the doctrine of St. Thomas in this respect. A real distinction would mean that the elements distinct of each other exist independently. If then actual essence and its existence stood against each other as real potency and act, essence

[31] Cf. É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, op. cit., p. 100.

[32] Cf. F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. XXXI, sect. 2, n. 5.

[33] Ibidem, sect. 1, n. 13.

and existence as distinct of each other would be something real, i.e. existing."[34] By introducing a real distinction, form, essence and substance would become in themselves *entia*. Trying to avoid this problem through the naming these elements *ut quo* would be unsuccessful. For if form or act had to stay as *ut quo*, they must have existence from which they would not differ.[35] If any distinction is to be allowed, it should be a metaphysical and not physical one. Suárez describes the mental distinction with a real foundation this way: "Thirdly I affirm that essence and existence in the creatures differ either as being in act and in potency or, if both are in act, they differ only mentally with a foundation in a thing. And this distinction suffices to affirm absolutely that actual existence does not belong to the essence of creature. In order to understand this distinction and the phrases in which it is used, we should suppose (what is quite sure) that no being, apart from God, does possess by itself its own entity, if it is a true entity at all. I add this, to avoid the ambiguity and to not confuse it with an entity in potency which indeed is no entity but nothing, and in the case of a thing possible to be created, it expresses only non contradiction, i.e. logical possibility, because no entity, apart from God, exists by itself and because this *by itself* implies that it excludes possessing anything through something other, what means that it expresses a nature which possesses the actual entity without undergoing to an action of something else, i.e. it is an actual entity."[36]

"Further, what follows from it, is that our intellect which can abstract from what in a thing is not separated, can also grasp the creatures without thinking of their actual existence, because since they exist contingently, it is not contradictory to grasp their natures without relating them to any efficiency and, consequently to actual existence. Since they are apt to be abstracted, one disregards also actual entity of an essence, either because, regarded actual entity, one cannot omit its existence, what we have proved above. This our way of thinking implies that when we disregard the actual entity in a thing, we consider something as intrinsic and necessary and as a primary constitutive factor of a thing which is an object of such a concept. And it is just what we name an essence of a thing, because without it, it is impossible to grasp it. Besides, one says that the predicates which are derived from it belong to it, in general, necessarily and essentially, because without them it is impossible neither to be nor to be grasped, though they

[34] M. Schneider, *Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suarez*, op. cit., p. 64.

[35] Cf. ibidem, p. 65; F. Suárez, *Disputationes*, Disp. XXXI, sect. 5, n. 8.

[36] Ibidem, Disp. XXXI, sect. 6, n. 13.

belong to it not always, but only when a thing exists. By the way, for the contrary reason, we deny that actual existence itself. i.e. actual entity would belong to the essence, because it can be disregarded, in the concept above mentioned, and in fact it must not belong to a creature, if it is an object of such a concept."[37] The actually existing beings are nothing else but actualized essences. They need not to have any other existence, for they have been already realized. Notwithstanding this, they remain still as contingent as contingent is their existence, with which they are identified.[38] The actual essence of a creature stands in the same relation to its *possibilis essentia*, as a being to nothing: *ens ad non ens simpliciter*. As a created essence it can exert the same functions which Suárez ascribes to act of existence. An act of existence really distinct from this created actual essence of a creature is not only needless, but also impossible.[39]

6. Recapitulation

Considered these texts of Suárez, we come to the conclusion that there is no reason, according to him, to take the existing creatures in the essentialist way. What more, just the negation of the real distinction between essence and existence, i.e. their identification, makes that there is in his teaching no place for essentialism. Though we concede that Gilson, well intentioned, looked for a right metaphysics after the period of its crisis, caused by the abuse of the Cartesian criteria of the genuine science, clearness and distinctiveness, which led to the skepticism of Locke and Hume as well as to the idealism of Kant and his successors, we must say that blaming Suárez by the French thomist for a would-be essentialism was overhasty. What Gilson would wish, namely to focus our attention on the sensitive impressions concerning that what concretely exists, we find it just in the English empiricism and partly by Kant. What Locke and Hume have done rejecting the notion of substance as well as what perpetrated Kant putting it in the categories of the reason, was quite anti-essentialist. One can hardly suppose that Gilson would be pleased with this turn. On the contrary, the defense of the essences of things or substances corresponded with the spirit of St. Thomas Aquinas.

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[37] Ibidem, n. 15.

[38] Cf. Ibidem, sect. 4, n. 5.

[39] Cf. Ibidem, sect. 5, n. 12.

We could see in our analyses that Doctor Eximius distinguished very well really existing beings from the mental contrivances and fictions, collections of beings and accidental complexes, and that he took into account in his metaphysics only really existing beings, though the existence stood not always in the centre of his attention, so that he could disregard it, but not to deny it. If somebody will name such a standpoint essentialism, we can agree that Suárez was essentialist. But since he did not deny existence and only allowed to leave it out of account, we can assert that the most of scholastic philosophers who consider themselves as existentialists are doing the same, because they investigate the essences of things too. Are they also essentialists?

Summary

The opinion that Francis Suárez SJ was an essentialist appeared for the first time in the Étienne Gilson's book *L'être et l'essence* (Paris 1948) or in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto 1949). Gilson accuses Suárez to be guilty of the dissent in the modern philosophy, by introducing the essentialist stream in scholastic. Between different philosophers the famous French historian of philosophy essays to find one who created the best metaphysic system. He realized that St. Thomas Aquinas was only one. He opposed to him Suárez as the most dangerous thinker, who spoiled the sane scholastical doctrine. This negative opinion on Suárez has been introduced to Poland by Mieczysław Gogacz, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and by the Philosophical School of Lublin. A positive opinion on Suárez' philosophical works has been defended by Adam Aduszkiewicz and Marius Schneider. The author of this paper discusses all the pros and cos, and tries to evaluate different opinions and arrives to conclusion that the Gilson's opinion is injust. It is too much to say that Suárez would be accused as essentialist.

It is true that the Doctor Eximius stresses the role of essence in a being, as he admits the possibility of making abstraction from the existence in a really existing thing. But to make abstraction of existence it does not mean to deny it. He rejects the mental fictions, sets of beings and accidental units as the object of metaphysics. Gilson' interpretation of Suárez texts seems to be far of true, when he identifies *essentia realis* with *essentia possibilis* and potential being with actual one. Contrary to this Suárez clearly treates the *essentia possibilis* as non being. Gilson's main argument for the essentialism of Suárez is his negation of the real distinction between essence and existence. The author of this paper maintains that not only the art of

distinction is irrelevant to the problem of essentialism, but more, he suggests that the real identification of essence with existence by Suárez rather is in favour of the existentialistic interpretation of his philosophical thought.

So the conclusion is that the Doctor Eximius should not be stigmatized as being harmful to philosophy, but contrary, he should be praised as a respectful thinker who ordered the metaphysics of Aristotle, defended it against the occamist nominalism and clarified the scholastic philosophical terminology.

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PETER FONSECA'S AND FRANCIS SUAREZ'S CONCEPT OF GOD'S SUBSTANTIALITY

1. Introduction

The issue of God's substantiality is undoubtedly one of key problems on the grounds of classical philosophy, and metaphysics in the first place, since it is in the centre of philosophical interpretations of the world. There are numerous works as far as the subject is concerned. In this context, one can notice that the problem was less referred to as that of God and attempts to say if he belongs to one of Aristotle's concepts of substantiality. The issue was vividly discussed in the Renaissance – and one concept was worked out by the school of Jesuits.

The Jesuits – after long and heated discussions – chose St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy but soon created their own school of philosophy, which beside the school of Dominicans (Thomas's philosophy) and Franciscans (Duns Scotus's philosophy) was at the turn of the XVI century the third important school of Christian aristotelism.[1]

The most renowned of the schools was Francis Suarez, whose ideas gave foundations for a certain doctrine called suarezianism, and influenced the shape of the modern philosophy. *"Disputationes metaphysicae" by Suarez (1597) in the beginning of XVII century were lectured on the field of metaphysics not only in schools of middle and western Europe owned by the Jesuits but also at German Calvinist and Lutheran universities, and they played an important role in shaping protestant scholasticism.*[2] Bearing in mind Suarez's concepts we would also like to take into account Peter Fon-

[1] See J. Czerkawski, *Filozoficzna szkoła franciszkańska w XVII wieku*, "Roczniki Humanistyczne" XXXIV (1986), z. 2, p. 119.

[2] See J. Czerkawski, *Humanizm i scholastyka. Studia z dziejów kultury filozoficznej w Polsce w XVI i XII wieku*, Lublin 1992, pp. 161–162.

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seca's ideas, who was a precursor of the school and whose thoughts were guidelines in it.[3]

Fonseca referred then to frequently raised questions: what are the possibilities of getting to know God and defining his nature? What kind of being is God? Is God a subject of metaphysics? One of the questions – which is discussed in this article – was: Is God, like other beings, a being of a certain category? In what sense is God a substance?

2. Renaissance discussions about God's substantiality

Fonseca's questions have already been dealt with in the XIV and XV centuries, especially by nominalists who followed Wilhelm Ockham and John Buridan. The nominalists in particular meant God as a definite individual being, namely substance. If God belongs to the substance category, then he can be defined. This cannot be a definition in the classical sense – that is to say: made by the closest kind and difference in category distinction but obtained through pointing to the most important qualities constituting the essence of God.[4]

Neoplatonists were of a different opinions: they claimed that God pre-existed and is a transcendent being, that is to say – he does not fall under a category and he cannot be ruled by the laws applied in the world of finite beings. Nicolaus Krebs, as a dedicated Plato follower, claimed that God, although he is an and individual and particular being, he is still much more perfect than other beings, and that is why he does not fall under any categories and cannot be brought down to any category.[5]

The Platonic stance, however, was not homogeneous. When one changes the perspective of looking at reality – that is to say, God is included into the whole reality, then the term substance becomes ambiguous and is only one of the ties linking the world of beings. Marsilio Ficino, paraphrasing Plato's concept of hypotheses, spoke of five substances embracing the whole universe. In his vision God was the substance – the most perfect and noblest being – but realities ontologically weaker were substance as well. God

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[3] See ibidem, pp. 165, 169, 177; see also K. Gryżenia, *Arystotelizm i renesans. Filozofia bytu Piotra Fonseki*, Lublin 1995, pp. 13–14.

[4] See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. IV: *Bóg*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 301–302; before mentioned, *Między średniowieczem a czasami nowymi*, Warszawa 2002, p. 53.

[5] See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. III: *Byt*, Warszawa 1978, p. 279.

was not only one substance, one category being, one designate of the term substance but substance were all its hypostases constituting the hierarchy of all other beings.[6]

In the discussion, Scotus's followers defined God as substance, underlined his individuality and thus were in favour of the nominalists' approach in this matter, but at the same time claimed in opposition to nominalists' that God is not a category being. On the other hand, Scotus's followers being closer to Aquinas claimed that God is transcendental in the light of categories and does not fall under any of them – he is simply beyond them. In this approach the followers of Scotus and Aquinas were unanimous. Thomas Aquinas Aristotle's division of being into ten categories limited to created beings. Those who ascribed God category way of existence were seen as radical followers of Aristotle and they did not go beyond Aristotle's categories and considered God to be in the first category singled out by Aristotle.[7]

This so much complicated problem in the XV century faced a change of the Aristotelian understanding of abstract, which was moved from the acquisition order to metaphysics, and that led to posing a thesis *universalis realia*. It seems that the change was a result of mixing the Aristotelian and Platonic tradition, which consequently resulted in thinking (Pico was of the opinion) that abstract can be self-existent independently – therefore is a absolute being; an individual being – a limited being, which participates in the absoluteness and fullness. In other words, *abstractum* is characterized by independent *esse* in which all concrete and individual being participate, for instance: a white thing participates in whiteness and a warm one in warmth. Such understanding of abstract and something definite led to an absurd notion that God as an individual being participates in something more perfect that possesses general existence.[8]

To make the above presented opinions perspicuous let us summarize what has been said. Therefore, nominalists claimed that God is a definite definable individual substantial being. Neoplatonism possessed two interpretations: one says that God is an absolute individual and transcendent being in the category existence; the other says that the category of substance belongs to God as well as to other inferior beings. According to the radical followers of Aristotle, God belongs to the category of substance. Finally, according to the tendency of metaphysical realism, general beings

[6] See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. IV, op. cit., p. 303.

[7] See ibidem, pp. 303–304.

[8] See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej w XV wieku*, vol. III, op. cit., p. 278.

exist independent of individual beings and thus God could equally exist in general.

In this context, one should add that representatives of the Church calling for doctrinal clarity were adamant to see any attempts to change the concept of existence of general beings; they were in favour of the idea that only individual beings exist in reality. The followers of Aquinas were of the same opinion and the nominalists even more. It is therefore not surprising that many thinkers were in favour of various kinds of nominalism: the concept of Ockham or Buridan's terminism.[9] That is why the question: *utrum Deus posit poni in paedicamento substantiae?* (e.g. does God belong to the category of substance?) was being promoted by the nominalists and many philosophers were under its influence because even those against nominalism supported the notion, for example P. Nigri.[10]

This short review shows that the problem of God's substantiality according to the school of Jesuits was very vexed.

3. The primary substance – the proper sense of the term substance

P. Fonseca, like many other thinkers of his time, claimed that God is characterized by his individuality and asked if he fell under the category of substance. His considerations began, however, by giving four meanings of substance:

1) Substance is meant as the essence of a thing, especially of a universal one and that can be definable.[11]
2) Substance as a thing, which is not accidental but is not thoroughly a thing; e.g. differences in the substance: matter and form.[12]

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[9] See S. Swieżawski, *Między średniowieczem*, op. cit., pp. 50–51.

[10] See ibidem, p. 53.

[11] "Haec autem (substantia) quatuor modis potissimum usurpatur. Uno, pro quavis essentia rei praesertim universali, et que definitione explicari potest". P. Fonseca, *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, vol. II Coloniae 1615, 513 B. In his reflections the author uses the following edition: P. Fonseca, *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Coloniae, vol. I–III, 1615; vol. IV, 1629; reprint by Hildesheim 1964. In vol. I and II *Commentariorum* titled *Questiones* are arranged in two columns on each page. The columns are divided in sectors from A to F. So further the work is cited in the following way: *Commentariorum* II, 513 B, the letter II stands for volume, 513 – column, B – sector in the right column.

[12] "Pro quavis re, quae non sit accidens, etiamsi incompleta sit: qua significatione Arystoteles (...) tum differentias substantiarum, tum etiam materiam et formam substantias appellat, ut eas ab accidentibus distinquat". Ibidem, 513 C.

3) Substance as a thing, which is not accidental but is a complete thing.[13]
4) Substances as primary substances.[14]

From these four notions of substance Fonseca considered to be the most important the first and fourth ones, then substance as essence and substance as the primary substance. He saw a connexion between them both and explained that substance as the essence of things can be considered in the broader and strict sense. In the strict sense denotes the primary substance, and in the broad sense denotes universals, that is to say *ratio obiectiva*.[15] Thus, the definition of substance in the strict sense denotes the primary substance and covers the fourth notion in Fonseca's understanding of substance. In the broad sense it applies to other substances since essence in a definition denotes species and categories – therefore refers to general contents. Therefore, one notion denotes other substances. To put it succinctly: substance – according to Fonseca – in the strict sense is the primary substance and derivatives but he favours the primary substance.

Having given the definition of the primary substance as well as the secondary substance, Fonseca fell back on the terms included in *the Categories* of Aristotle. The definition of the primary substance is: *Id quod nec de subiecto ullo dicitur, nec in subiecto ullo est.*[16] The primary substance is therefore what states nothing about a subject and exists in no subject. This definition is interesting in the way that it comprises the ontological and logical moment; substance is not only the subject of definition but also requires nothing for its existence. It is the strict sense of substance because it excludes accidents from its existence. Fonseca was of the opinion that *the strict sense of substance should exclude accidents.*[17] Needles to say that all the notions of substance more or less denote this aspect. Putting in opposition substance and accidents and showing their substantial dissimilarity is important. Fonseca, being the follower of Aristotle, says that what characterizes each substance – as opposed to accidents – is its

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[13] "Pro re, que non est accidens, completa tamen". Ibidem.

[14] "Pro primis substantiis". Ibidem, 513 D. More on the subject of Fonseca's terms on substance I wrote in the work *Arystotelizm i renesans*, op. cit., pp. 139–145.

[15] "Nomen substantiae presse quidem sive pro vera essentia in hoc capite, cum traditur quarta substantiae significatio, late autem sive pro quavis ratione obiectiva". *Commmentariorum* II, 513 B.

[16] See ibidem, 513 F. See also *Kat.* 5, 2a, translated by K. Leśniak in: Aristotle, *Dzieła wszystkie*, vol. I, translations, introductions and commentaries by K. Leśniak, Warszawa 1990, p. 34.

[17] "Propria autem significatio substantiae, accidentia excludere debet. Nihil autem remotius est a conditione accidentium". *Commentariorum* II, 513 D–E.

self-existence, subjectivity since substance exists in itself and it is a ground for accidents.[18]

4. Subsistentia – one of the basic conditions of substance

Fonseca, thinking about substance, used the following terms: nature, supposition, subsistentia. Let us concentrate on the last one that seems to be of paramount importance to Fonseca.[19]

Fonseca's claim that subsistentia tells us exactly what supposition, on the other hand, adds to the individual nature, and this "addition" is a kind of a positive being, which makes things belong to a category of substances and differentiates things.[20] "Addition" that supposition gives to the individual nature is not an accident or a being itself but restrains the nature or denotes it. The individual nature without the "addition" would be unlimited and communicative, yet unable to be a substance. To closely describe this "addition", Fonseca suggests the following terms: interior being, difference, restriction, pure term, addition, positiveness.[21] Finally, he says that supposition which adds extra value to nature has its way of existence – by that he means existentia[22] – not pure but substantial existence.[23] To put it briefly, it is substantial way of existence, therefore substance.

Substance, apart form being a subject for an accident, is also an important characteristic of a substantial being. Fonseca, dealing with the idea, supported Kajetan's concept, but it does not mean that he thoroughly accepted it. He modified it and thus wanted to give it the original sense –

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[18] See ibidem, 513 A–E. See also *Met.* V 8, 1017b, translated by K. Leśniak in: Aristotle, *Dzieła wszystkie*, vol. II, translations, introductions and commentaries by K. Leśniak and others, Warszawa 1990, p. 695. *Met.* VII 3, 1028b, op. cit., p. 720. More on the subject writes M. Krąpiec in: M. A. Krąpiec, T. A. Żeleźnik, *Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji*, Lublin 1966, pp. 52–53.

[19] It is not our aim here to give a complete understanding of Fonseca's understanding of subsistentia but mention just one aspect of it that he considers to be the most important. I wrote about all notions of subsistentia in the book *Arystotelizm i renesans*, op. cit., pp. 149–159.

[20] "Suppositum creatum addere naturae singulari aliquam entitatem intrinsecam pertinentem ad praedicamentum substantiae, et rei ipsa a natura diversam". *Commentariorum* II, 546 D.

[21] See ibidem, 548 C.

[22] See ibidem, 548 E–F.

[23] "Possunt igitur suppositorum complementa in creaturis modi essendi vocari ut a bonis auctoribus appellantur, verum non puri, sed entitativi, atque adeo substantiales". Ibidem, 550 C. This thesis has been recalled several times. See ibidem, 549 A–F.

that of Aquinas. What is interesting in it is that he did not read Thomas's original manuscripts but claimed to do so.[24]

Fonseca's problem of subsistentia – meant as substantial way of existence – is an echo of Scotus' *modus intrinsecus* and nominalists' *terminism* as well as introduced by Scotus and nominalists Kajetan's *modus substantialis*. St. Swieżawski underlines that Kajetan's *modus substantialis* did not contribute to clarification of the term substance – on the contrary, it caused its misinterpretations.[25] The same conclusion can be drawn in relation to Fonseca. But Fonseca is not the only one who made the understanding of substance more difficult. This theory was taken over by F. Suarez, Cartesius and B. Spinoza. Their claim that substance is characterized by self-existence led to a definition of substance as a being *per se*. All different ways of the existence of substance are modifications of the substance.[26]

As far as Suarez was concerned, subsistentia was one of the most important quality in the matter of substance. He introduced some other qualities of substance and accidents beside subsistentia. They were needed to explain the fact of complexity of matter and form – as well as substance and its accidents found in particular substances. Thus, the mode of unity (*modus unionis*) guaranteed the unity of the primary substance and its substantial form, but the mode of inherence (*modus inhaesionis*) created the possibility for substance and its accidents to become oneness. These modes are something real and positive and exist beyond the richness of an individual being. They are truly extra elements – different from the primary substance and its substantial form, different from the substance and its accidents. Their real existence, according to Suarez, is obvious. Man normally notices the reality of matter and its form – in the same way their mode of inherence and mutual cohesion are real.[27]

Subsistentia in Suarez's metaphysics is one of many substantial modes. His main point of argumentation covers those of Fonseca. In *Disputationes metaphysicae* Suarez explained that subsistentia becomes one substantial mode that makes individual nature exist in itself and by itself (*in se et*

[24] See ibidem, 550 E – 551 A.

[25] See S. Swieżawski, *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej XV wieku*, vol. III, op. cit., pp. 433–434.

[26] See C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, vol. I: *I grandi commentatori di San Tommaso*, Milano 1944, pp. 159–160.

[27] See C. Giacon, *La seconda scolastica*, vol. II: *Precedenze teoretiche ai problemi giuridici: Toledo, Pereira, Fonseca, Molina, Suarez*, Milano 1946, pp. 255–260; J. Pasterski, *Tomistyczna a suarezjańska definicja substancji. Studium porównawczo-krytyczne*, Lublin 1948 (manuscript), pp. 115–117.

per se). Strictly speaking, subsistentia is not existence but a substantial mode of existence or the end of individual nature.[28] Suarez – more than Fonseca – was of the opinion that self-existence is the prime and most important quality of each substance. Through this quality, each substance exists in itself and by itself (in *se et per se*). It is an unconditional quality that characterizes finite substances as well as infinite substances. Being a subject for accidents is relative and belonging only to finite substances. The reason for being a subject for accidents is unimportant and second-rate as a result of imperfect created substances.[29]

Self-existence, therefore, the only property of each substance, gives Suarez a reason for making the definition of substance as such, and then defining category substance. Thus, the general definition of substance is: a being existing by itself. The designate for such a statement is first of all God and then creation. Suarez, giving such the definition, helped Cartesius and Spinoza form the concept of substance as a being *per se*; and different modes of substance are called modifications. Spinoza speaks first of all of one substance, and all other realities are modes of this substance and its modifications. As a result, this process of thinking ended in monism and pantheism.[30]

5. God as a category being

The above presented conclusions entitle us to say that the term substance in its basic meaning is regarded as the primary substance. This conclusion is important on the field of metaphysics as well as in the field of acquisition. A substantial being is a thing which does not mean a subject and does not exist in any subject. Substance is therefore any individual being. Fonseca used to say frequently that God is an individual being, but, one must admit that he was not convinced if God belonged to a category substance. Since substance in its basic meaning means the primary substance thus an individual substance – then God is an individual being as well, and he is the primary substance without doubt. This notion was in opposition to the common belief – Fonseca himself believed it – since the primary substance was a finite being and they fall under categories. Consequences of such reasoning were the following: God was excluded as the one beyond all categories and he was an extra being. Fonseca objected to such reasoning

[28] See J. Pasterski, op. cit., pp. 99–100, 118–122.

[29] See ibidem, pp. 125–126.

[30] See S. Swieżawski, *Istnienie i tajemnica*, Lublin 1993, p. 74.

and claimed that so much Socrates or a piece of stone as God – or so much more Go – is the primary substance. Thus, God is undoubtedly the primary substance – more perfect than other finite substances and takes the first place in all categories.[31]

Fonseca, advocating the thesis that God and finite substances are the primary substances, was aware of the difference among them. This dissimilarity tried to prove by ways of the etymological analysis of the terms *subsistere* and *substare*, which define closer the term substance. *Subsistere* denotes a subject that exists by itself but not in another. Another term *substare* denotes a subject which creates grounds for accidents. The author noticed that the first quality belongs to God as well as to finite substance. The other quality, e.g. being a subject for accidents, is relevant in relation to finite substances. Thus, etymology of the term "substance" and the terms *subsistere* and *substare* is not the best way to prove that God belongs to a category substance since he possesses no accidents. All category substances are the only primary substances, they exist by themselves and they are the subject of their qualities. As far as God is concerned, it is impossible to apply the above mentioned terms since he is self-existent. But this does not mean, according to Fonseca, that we cannot consider God to be the primary substance.[32]

To fully understand the problem, Fonseca referred to the understanding of the secondary substance. As in the case of the primary substance so much in the case of the secondary substance he used to recall Aristotle's words: *Secundae substantiae* (...) *sunt genera et species, in quibus insunt primae, hoc est, sunt quibus collocantur essentiali subiectione cuiusmodi substantiae sunt animal et homo.*[33] Such substances are "animal" and "man", e.g. species and categories and they are designated in the logical order. In the

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[31] "In qua definitione (the primary substance – K. G.) ens finitum et completum solet intelligi, quia illud tantum habet locum in praedicamentis. (...) Nam, ut Sokrates his lapis, et huiusmodi, sunt primae substantiae, quia nec de subiecto ullo dicutur, nec in subiecto ullo insunt: ita et Deus. (...) Deus est (...) verissima prima substantia: non tamen ut prima substantia in praedicamentis ponitur, sed absolute". *Commentariorum* II, 513 F – 514 B. Fonseca gives quite a number of other arguments that are in favour of the opposite argument that he does not accept. Ibidem, 514 C – 515 E. I have already written about this on another occasion. See *Arystotelizm i renesans*, op. cit., pp. 94–98. Those considerations require mentioning the reflection included therein.

[32] "Quo nec Deus, neque ulla divina persona dicitur substantia iuxta Latini nominis veriores etymologiam quam a substantiis finitis ductam esse, perspicuum est". *Commentariorum* II, 513 E; see also 513 A – 514 C. The similar understanding of *subsistere* and *substare* according to Thomas Aquinas gives M. Jaworski, *Metafizyka*, Kraków 1988, pp. 148–149.

[33] *Commentariorum* II, 515 F – 516 A.

same way the primary substance is dependent on the secondary substance since its essence depends on category or specimen. We have the opposite of such reasoning when our considerations are brought on the field of metaphysics. Here, the secondary substances in their existence are dependent on the primary substances. This dependence noticed Fonseca, concluding: *The secondary substances are called this since they need the primary ones to become existent.*[34] From the metaphysical point of view the secondary substances are in relation to the primary ones in the same way as accidents to substances. They simply need a subject in which they become existent. If we wanted to consider God as the secondary substance, he would need another subject to become existent, therefore, he would become an accident of the substance, and that is absurd. This argument entitles Fonseca to talk about God as the primary substance – and we cannot claim that he is the secondary substance both on the metaphysical and acquisition grounds. God does not need other things to exist and does not fall under categories.[35]

The differentiation between the primary and secondary substances led on the threshold of the Modern Ages to a vivid discussion. Questions were raised: is the primary substance self-existent and the principle of the secondary substances or the secondary substances are the principle of individual substances? Therefore, whose concept is it? – Plato's or Aristotle's.

The followers of Aquinas and Ockham denied the reality and self-existence of the secondary substances, and their importance in relation the primary substances. There were exceptions, however, because some followers of Aquinas were claiming that the secondary substances were self-existent and the primary substances were characterized by a subject for accidents. Plato's influence was that at some stage there was a tendency saying that individuals, specimen and categories are also substances. This tendency was not only seen among the followers of Aquinas but also Dominic from Flandres (1425–1479) was of the opinion that general substance is the principle of concrete entities. Dominic was aware that such opinions were rejected by the school of Aquinas. He himself claimed that he was favouring the concept of the common nature as the real principle of all individual beings and that it is in accordance with Thomas's philosophy. In just one case Dominic claimed something different to what Aquinas held: namely, the primary

[34] "Secundae autem substantiae ideo dicuntur secundae, quia indigent primis, in quibus existent". Ibidem, 516 A–B.

[35] "Nihil praedicari posse de Deo, quod sit secunda substantia, cum Deus nulli generi aut speciei subici possit. Hue accedit, quod in Deo nulla omnino entitas reperitur, quae indigeat re aliqua, in qua existat". Ibidem, 516 A.

substances are more than substances in relation to the secondary substances when they function subjects for accidents.[36]

Fonseca got to know some theories of those who were following Plato in his considerations and thought that substances are rather general things than individual beings – and that generals are the principles of individuals.[37] Fonseca, while dealing with the problem, seems to support more the philosophy of Aristotle than Plato. Many of his statements prove that: only the primary substance, he says, is substance in the strict sense;[38] categories and species are not substances;[39] only an individual and concrete being is the principle of existence and getting to know all other beings;[40] the secondary substance is not a being in action but in ability since it is not self-existent – this existence is due to certain objects, thus the primary substances that are characterized by being in action;[41] whatever constitutes species is less perfect and actual than any individual.[42] In the light of the pretty clear Aristotelism, the following statement about Plato comes as a surprise: Plato can be wrong in saying that the common things exist *per se*, and that they are more substances than individual things.[43] In the same spirit, accepting Plato's argumentation, Fonseca wrote about subsistentia that is inherent not only in the primary and complete substances but also in the secondary substances. Fonseca believed that Thomas Aquinas was of the same opinion, who claimed that the quality of self-existence belongs to the se-

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[36] See M. Markowski, *Definicje substancji w "Komentarzu" do Metafizyki Dominika z Flandrii*, "Studia Mediewistyczne", VI (1964), p. 48.

[37] "Sed hoc intererat quod recentiores qui Platonem sequebantur, universalia magis substantias esse existimarent, quam singularia; proinde, ea potius esse principia quam singularia iudicarent". *Commentariorum* IV, 76b F – 80a A.

[38] According to Fonseca substance in its proper sense is the primary substance. See *Commentariorum* II, 513 D.

[39] Fonseca supporting Aristotle in his reasoning says: "in disputatione contra ideas Platonis, negat genera et species substantiarum esse substantias", Ibidem.

[40] "Substantia (prima) est primum, ac praecipuum ens, et ex cuius cognitione coeterorum omnium tuum esse, tum perfecta cognitio pendet". *Commentariorum* III, 196 explanatio.

[41] "Substantiae universales (...) quaemadmodum et partes integrantes, non sint actu substantiae, ut Plato existimavit, sed potentia: non quo ita sint potentia, ut aliquando possint esse actu, veluti partes integrantes, (...) sed quia habend esse in singulari substantia, cui primo convenit operatio, et distinctio, ac proinde veluti materiales partes accipiunt complementum additione differentiarum, quibus contrahuntur ad singulare substantias". Ibidem, 411.

[42] "Quidquid enim ut species concipitur, imperfectius minusque actuale cogitatur, guam quodlibet eius individuum". *Commentariorum* II, 520 E.

[43] "Nisi quod hoc peccavit Plato, quod universalia per se cohaerere, magisque substantias esse putabat". *Commentariorum* IV, 80b A.

condary substances prior to the primary ones.[44] One can draw a conclusion that Fonseca was in line with Aquinas just theoretically but in fact shared the opinion of Dominic from Flandres, e.g. the secondary substances to his mind were self-existent and were prior to them in existence. When speaking of the primary substances, he considered them to be subjects for accidents.

Fonseca, claiming that God is an individual concrete entity, supported the common stance in the matter at that time. The stance was valid for the follower of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, radical Aristotelians, nominalists, especially in certain interpretations made in their considerations. Fonseca came closer to nominalists by saying that God is a substantial being. The idea of God's substantiality in each school was different – it was confusing and unclear. Fonseca's opinion is also difficult to put in one definite school of interpretation. His thinking some elements from one school and some elements from others. He did not seem to accept one definite way of argumentation. His thought that God is an individual concrete entity and belongs to the category substance brought him close to nominalists. The category substantial God was typical of the nominalists' speculations.[45]

Fonseca's notion of God's substantiality is an example of the strong influence of nominalists. Fonseca was essentially against nominalism but despite that certain elements influenced his metaphysics. As a consequence, he is blamed for taking over some of the nominalists' theses – instead of fighting them in his philosophical consideration. This Latin text is to support the opinion: *Non desunt, qui dicat, nos libro 5. postquam impugnavimus eam Nominalium sententiam,* (...) *in impugnatam sententiam incidisse.* (...) *Sed luce clarius est nihil tale esse in loco, quae citant; nec aliud quicquam, unde colligi posit.*[46] To tell the truth, Fonseca placed the above mentioned text in another context rather than the one we are presently interested in but it is still relevant to say that he was nominalist in his philosophical thought.[47]

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[44] "Apud Philosophos autem, subsistere primo modo sumitur pro esse per se, hoc est non in subiecto inhaesionis, quo pacto omnis substantia sive completa sint, sive incompleta, subsistere et hypostasis habere dicitur, subsistentiaque et hypostasis interdum appellatur. Quo pacto non tantum primae substantiae, sed etiam secundae et substantiarum partes subsistere dicuntur, imo D. Thomas (...) saepius ait, quia subsistere hoc pacto convenit substantiae, qua ratione substantia est, id circo secundas substantias prius sibi vendicare subsistentiam quam primas". *Commentariorum* II, 522 A–B.

[45] See S. Swieżawski, *Między średniowieczem*, op. cit., p. 53.

[46] *Commentariorum* III, 410b D–E.

[47] See D. Martins, *Essêntia do Saber filosófico, segundo Padro da Fonseca*, "Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia". IX (1953), pp. 401–402.

6. In conclusion

The subject of God's substantiality under discussion in the school of Jesuits contributes to the complicated considerations in this matter in the Renaissance. Their considerations, however, did not eliminate the existing intricacy in the subject under discussion. The base for their reflections upon the above mentioned concept were written texts by P. Fonseca and F. Suarez. One can claim, as far as God's substantiality is concerned, that the two philosophers are close in their understanding of the subject – Fonseca had an influence on the shape of the philosophical thought promoted by Suarez. On the other hand, the Jesuits drew their inspirations form different philosophical schools and philosophers as well as from thinkers less known in the history of philosophy; but they would not take over one of their concepts as a whole. One can deduce from this that owing to many controversial stances on the matter under discussion, the Jesuits tried to work out a spectrum of opinions that would become a sort of *opinio communis*.

The issue of God's substantiality discussed by the Jesuits comes down to their statement that God is an individual substantial and concrete entity, yet they posed some objection to that opinion and gave some extra explanation. All in all, such conclusions are close to nominalists. Although the Jesuits verbally opposed nominalism, in fact, they remained under its influence. This proves that nominalism – although it was being discredited all the way – it still enjoyed appreciation.

translated by Marian Nycz

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JOSÉ LASHERAS HELLÍN'S INTERPRETATION OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ'S VIEWS

1. Introduction

This article is an attempt to reveal and present the interpretation of Suárez's philosophy suggested by Hellín, specifically Suárez's metaphysics. The author of the article focuses mainly on the characteristics and presentation of the attributes of the created and uncreated being. According to Hellín, Suárez's fundamental thesis bases on a statement that God is existence through a being, whereas the creature owes its permanence in existence and action to the so-called dynamic participation. The metaphysical essence of the creature, after Hellín, consists neither in a real composition of a being and existence nor in its finiteness, nor in the predicative interrelation called *mensurae et mensurati* but it bases on a radical relationship also called dynamic participation or casual participation.[1]

In the first part of the article a figure of José Lasherasa Hellín will be presented. Although he is regarded as a world authority and an expert in the analysis of the philosophical system by Francisco Suarez, he is still peripheral for the historians of philosophy. None of his numerous works (over sixty publications) have been translated into Polish. Whereas the second article part is a presentation of Hellín's interpretation of Suarez's metaphysics on the basis of Hellín's text titled *Suarezianismus*. Not only does the said text have cognitive value but also has a very interesting story behind, which I try to recount briefly in the first part of the article.

[1] See Hellín, Jose, Lasheras, Suarezianism, in: *Archivo Teológico Granadino*, no. 63, Granada 2000, p. 195.

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2. José Lasheras Hellín – *Princeps Suarezianorum*

José Lasheras Hellín (1883–1973) is not well-known for the Polish reader.[2] However, this Spanish Jesuit is regarded by the researchers of scholastic philosophy as the greatest authority in the field of the studies related to Francisco Suárez's philosophy and the reception of his views. The original interpretation of suarezianism as well as his own independent judgement both characterising Hellín's masterpieces made his work important and valuable not only for Spain and the Iberian culture but also for other remote territories. As Verdi said: "His knowledge was encyclopaedic and he had no competitor in philosophical suarezianism (*suarismo filosófico*), of which he was the unquestionably greatest expert: «princeps» of his epoch. Although his thought functioned in the circle of the "Distinguished Doctors" (*Doctor Eximius*), he never abandoned the independence of thought characteristic for a real philosopher".[3]

Except a short time when he was giving lectures at the University of Murcia (1941), he belonged to young Jesuits for all his life. During his long 50-year career of a lecturer he gained the title of full professor in psychology and theodicy. He also taught criticism, metaphysics, and cosmology. He gave lectures and wrote on a wide variety of subjects in almost all philosophical fields and disciplines; his productivity is proved by a vast amount of publications (over sixty works).

Hellín became famous also as a founder of the Spanish Philosophical Association and as a lecturer in the national and international conventions. However, he owed his fame to his numerous publications in *Pensamiento* periodical, of which he was a co-founder and co-editor.

Hellín is said to be one of the most eminent representative of Neo-Scholasticism of the 20th century. His philosophical stance constituted an attempt to create a coherent metaphysical system, which included all philosophical disciplines and which had its base in God as essential existence and in a being as existence through dynamic participation, i.e. the being's existence and activity are identified with its essence. Basing on these principles, Hellín deduced *quasi a priori* all attributes of God and a being.

Hellín's *Suarezianismus* constituting groundwork for this article is an attempt to present the hallmarks of Francisco Suárez's philosophical concept.

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[2] Biographical data come from G. M. Verdi, Hellín José Lasheras, [in:] *Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús. Biográfico-Temático*, Ch. E. O'Neill, S.I., J. M. Domínguez, S.I. eds., Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid, 2001, p. 1896–1897.

[3] Ibidem, p. 1897.

In the Polish research of modern philosophy his concept is still peripheral for the historians of philosophy and remains unknown to a great extent[4] and, with absolute certainty, underestimated. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the prevailing opinion that the turn of 16th and 17th centuries, the time when Suárez was creating his works, was a period when Scholasticism declined and a new opposing philosophy was born. The misconception of this stance was discovered already by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, who indicated that "it is a failure to understand Renaissance as a sudden change of the old philosophy to the new philosophy that will rule with absolute power."[5] Scholasticism, whose influence seemed to decline from the beginning of the modern era due to the Counter-Reformation, revived to gain its perfect form as a philosophical system created by the Spanish philosopher – Suárez. However, this is not an accident that the new scholastic thought originated from the Spanish land. In those days Spain was one of the most thriving centres of the Christian philosophy. Moreover, the history of the Spanish philosophy is full of eminent individuals, specifically among mystics, such as St. John of the Cross, St. Ignatius of Loyola, or Luis de Molina, a professor at the University of Coimbra who gained great popularity by his lecture which triggered a lively discussion in relation to divine grace and human free will between the Dominicans and Jesuits.[6]

The discussed text by Hellín not only has the aforementioned obvious cognitive value but also a very interesting history behind. In 1966 the author sent his article titled *Suarezianismus* to Schwabe & Co. Publishing House in Basle in order to publish it in a dictionary *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. However, this text never appeared in the dictionary which was not published until 1998. The dictionary, however, included Knebl's article which was significantly shorter and focused on the historical development of suarezianism, whereas Hellín's text had a systematic character and concentrated on Suárez's metaphysical system. Hellín's original article was found after more than thirty years from its postage in a theological archive in Granada, where Hellín was a lecturer between 1921 and 1931, hence, until frag-

[4] Stanisław Ziemiański SJ should be replaced among the Polish experts of Suárez; he is the author of: Franciszek Suárez, WAM Publishing House, Kraków 2004. The following titles are also noteworthy: A. Maryniarczyk, *Od scholastyki do ontologii. Dwa studia, Suárez*, Warszawa 1995, p. 25–76; M. Bożyszkowki, *Suárez a św. Tomasz z Akwinu – przegląd literatury filozoficznej*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne" XII, *issue* 1, Lublin 1964, p. 113–119; J. Rosiak SJ, Suárez 1548–1617, "Przegląd Powszechny" 65 (1948), volume 226, pp. 353–367; W. Seńko, *Ewolucja poglądów na temat istoty i istnienia*, volume 2, Warszawa 1978.

[5] F. W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii*, volume 2, Warszawa 1988, p. 31.

[6] Ibidem.

menting the Society of Jesus by the Spanish Republic on 23 February 1932. Since then Hellín had to lecture abroad – at first in Portugal (1932–1934) then in Belgium (1934–1938). He did not return to Spain, more specifically to Durango, until 1938. Following the end of the Spanish civil war, he began lecturing on philosophy in Chamartín (1939–1955). In 1955 he was finally transferred to Madrid where he died on 1 August 1973 after a surgery intervention. He was 90 years old.

Discussing Hellín's article, we must remember that it was originally intended for a publication in a dictionary, that is why such elements as: Suárez's biography, its influence, the concept of the human soul or the philosophy of law were only outlined by the author, as his entire intellectual effort focused on deliberations on metaphysics, specifically on the opposition and relationship between the finite and indefinite existence, and the created and creating existence.

Suarezianismus is divided into four parts. The first part, which Hellín purposefully shortened and condensed, has a historical character and illustrates the fundamental and the most important events in Suárez's life, his influence on later scholasticism and the rise of the new philosophy. In relation to this philosophy the author stated that Suárez's thought had not been reflected in the ideas propagated by the modern and contemporary philosophy.[7] Hellín indicated also the rightness of the Decadence and the decline of suarezianism.

The second and the most elaborate part of Hellín's article concerns Suárez's metaphysics and is carefully analysed in the second part of my article.

The third part is dedicated to the issue of the human soul which, according to Suárez, constitutes a substantial form of the body and the human being. Here, the author also analysed the basic epistemological assumption of Suárez's philosophy, the assumption which was to live up to simplicity, clarity, and empiricism required by the new epoch. According to this assumption, mind distinguishes individual existence as superior and has direct access to such an existence. This stance is termed "epistemological singularism".

The subject matter of the fourth and the last part of the article is Suarez's concept of ethics, politics, and law. According to Suárez, both ethics and politics are born from natural law which as such is rational, for it is founded in God and takes part in His invariability. In reference to state

[7] Jose Hellín, *Suarezianismus...*, op. cit., p. 193.

policy Suárez stated that God directly entrusts a political community with power; the community, in turn, chooses its representative so that he/she could care for its interests. If the person who was entrusted with power disappoints the community and betrays the imperative of common interest, he/she can be deprived of power and severely punished. After Suárez, there is also a transnational community which should follow the so-called human law. We should remember, as Hellín also pinpointed, that this was the philosophy of law that made Suárez popular. Nevertheless, preferring the concept of St. Thomas from Akwin to other philosophies, the Church turned away from Suárez after the encyclical by Leo XIII and a document issued by Pius X.

3. José Lasherasa Hellín's Interpretation of Suárez's Metaphysics

According to Hellín, the subject of Suárez's metaphysics is "existence as existence" understood as real existence realistically and notionally disregarding matter; thus, metaphysics focuses on the fundamental types of existence, which uses the same method to separate form matter (abstacción).

Suarez provides the notion of real existence shared by all. This notion should be described as something real and existing in an action or potency. "This notion is one." – Hellín wrote. "As it does not allow mind to find any diversity but at the same time it is imperfectly one and imperfectly disregards differences and modes which it already encompasses as the reason of being or existence. That is why, this is a transcendental notion which embraces the entire existence, the existence of each object to which it is applied or can be applied and which establishes the diversity of each object; as a result existence cannot be in different existence (entes) in the same way or in the unambiguous way but analogically through the analogy of internal attributes."[8] Nevertheless, Hellín claimed that we do not learn about the analogy of the notion through mere usage – we learn about it only if we assume that God exists and that all that was created essentially depends on Him; we learn about it if we assume that both "are similar in relation to raison d'être with simultaneous infinite dissimilarity."[9]

According to Hellín, Suárez, proving necessary existence *a posteriori*, at the same time specifies its quasi metaphysical essence which, according

[8] Ibidem, p. 194.

[9] Ibidem.

to the author of *Suarezianismus*, is not the self-contained nature but the Lasting Existence (Subsistente), Ipsum Esse[10]. From this predicate... – as Hellín concluded "[...] Suárez deducted quasi *a priori* all the attributes of God such as: unity, (unicidad) invariability and infinity. "Necessary Existence is through being, is one through being, and is invariable through being."[11] Infinity is deducted by Suárez the same way. Hellín said: "God is a creator of everything that exists and He can create everything that is internally possible, that is why, He necessarily and invariably includes the entire perfectness in an act."[12]

According to Hellín, in connection to Suárez's notion of the created existence, we should explain its origin, quasi metaphysical essence, and its essential properties.

Origin: In metaphysics Suarez assumed that everything that existed beyond God was created out of nothing: Hellín wrote: "Uncreated Existence is one and hence all that exists beyond it is created; otherwise, we would have two uncreated things."[13] Moreover, Hellín states that Suárez makes the permanence of existence in its being and its activity essentially dependant on the free act of God. "The necessity of the relationship between action and another action is founded in the fact that the created thing does not exist through being, so the creature has this deficit in its existence, permanence (en el existir), and its activity."[14]

Quasi Metaphysical Essence of a Creature In metaphysics Suárez rejects the real composition of existence blended from both being and existence. This thesis was then acquired and radicalized by the representatives of the scholastic philosophy current referring to Suárez's intellectual legacy, specifically to his metaphysics. The current is termed "suarezianism" and is characterised by radical essentialism, that is: "a doctrine seeking the main cognitive and ontic *principium* in a being, abolishing the real difference between the being and existence and reducing the entire existence (entitas) of a thing to the structure and determination of its essence."[15] As Hellín wrote: "The metaphysical essence of the creature consists neither in the real composition of the being and existence, nor in its finiteness, nor the

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Ibidem.

[13] Ibidem, p. 195.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] B. Paź, *Suarezianizm*, accepted for printing in: *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, volume IX, A. Maryniarczyk, Lublin 2008.

predicative interrelations called *mensurae et mensurati*, but consists in the radical relationship called also dynamic participation, another words casual participation; it also consists in the essential poverty of the creature which needs internal and essential influence of God as an exemplary cause (causa ejemplar), effective and final, in order to exist."[16]

Essential Properties (propiedades) Later on Hellín revealed the following essential properties of the created being deduced *a priori* by Suárez: contingency, finiteness, potency, variability, subordination to becoming, real composition of potency and act, infinite multitude of species (especies), the possibility of infinite number of individuals in all species, inborn tendency to manifest perfectness and glory of God from whom they come. Hellín wrote: "Thus the completeness of unity (Suma Unidad) is a beginning of the completeness of multiplicity (suma multiplicidad) and the completeness of multiplicity returns to the completeness of unity."[17]

Consequences In this deduction of properties Suárez established also other universal principles revealing relationships between the Existing Being (Ser Subsistente) and non-conditioned existence, and between the existence definitely dependant and conditioned existence. One of these principles indicates that the creature is actually identified with its existence in the created existence. "The radical relationship provides the distinction of reason (de razón) between both the creature and its existence but does not provide real distinction. God is Existence and Existence itself: the creature is determined through the internal relationship."[18] Moreover, Suárez rejects the assumption separating an act from potency, which is basic for Thomism and Aristotelianism. For Suárez only actual existence constitutes existence and only existence in act exists.

4. Conclusion

Undoubtedly, José Lasheras Hellín was a modern ambassador of suarezianism. He unceasingly spoke in defence of the scholastic mind and played a significant role in attempts to promote and modernize it. Although some of his statements presented herein may rise doubts and be controversial (e.g. in

[16] Jose Hellín, *Sobre el constitutivo esencial i diferencial de la creatura, in: Actas del IV Centenario del nacimiento de Francisco Suárez 1548–1948*, volume II., Burgos 1949–1950; volume I, pp. 251–290; Idem, *Sobre la limitacióndel acto por la potencia*: Las Ciencias, no. 16, Burgos 1951, pp. 325–365.

[17] Jose Hellín, *Suarezianismus...*, op. cit., p. 195.

[18] Ibidem, p. 195–196.

the case of Hellín's statement that Suárez's thought had no influence on the modern and contemporary philosophy and that "[...] the fundamental principles which served as the basis for Cartesianism, Kantism, subjectivism, idealism, pantheistic monism, and atheistic existentialism were rejected beforehand and opposed the entire context of Suárez's philosophy." I decided that one of his numerous articles was worth discussing and presenting to the Polish reader. Moreover, I think that this text, whose subject matter is the thought of such an eminent philosopher of the modern era philosophy, can contribute to fill the gap in the Polish philosophical literature.

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DESCARTES' *MEDITATIONS* IN THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM

1. Sceptical tradition before Descartes

Ancient scepticism was shaped as a special philosophical movement due to Pyrrho of Elis (IV–III B.C.), even if he had many antecedents (Heraclitus, Democritus, Socrates, Protagoras). Pyrrho's ethical scepticism inspired the heads of Plato's Academy Arcesilaus and Carneades. Plato's Academy was the centre of creative sceptical thought during several centuries (probabilistic scepticism IV–II B.C.). It was the second stage of ancient scepticism. Only when the Academy moved to Rome and Antiochus rejected scepticism, Plato's followers returned to their own tradition. Aenesidemus was discontented by this change and founded his own sceptical school in Alexandria, launching the third stage of ancient scepticism, later Pyrrhonism (I B.C.–II A.D.). His most important followers were Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus. Sextus' works are our basic source for ancient scepticism.[1]

Important even final stage of ancient scepticism was *Contra Academics* and other works by St. Augustine (354–430), who rejected sceptical arguments (knowledge does exists, for instance about my own existence, my feelings or other conscious contents and mathematical truths). After this reply radical scepticism was not heard many centuries in Europe. Medieval sceptics (nominalists of XIV century, like Wilhelm Ockham) did not deny human access to truth but only were proponents of fideism in the case of religious claims.

Scepticism revived in Renaissance when ancient texts were discovered, translated and became popular. *Outlines of Scepticism* by Sextus Empiricus

[1] See Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism* (transl. J. Annas and J. Barnes). Cambridge 1994; Richard Bett, *Pyrrho. His Antecedents and His Legacy*, Oxford 2000.

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"were read in France in the Middle Ages. One of Latin medieval translations of this treatise was found in the library of St. Victor monastery near Paris, the centre of mystical school famous in XII and XIII century, an important link in French scepticism development".[2] But only "in Renaissance together with other ancient writers, Sextus became lovely reading for intellectual elite".[3] Scepticism revived in XV and XVI century was settled in new Christian context. It was also different from medieval scepticism by knowledge of Pyrrhonian arguments reconstructed by Sextus. Both medieval and renaissance scepticism looked for help in fideism.

The renaissance sceptics are first of all Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) but also Pierre Charon (1541–1603), Francisco Sanchez (1552–1623) and others. There were even in XVII century sceptics inspired by Montaigne (Francis de La Mothe Le Mayer 1588–1672, Samuel Sorbiere 1615–1670, Pierre Daniel Huet 1630–1721 and Pierre Bayle 1647–1706). Essays by Montaigne alluded to *Sceptical Outlines* by Sextus and to *Soliloquies* by St. Augustine. It was "one of the most popular book in France and all intellectual modern Europe".[4] Also Descartes had to be imbued with Montaigne's scepticism. Montaigne represents modern scepticism, where ancient arguments against senses and reason are melted with Christian understanding the world (the misery of human mind) and enriched by renaissance experience (cosmological and geographical discoveries, the Reformation).[5]

I. Dąmbska studied the French scepticism influence on Descartes' *Meditations*. She stated that the influence was as great as the influence of medieval philosophy. But in both cases Descartes does not mention about his guiding spirits. "We can ask why Descartes does not mention and overtly discuss in *Meditations* any French sceptic of XVI and XVII century. He seems to conduct according to his permanent custom – often being remarked – the custom does not mention his antecedents and discuss only his direct critics. Actually, in this case the sceptical argumentation, repeating and developing ancient writers thought, belonged to common property of science, as *elementary* theorems of Euclidean geometry".[6] It is very probable that

[2] I. Dąmbska, *"Meditationes" Descartesa na tle sceptycyzmu francuskiego XVII wieku*, "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny", vol. XIX (1950), z. 1/2, p. 3.

[3] Ibidem.

[4] I. Dąmbska, *Sceptycyzm francuski XVI i XVII wieku*, Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, Toruń 1958, p. 24.

[5] See my paper *Michel de Montaigne jako sceptyk renesansowy*, in: P. Gutowski, P. Gut, *Z dziejów filozoficznej refleksji nad człowiekiem. Księga Pamiatkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Czerkawskiego (1939–2007)*, Lublin, Wydawnictwo KUL, 2007, pp. 195–211.

[6] I. Dąmbska, *Meditationes*, p. 20.

Montaigne and strong sceptical movement raised by him inspired Descartes to start his philosophy expressed later in *Meditations*.

2. Making scepticism deeper – two hypotheses

Before giving answer to renaissance scepticism, Descartes contributes to making sceptical arguments deeper and becomes one of important creator of sceptical history. The important place is just the first meditation of his *Meditations*, where we find two famous hypotheses: of dream and of evil demon.

First let us see how Descartes refers to sceptical arguments. Sceptical tradition is noticeable at the very beginning of the *Meditations* in the resolution to "withhold my assent from what is not fully certain and indubitable" (M I, 18)[7] and in statement that senses are deceptive and "prudence dictates that we should never fully trust those who have deceived us even once" (M I, 18). Descartes does not think highly of classical sceptical arguments. In replay to the *Second Objections* he writes: "Even though I had long ago seen several books on this subject composed by Academics and Sceptics, and therefore it was with some distaste that I found myself rehashing all this stuff, I could not dispense myself from devoting a whole Meditation to it" (O II, 130). We can hear in these words the aversion to sceptical literature, to repeating the old arguments. Scepticism is not a goal or a value for him but an obstacle to copy with. But, in the sixth meditation he uses ancient examples: "many experiences gradually undermined all the faith I had placed in the senses. For sometimes towers that from a distance seemed round appeared from close up as square; and giant statues perched on the top of those towers did not look particularly large to one gazing up from below" (M VI, 76). He adds the pain illusion argument: "I had often heard from people whose arm or leg had been amputed, that they still occasionally seemed to feel pain in the part of the body they were missing" (M VI, 77).

Ancient arguments are inconclusive according to Descartes, because perceptual illusions happen only in special circumstances, for instance where objects are small or remote. It is also difficult to deny what is the evident:

[7] Numbers in brackets refer to: René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies*, transl. by M. Moriarty, Oxford University Press 2008. Numbers in brackets refer to subsequent Meditations, Objections or Replies. Letter "M" refers to "Meditations", "O" refers to "Objections" and "R" refers to "Replies".

"that these hands themselves and this whole body are mine" (M I, 18; this argument will be repeated in XX century by G. E. Moore). The real danger for perceptual knowledge is the case of mad people (they see what does not exist). The mad people case leads Descartes to the dream hypothesis. He concedes: "in my dream I have all the same experiences as these madmen do when they are awake – or sometimes even stranger ones" (M I, 19). The dream representations are less clear but: "waking can never be distinguished from sleep by any conclusive indications" (M I, 19).

The dream hypothesis was presented previously in *Discourse on the Method* and it was know before Descartes, what Hobbes reproached him in the *Third Objections* (O III, 171). In fact, the problem to discern dream and reality worried Heraclitus, Plato in *Theaetetus*, Carneades, St. Augustine, ockhamist Petrus Aureolus, Montaigne and others. Descartes refers to this rather marginal part of sceptical tradition, but stresses its significance for the problem of our senses credibility. In fact, we can pass over particular cases of perception illusions, when we see the possibility that all of them can be not real but part of global dream. The dream hypothesis is Cartesian counterpart to traditional reasons against senses. And it is making them deeper, because we doubt not only the particular perception content but even the existence of empirical world. There was no philosopher before Descartes to give this hypothesis so important meaning and that is why we say that dream hypothesis is Cartesian hypothesis.

The next Descartes' contribution to scepticism development is the evil demon hypothesis. There is no trace of it in *Discourse on the Method* and this second hypothesis makes scepticism even deeper. Descartes remarks that dream hypothesis does not question the value of truths of reason like mathematical theorems. Arithmetic and geometry do not care whether their objects exist or are not real. What is only dreamt and possible has the same status as what is real. "Whether I am waking or sleeping, two plus three equals five, and a square has no more than four sides" (M I, 20).[8] But he observes a more serious possibility important both to the value of knowing by sense and reason. It is the evil God/demon hypothesis. If the God can do everything, if he is omnipotent, how we know that "he has not brought it about that there is no earth at all, no heavens, no extended things, no shape, no magnitude, no place – and yet that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? ...I too should be similarly deceived whenever I add two and three, or count the sides of a square" (M I, 21).

[8] See Plato, *Theaetetus* 190 B.

In the next step, Descartes observes that he must modify the hypothesis, because God as the source of the truth and the good should not be a deceiver. From now on Descartes says about evil demon instead of God deceiver. "Some evil spirit, supremely powerful and cunning, has devoted all his efforts to deceiving me" (M I, 22). In the third meditation he repeats: "whenever this preconceived opinion of God' supreme power occurs to me, I cannot help admitting, that, if indeed he wishes to, he can easily bring it about that I should be mistaken, even about matters that I think I intuit with the eye of mind as evidently as possible" (M III, 36). After constructing his hypothesis Descartes confess: "To all these arguments, indeed, I have no answer, but at length I am forced to admit that there is nothing of all those things I once thought true, of which it is not legitimate to doubt – and not out of any thoughtlessness or irresponsibility, but for sound and well-weighed reasons" (M I, 21). After discovering *cogito* he assess his hypothesis as weak, but even then he writes: "I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver; since, as long as I remain ignorant of this matter, I seem unable ever to be certain of any other at all" (M III, 36). We should remark that this hypothesis assumes what later Descartes will see as the evident: the existence of doubting ego and the existence of God.

The evil demon hypothesis has its source at Ockham and ockhamists. Ockham was deeply convinced about God's omnipotence and that is why he believed that "God can create the intuition of something that does not exist".[9] "If Aureolus supposes that God – if wants – can trigger in us sensual contents and images without any transcendental object as their counterpart, he moves in the circle of thought, that will be repeated in Descartes' first *Meditation*".[10] But the basic source of Cartesian hypothesis is the Christian concept of omnipotent God and the medieval current of voluntarism stressing the God's omnipotence even to negation of the law of contradiction.

With these two hypotheses Descartes creates the specific form of modern scepticism, other than ancient scepticism and contributes to making the sceptical problem deeper. First, Descartes added to ancient pure question "How do you know?" two serious reasons, why we may be deceived. The two hypotheses make the sceptical doubts serious. Doubts are not baseless, but now have clear reasons. Second, ancient sceptics questioned the properties of things; Descartes started to question their existence. Ancient

[9] E. Gilson, *Historia filozofii chrześcijańskiej w wiekach średnich*, PAX, Warszawa 1987, p. 436.

[10] I. Dąmbska, *Meditationes*, op. cit., p. 9.

people assumed the existence of the world as something evident; Descartes compares the world to dream and asks himself, what existence I can be certain. "If I dream that I, for instance, walk in the forest, my mistake is not the belief that the forest is green but the belief that the forest exists when it does not".[11] Jerzy Szymura aptly writes that ancient scepticism was scepticism about properties, universals (what something is?), and modern scepticism is about existence (does something exists?).[12] Thanks to Descartes the arguments for scepticism increased in their strength. But there are some reasons to ask whether Descartes was any serious sceptic. We move to the question of methodical scepticism.

3. Methodical scepticism

Descartes clearly declares his sceptical doubts ("there is nothing of all those things I once thought true, of which it is not legitimate to doubt" M I, 21) but according to some critics he is not sincere. "It became common, in accordance with Descartes himself suggestion, that two first meditations are original methodological trick and the concept of the Cartesian that is methodological scepticism was created. The method was to accept, on principle, normative scepticism that is using the basic directive *epoché* towards all judgments about reality, even evidently forcing on us. The suspension should last until formulating axiom that can not be denied without contradiction. Only such a priori and necessary axiom could be the base to reconstruct infallible philosophical system".[13] But according to Dąmbska, in XVII century scepticism was so serious trend that rejecting its arguments was necessary to avoid the name dogmatist. We can not say that Cartesian doubting was faked. W. Augustyn claims that Cartesian scepticism was not methodical but epistemological. It is not scepticism pretended but "taking negative stance towards particular cognitive results".[14]

Descartes like ancient sceptics accepts scepticism as a rule of acting. Because we can doubt everything and evil demon can exist, Descartes decides to treat his beliefs as if they were "false and imaginary" (M I, 22).

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[11] F. Alquié, *Kartezjusz*, PAX, Warszawa 1989, p. 77.

[12] J. Szymura, *"Adeaquatio intellectus et rei" w świetle dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem semantycznym*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne", vol. 53, nr 2, p. 248.

[13] I. Dąmbska, *Meditationes*, op. cit., p. 19.

[14] Compare W. Augustyn, *Podstawy wiedzy u Descartesa i Malebranche'a*, PWN, Warszawa 1973, p. 21.

"I will try...eliminating everything in which there is the smallest element of doubt, exactly as if I had found it to be false through and through; and I shall pursue my way until I discover something certain; or, failing that, discover that it is certain only that nothing is certain" (M II, 24). So, Descartes takes sceptic reasons seriously but he does not exclude discovering truth. He uses "hyperbolic doubting", writes Alquié,[15] to protect himself against false. He decides to treat the dubious as the false. He doubts with overcautiousness. This extreme doubting is apt to so ambitious goal as achieving certain knowledge. Answering to sceptical arguments Descartes uses the strategy of seeking certainty like St. Augustine. The Cartesian result decided that his scepticism turned out to be methodical only and passing. It seems that Descartes at the beginning of his philosophy was ready to accept every rational, even sceptical, conclusion.

Methodical scepticism is, as Dąmbska aptly writes, a kind of normative one. Just in modern times scepticism ceases to be a stance in practical philosophy. Descartes is a practical sceptic yet but in a specific form. He takes the scepticism as a method of theoretical thinking but not a method of life, wisdom for life. He writes "my concern at the moment is not with action but only with the attainment of knowledge" (M I, 22). In replies to second objections he reminds us the difference between the need of life and the truth contemplation (R II, 149). It is obvious to him that scepticism can not be the philosophy of life and acting, what D. Hume will stress (ancient sceptics were contended with the charge of impossibility of acting). Descartes rejects the ancient and Montaigne scepticism as the wisdom for life. Scepticism has for him theoretical use, as the method to clean the searching field and the method to test judgments.

Methodical scepticism comprises both dream and evil demon hypothesis. "I will think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds, and all external things are no different from illusions of our dreams, and that they are traps he has laid for my credulity; I will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, and no senses, but yet as falsely believing that I have all these" (M I, 23). There is here both dream and evil demon activity.

The particular domain for doubting is the sense perception. It is psychologically hard to doubt in the value of whole own knowing, especially knowing by reason what is necessary to conduct thinking. Cartesian doubting is theoretical, based on rational grounds (hypotheses) and we can see

[15] Compare F. Alquié, op. cit., p. 72.

that he tries to break his natural psychological inclinations: "I shall now close my eyes, I shall block up my ears, I shall divert all my senses, and I shall even delete all bodily images from my thought" (M III, 34).

Descartes is a kind of philosopher who strongly believes that discovering truth is possible. But at the beginning of his philosophy he is a sincere sceptic (ready to accept sceptical conclusion) and a creative sceptic (he creates radical and original sceptical arguments).

4. An attempt to answer scepticism

Cartesian sceptical doubting was stopped by discovering subject's own existence. After all, doubting needs the existence of doubting subject. "Certainly I did exist, if I convinced myself of something" (M II, 25). "I also exist, if he is deceiving me ... he will never bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think I am something" (M II, 25). After rejecting the evil demon hypothesis he boldly says: "this proposition, 'I am, I exist', whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in my mind, is necessarily true" (M II, 25). Knowing one's own existence turns out to be immune to the evil demon hypothesis. The dream hypothesis has here little significance and it can easily be rejected by the same move: "I exist – even if I am always asleep" (M II, 29).[16]

The next stage is the gradual regaining the knowledge previously under sceptical doubting. At the beginning of third *Meditation*, before the argument for God's existence, Descartes states the criterion of truth and rejects the power of evil demon against the clear and distinct perception. "I am certain that I am a thinking thing. But do I not therefore also know what is required in order for me to be certain of something? For in this first act of knowledge [cognitione] there is nothing other than a clear and distinct perception... I seem already to be able to lay down, as a general rule, that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true" (M III, 35). Clear and distinct judgments receive the guarantee of truth before the proof of existence of truthful God is constructed. Descartes admits his mistake: "In fact, when I later judged that such things should be doubted, this was only because the thought had come to me, that perhaps some God might endowed me with such a nature that I could be deceived even about those

[16] Again, Descartes does not refer to his antecedents. The discovery of own existence was made by St. Augustine (Sol. 2, 1–1; DC 11, 26). Arnauld already noticed this resemblance (O IV, 198).

things that appeared supremely obvious" (M III, 36). Now he writes: "Let whoever can, deceive me as much as he likes: still he can never bring it about that I am nothing, as long as I think I am something ... or that perhaps two plus three added together are more or less than five; or that other such things should be true in which I recognize an obvious contradiction" (M III, 36).

We observes that Descartes in his third Meditation withdraws the evil demon hypothesis as applicable to clear and distinct (evident) perception. If his own existence was discovered without God's guarantee, the same is right towards all evident judgments. So, the criterion of truth (what is clear and distinct) is not dependent on God's truthfulness.[17] In the first Meditation even evident perception was in danger of evil demon, in the third Meditation Descartes changes his mind and withdraws this danger. In reply to objections we find confirmation: God's guarantee is needed when we use memory (for instance during complicated reasoning) and when we use senses (always without clarity and distinctness). After discovering his criterion of truth, the evil demon hypothesis is called weak base for doubting (III, 36). "Whatever is shown to me by the natural light (for instance, that, from the fact that I am doubting, it follows that I exist, and suchlike) can in no way be doubtful, because there can be no other faculty that I could trust as much as this light" (M III, 38).

In this way Descartes finds some means to know God. It is intuitive knowledge like knowledge about first principles. "From the bare fact that I exist, and that in me there is an idea of a supremely perfect being, that is God, it is proved beyond question that God also exists" (M III, 51). One cannot think about "God without existence (that is, to think of the supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection)" (M V, 67). These and other arguments look like proofs but they are in fact several ways to put us on the right track to intuition of God existence.

Next problem is the existence and knowability of the external world. After presenting argumentation for the existence of God, Descartes finally removes the evil demon hypothesis, early limited to non-evident knowing. "It cannot happen that he should ever deceive me; for in all deceit and trickery some element of imperfection is to be found" (M IV, 53). Truthfulness of God guarantees the world existence and principal knowability. We can be sure the existence of material things and what we can know clearly about them (see M VI, 80). The rest of our beliefs are not certain but owing

[17] See J. Czerkawski, *Istnienie świata materialnego w filozofii N. Malebranche'a*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne", vol. 50 (2002), p. 76.

God's truthfulness they are credible. "Although I do not think that all that senses seem to teach me is to be rashly accepted, I do not think that it should all be called in doubt" (M VI, 78).

4. Some critics

The basic objection to Descartes, formulated already by the authors of the *Objections*, is unclear relation between clear and distinct knowledge and God's guarantee (the suspicion of vicious circle). We can be certain that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, only if God exists, and we can be certain that God exists, only because we clearly perceive it (see O II, 125; O IV, 245). Descartes in *Replies* denies that all knowledge depends on knowing God. "For the knowledge [*notitia*] of principles is not usually called 'scientific knowledge' by logicians. But when we realize we are thinking things, this is a first notion not derived from any syllogism. And, when someone says, *I am thinking, therefore I am, or exist*, he is not deducing existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as known directly [*per se notam*] by a simple intuition of the mind" (R II, 140). And he adds that there are things so evident and simple that "we can never think of them without believing them to be true: for instance, that while I am thinking, I exist; that what has once happened, cannot not have happened, and suchlike" (R II, 145). A. Arnauld (O IV, 214) repeats the vicious circle accusation. "The sentence 'all known clearly and distinctively is true' is based on God truthfulness but the sentence stating God existence has its ground in the previous sentence; so we have here *circulus vitiosus*".[18] Descartes gives short answer that we need discern "between what we clearly perceive in actual fact and what we remember we once clearly perceived" (R IV, 246). God is to be needed only in the second case. The knowledge of own existence and knowledge about God is to be like knowledge about first principles. These three kinds of knowledge are prerequisite to know other things. They are rather intuition or a sequence of intuitions than some discourse employing memory.

In *Meditations* we have some problems with the status of clear and distinct intuitions and this is the source of so called Cartesian circle problem.[19]

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[18] S. Swieżawski, *Słowo wstępne*, in: Rene Descartes, *Medytacje o pierwszej filozofii. Zarzuty uczonych mężów i odpowiedzi Autora. Rozmowa z Burmanem*, Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk, 2001, p. 18.

[19] Compare J. Czerkawski, *Zagadnienie punktu wyjścia w filozofii N. Malebranche'a*, "Roczniki Filozoficzne", t. 42 (1994), p. 104.

In the first Meditation Descartes doubts in the value of evident intuitions (clear and distinct) on the ground the demon. The example is mathematical theorem "two and three equals five". In the second meditation Descartes discovers the certainty of his own existence and at the beginning of the third Meditation, before discovering God's existence, he states the criterion of truth as clear and distinct perception. Thus he restores the power of mathematical knowledge. The turning point was the discovery of *cogito*. This discovery limited the scope of the evil demon hypothesis. This is rather development of Descartes thought than any contradiction.

The problem is that later in fifth Meditation Descartes writes that evident knowledge is dependent on God: "Once I have perceived that God exists, then because I grasped at the same time that everything else depends on him, and that he is no deceiver, and from this I deduced that everything I clearly and distinctly perceive is necessarily true" (M V, 70). "I plainly see that certitude and truth of all knowledge [*scientiae*] depends on the knowledge [*cognitione*] of the true God alone: so much so, that before I had discovered his knowledge, I could have no perfect knowledge [*scire*] of anything else at all" (M V, 71).

We should not rather say that only knowledge about external world is dependent on God (that would be consistent). Descartes says clearly that all knowledge is dependent. But early he said that clear knowledge even in a dream is true: "even if I were sleeping, if something is evident to my understanding, then it is altogether true" (M V, 71).

One way to avoid inconsistency is to distinguish the order of being (creatures depend on their Creator) and the order of knowing (evident knowledge must be confirm by truthful God). Descartes in the fifth Meditation could write about the ontological dependency but not necessarily about the epistemological one. Next way to avoid vicious circle is to assume that *cogito* and knowing God is intuitive (in fact Descartes was not clear to distinguish intuition and inference both in the case of *cogito* and in the case of the existence of God). "Ego and God reveal as beings directly (even if incompletely), however they are not proved by discourse and conceptualised. They are only truths that can go without God's truthfulness guarantee. Descartes often say that mathematical and logical truths need God's guarantee but he never say about the guarantee stating *cogito* or God himself. On the contrary, *cogito* is stated when God is assumed as deceiver and despite evil demon".[20]

[20] F. Alquie, op. cit., p. 111.

Actually, all intuitive knowing by reason gain its status by resemblance to *cogito*. *Cogito* resisted the evil demon hypothesis when mathematical knowledge was defeated by it. But, against Alquié, later Descartes treats both mathematical knowledge and *cogito* as the same type of evidence (see M III, 36). W. Augustyn analysing Cartesian grounds for knowledge concludes that Cartesian evidence was based on "the impossibility to deny the statement without nonsense".[21] According to him this is the real criterion of evidence and certainty. Descartes uses this criterion to defend his own existence and it is suitable to mathematical knowledge. We must agree that such criterion was able to guarantee the absolute certainty and impossibility to turn out the statement false. "Clarity and distinctness are so necessary conditions for stating certainty of some knowledge, but they are not sufficient conditions."[22] W. Augustyn also rightly remarks that the author of *Meditations* already before the discovery *cogito* in practice takes self-consciousness data as infallible. He uses them unknowingly to negative valuation of sense perception and to formulate sceptical hypotheses.[23]

Next objection directed to Descartes was week analogy between *cogito* and other statement recognized as clear and distinct. According to Gassendi "the principle 'the true is what we know clear and distinct' is subjective".[24] We must concede that knowing own existence is self-verifying (if I ask whether exist, I must exist). Similarly, to deny the simple a *priori* statement like "triangle has three sides" would lead to contradiction. But we can not say this about statement "I am thinking substance" when we mean metaphysical substance.

We would like to say that what is certain is only the existence of transcendental *ego* as a necessary condition for all knowledge but Descartes claims that certain is the existence of thinking substance, meaning soul containing reason, the faculty of imagination, will and consciousness.[25] Descartes can defend his criterion of truth when we assume his theory of "simple natures" and distinguishing the function of reason and will. The price is the limited application for such criterion. "Whenever in passing judgement I so keep my will under control that it confines itself to items clearly and

[21] W. Augustyn, op. cit., p. 24.
[22] Ibidem, p. 28.
[23] Ibidem, p. 22.
[24] S. Swieżawski, op. cit., p. 19.
[25] Compare F. Alquie, op. cit., p. 88–89.

distinctly represented to it by the intellect, it certainly cannot come about that I should make a mistake" (M IV, 62). He concedes that "the necessities of action do not always allow us the opportunity for such a thorough examination" (M VI, 90).

Let us pass over objections by Caterus, Gassendi and others concerning the conclusiveness the proof for the existence of God. As we have already said, Descartes takes knowing God as a kind of intuition, equal to knowing first principles. "One can not think about anything without thinking at the same time about thinking mind and one can not think about our limited mind without thinking about God".[26]

The more important problem is that even truthful God could have "his own reason for deceiving us"[27] for our good, like a doctor with his patients or a father with his children (O II, 126). Descartes thinks that great metaphysical illusion would deny God's truthfulness but not some local illusions. We should agree with critics that when we seek absolute certainty and when such rigorous criteria for knowledge were established, we should keep their obeying. However Descartes weakens criteria for evidence (he can not know clearly the reasons of unlimited being) and this is his way to avoid sceptical conclusion.

Next matter is the status of *cogito*. Bourdin writes that *cogito* can be a part of dream. Descartes answers that there is no possibility of mistake in the knowledge of one's own thoughts because a thought and our thinking about it is the same thing. "The first thought, by which we become aware of something, differs no more from the second thought by which we become aware that we have become aware of it" (R VII, 559). The same strategy to defend the certainty in self-consciousness developed in XIX century F. Brentano in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. According to him the ground of certainty is strict unity between conscious act and its knowing. The unity excludes the interruption of evil demon and the threat of regresses in knowing. Similar Cartesian way to break scepticism and justify the existence of world took also E. Husserl in *Cartesian Meditations*. The certainty of one's own existence was limited to transcendental *ego*, being no part of the world but the condition of its existence for subject. Later discussion about the value of self-consciousness data showed that distance in time and structure and the medium of social language do not allow for certainty. There is no sentence reporting any current conscious state and

[26] Compare F. Alquie, op. cit., p. 99.

[27] R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981, p. 202.

being absolutely certain.[28] That is why *cogito* can not be considered to be an example of absolute certain truth and knowledge (denying scepticism). But we can use cogito, as Descartes in the *Meditations*, to rebut sceptical doubt (if I doubt, I exist).

Descartes sought some help for *cogito* in God's truthfulness, like St. Augustine and Malebranche in God's illumination. Contemporary theories of consciousness are reluctant to look for such help and that is why they had to resign to the lack of certainty. Recently the Cartesian way to answer scepticism was questioned but the Cartesian hypotheses are still pattern for radical scepticism.

5. Contemporary versions of Cartesian hypotheses

Descartes as the author of evil demon hypothesis is the hero in contemporary philosophical literature on scepticism. Declared sceptic P. Unger writes that he wants to play the role of contemporary Descartes. He considers evil demon hypothesis as classical and constructs its modern version based on recent knowledge and *science-fiction* literature. Evil demon was replaced here by evil scientist.[29] Let us take any belief about world, for instance the believing there to be rocks. Let us imagine that it is false belief triggered in a subject by an evil scientist.

"This scientist uses electrodes to induce experiences and thus carries out his deceptions, concerning the existence of rocks or anything else. He first drills holes painlessly in the variously coloured skulls, or shells, of his subjects and then implants his electrodes into the appropriate parts of their brains, or protoplasm, or systems. He sends patterns of electrical impulses into them through the electrodes, which are themselves connected by wires to a laboratory console on which he plays, punching various keys and buttons in accordance with his ideas of how the whole thing works and with his deceptive designs".[30]

The hypothesis takes part in a following argument: (1) if you know that there are rocks, and then you can know that there is no such scientist doing this to you (triggering you to believe that there are rocks). (2) No

[28] See my paper *Intuicja przeżywania*, "Przegląd Filozoficzny" Nowa Seria 1993, no. 2, p. 71–8 and *Samoświadomość i samowiedza z punktu widzenia epistemologii*, "Analiza i Egzystencja", no. 7 (2008).

[29] P. Unger, *Ignorance. A Case for Scepticism*, Clarendon Press. Oxford 1975, p. 7–8.

[30] P. Unger, op. cit., p. 7.

one can ever know this. So, (3) you never know that there are rocks. After generalisation we get sceptical thesis: nobody ever know anything about the external world.[31] Similar consequence for knowledge about past has B. Russell's hypothesis that our world was created five minutes ago.

The most famous versions of Cartesian hypothesis are created by R. Nozick and H. Putnam. In 1981 both (colleges at Harvard) published books demonstrating scepticism by new hypothesis. Nozick writes that he was inspired by *science fiction* literature and Putnam writes that he was inspired by Nozick. Nozick referring to Descartes constructs the evil scientist or brain-in-a-vat hypothesis. "You think you are seeing these words, but could you not be hallucinating or dreaming or having your brain stimulated to give you the experience of seeing these marks on paper although no such thing is before you? More extremely, could you not be floating in a tank while super-psychologists stimulate your brain electrochemically to produce exactly the same experience as you are now having, or even to produce the whole sequence of experiences you have had in your lifetime thus far? If one of these other things was happening, your experience would be exactly the same as it now is. So how can you know none of them is happening?"[32]

Putnam's version turned to be most popular and most frequently quoted. "Imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person's brain (your brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerves endings hale been connected to a super-scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc; but really all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses traveling from the computer to the nerve endings".[33] Contemporary discussions on scepticism are totally dominated by this hypothesis which is modern version of evil demon hypothesis created by Descartes.

Descartes has important place in the history of scepticism. He is the model of modern sceptic, who established conditions for knowledge impossible to fulfil. His hypotheses turned to be more convicting than his original answer to scepticism (highly inspiring for all modern philosophical systems). Let us stress the meaning of this answer, following Alquié: Descartes help

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[31] Ibidem, p. 8.

[32] R. Nozick, op. cit., p. 167.

[33] H. Putnam, *Brains in a Vat*, in: H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge Univ. Press, New York 1981, p. 5–6.

us to understand that our existence is the most certain truth and that our consciousness should not be the victim of its own hypotheses.[34]

Abstract

Descartes started his philosophy when scepticism was very popular in France (M. de Montaigne's followers). Meditations are under influence of sceptical tradition even if Descartes does not mention it. His methodical scepticism was very serious in fact (the threat of sceptical conclusion was real). Descartes made the traditional sceptical reasons deeper by constructing two hypotheses: of dream and evil demon. He stopped sceptical doubting by discovering his own existence and tried to rescue the rest of human knowledge. There are many critical remarks about his answer to his own sceptical hypotheses. Descartes' role in the history of scepticism is the role of the author of evil demon hypothesis (recently modified as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis).

[34] Por. Alquié, op. cit., p.106. In contemporary Polish literature S. Judycki continues the Cartesian way to seek certainty in ontological proof as the only way to answer scepticism. See S. Judycki, *Sceptycyzm i dowód ontologiczny*, "Analiza i Egzystencja", no. 1 (2005), pp. 9–29. Similarly L. Kołakowski claims that if there is no God, the concept of truth is out of sense. There is no epistemological absolute without ontological absolute. But he denies the possibility to achieve certainty by humans. See L. Kołakowski, *Husserl and the Search for Certitude*, New Haven, Yale University Press 1975.

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JOY ACCORDING TO DESCARTES AND SPINOZA

There are few images of Descartes and Spinoza that survived to the modern times. The portrait of the first of the two, the author of theories nearly stripping us of any hopes of ever becoming free from the influence of affections marring the clear thoughts, displays a carefully posed man looking at us. He seems to be effortfully surpressing an almost rougish smile, as though he had performed an amusing practical joke just a moment ago. The second one, teaching that our action (power, essence) is synonymous with joy, looks forward with a melancholy-filled stare. Spinoza's faint smile appears to fade as we move our sight up his face, from chin to forehead. Could it be that both men found joy troublesome?

It is not possible to present all variations of this affect, more numerous than the subjects of the senses. Therefore, this article will concentrate on the most characteristic qualities of joy, underlined by both philosophers.

In the treatise *Passions of the Soul* it is not *res cogitans*, but *l âme* (lat. *Anima*), the resident of corpus pineal, that is subjected to the unsettling and unhingering feelings, *affections*[1] caused my the movement of the life breaths in the body. These experiences are blurred and hard to capture discoveries by nature, very hard to comprehend due to "the alliance between the soul and the body".[2] Descartes does not describe the soul as a substance, as he called the bodies and the minds before. The way it affects the mind

[1] Terms such as *affection* written in italics are used in a technical sense according to the way they appear in the works of Descartes and Spinoza and should be distinguished from the common use in everyday language.

[2] R. Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, art. XXVIII (= PS; all the quotations from the translation based on the 1650 London edition of an unknown translator available from http://net.cgu.edu/philosophy/descartes/Passions_Part_Two.html). It can be assumed that the unclear description results from the nature of the discovery itself and the limitations of speech, incapable of giving a name to such subtle and beforehand unknown phenomena.

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and body can be compared to the function of the blister of air in a mason's level, regulating the mutual location of both portions of the liquid in a glass tube. Together with the "drop" of air they create a whole without touching each other, and whatever befalls one of them is immediately displayed in the movement and the position of the other.

The reading of *Passions...* on the soul tells us that it feels and experiences, but it does not cognize. Ideas, as Descartes puts it, being *"similar to images of things"*, are subjected to the mental powers and it is *mens*, not *anima*, that conceptualises, claims, denies, wants and does not want, and even imagines. The soul, much like the mind, *percieves*, although not as clearly and vividly as the latter, and not the ideas, but motions of the "animal spirits". They are shaking it, and the intellect recognises their kinds by experiencing the movements in the soul and realises what it feels, conceptualising the proper terms. There is a long way from naming a sensation and understanding its source to realising its nature and what this knowledge can be used for, however.

Explaining its complication, Descartes calls upon the theory of distinction and hierarchy of the functions of the mind. Established in *Meditations* and repeated in *Passions of the Soul*, it claims that "...there remains nothing in us which we ought to attribute to our soul, unless our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some actions of the soul, others, her passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills because we experimentally find they come directly from our soul and seem to depend on nought but it. As on the contrary, one may generally call her passions all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us because oftimes our soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she always receives things as they are represented to her by them."[3]

According to the definition, the affects of the soul are "apprehension, resentments, or emotions of the soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits."[4] The phrase *attributed to it* isn't a fortunate one; in fact, apprehensions or emotions are *are found already present in it*. The soul notices their presence in itself, but does not capture the moment of their occurrence, and the search for their causes is the occupation of the mind. Therefore the *Passions...* claim that the *anima* is passive, subjected to emotions.

Commonly, in spite of this theory, the soul is attributed with a capacity to take action. Descartes explains it as a custom, according to which it was

[3] PS, art. XVII.

[4] PS, art. XXVII.

an usual practice to create a name for what is more "noble" and include in it also what is more common. That is why the soul is said to act, although *in fact it experiences* actions (therefore we accept an error to respect a custom). Such a troublesome image in language will make a proper expression of philosophical ideas more difficult more than once.

Descartes attempts to make a clear distinction between the fields of the will and the mind. In *Principles of Philosophy* and *Meditations* the intellect is a passive function; it receives the ability to perceive (*perceptio*), to feel, to imagine and to purely understand, its feeling is *certainty*. In opposition to it the will, an active and "superior" resort of the mind that wants, and therefore desires, despises (does not want), claims, denies and *doubts*. The fact of acceptance of the superiority of the will over the intellect tells a lot of Descartes' understanding of the human nature. The rule that *"The active" is better than "the passive"* is undeniable; when related to the mental powers, however, it would be hard to admit that a doubt as an act of will could be more perfect than the most enlightened grasp of the truth by a passive intellect. Everyday experience shows how reluctantly the will affirms or rejects judgments clearly put in the natural light of the mind as true, how commonly we choose the worse, even knowing the better.

When does the mind experience *joy*, the *passive state* of the soul? Is it possible to cause it by an act of will and, thus having changed one's mood, strengthen the natural light of the reason, see the world brighter and notice only its limitations, but also the possibilities it offers to us? What is it and what conditions does it depend on? Answering these questions requires certain initial establishments.

Let the first one be the *"rule of relativity"* introduced in the first article of *Passions of the Soul*, claiming that what is an action towards one thing is an experience in relation to another. It makes an axis of considerations on the processes taking part in the uneven gland placed in the middle of the brain, where the movement of the spirits presents the soul with indifferent or emotion-rising sensations and motions of the body.[5] The soul is a unity, it does not consist of parts; "the same which is sensible is rational",[6] the impulses are desires to it, depending on what they are directed at. It can be assumed that the intellect is a soul *picking up on* the contents of the perceptions and does not differ from the will, or the soul governing the perceptions, in any other way than by the very way of relating to the subjects

[5] PS, art. XLVII.

[6] Ibid.

of thinking. Being a unity, the soul is unable to change the movement of the animal spirits awakening its feelings by an act of will – it is therefore not possible to cause joy in oneself by the "demand" of will.

The second establishment concerns the *object* of the consideration. The "rule of relativity" enables us to limit the analysis to the passive states of mind and reasoning about the processes taking part in the body basing on it. The first part of the treatise includes a physiological model of occurrence of affects and substantiates the next establishment, according to which "the principal effect of all the passions in men is, they incite and dispose their souls to will the things for which they prepare their bodies so that the resentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldness, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest."[7]

The considerations on joy can be found most of all in the 2nd part of *Passions of the Soul*. Descartes underlines that the sensations caused by the subjects of the senses are not connected to the qualities of those things, but to their malevolence or their usefulness to the body. Joy is not therefore the final accomplishment of the efforts of the mind or its objective, but a mean leading to a more important end – a certain gain. The feeling of joy should sign the *presence* of what is related to our well-being and direct the will, conditioning the body to an appropriate course of action. Other affects shaking the souls might, however, enfeeble the force of will and weaken its influence on our behavior. In general, though, the sensations help distinguishing between important and non-consequent perceptions and make us prone to and endurant pursuit of what is profitable to us.

The intellect and the will, in their search for subjects beneficient to the body are exposed to three primal, and possible only to them, experiences. The soul is therefore shaken by six basic affects:

- astonishment, love and hatred (experiences of the intellect),
- desire, joy and sadness (feelings of the will).

All of them are by character observations, sensations (in an sensoric sense of the word) or affections caused, supported and reinforced by the movement of the animal spirits.[8] Since the will does not learn but decide (in the extreme cases *doubts*), its actions, and possibly also experiences, are conditioned by the intellectual processes.

Describing the origins of joy, Descartes says that joy awakens in us under the impact of considering the current good, imagined as our own

[7] PS, art. XL.

[8] PS, art. XXVII.

(analogically, imagining our own evil and considering it as a "current" one causes sadness to the soul). It will be prudent to return to this thesis on an occasion; for now, it can be noticed that *without consideration* and *imagination* the feelings of the soul would be merely unvaried observations, rising the astonishment of the intellect at best. Before the joy sets in, the will needs to experience *desire* (*cupiditas* or *appetitus*), directed towards the object shown by the intellect. It also creates the awareness of "myself". The lack of self-consciousness makes the experiences characteristic for the will impossible, and even excludes its activity. In an animal, the will is replaced by instincts. What, on the other hand, happens in the soul of a small baby, whose intellect does not yet evolve an awareness of its own existence? It should be reasoned that it is not capable of joy or sadness, and the experiences of its "will" are limited to the appetition.

A human is overjoyed not only by his *own* good. Joy can be caused by a view that "things fall out as they should do",[9] even if the course of events concerns other people. The role of the intellect and its experiences, *astonishment* and *love*, in the creation of such a feeling becomes even more visible. When good befalls someone we *consider* worthy of it, and evil reaches the one who – as we *believe* – deserves it, we experience joy because our vision of the world order has been confirmed; the *mind* knows what course of events should be, and the world admits *it* to be correct. A joy overwhelming us with the news of the goodness of the world befalling the *good* is written to be *serious* – not accompanied by laughter. It will make its appearance when evil catches up with someone we *believe* to have deserved it. The joy of a punished evil shakes the mind stronger than the previous one – the laughter, similarly to the mockery, is an affect engaging the body. The mockery is born in the intellect, as a matter of fact, but it is accounted as an affect for the very reason of moving the body and appears in it by voice, facial expression, gesture and the inability to "bite one's tongue".

Both the serious and the mocking joy has its source in the *intellectual* satisfaction of the subject who realises s/he knows how things should be, how they really are and – most importantly – who is aware *s/he knows about that.* Its narcisstic feature is caused by *love* as an affect of the intellect, directed towards the same subject discovering its own proficiency and experiencing an "inward satisfaction, which is the sweetest of all the passions".[10]

The description of the origins of the affects and their ties to the states of body are not enough to provide with ways of subjugating them. It is also

[9] PS, art. LXII.

[10] PS, art. LXIII.

important to know what they are, how they are connected to the subjects of the senses, what their dynamics and strength depend on. This knowledge is expressed among others by the definitions of the passions of the soul. *Joy* is "a pleasing emotion of the soul, wherein consists her enjoyment of good that the impressions of the brain represent unto her as her own".[11] Here, however, we come to a doubt.

The description of the origins of joy mentioned above spoke of an existent good, *imagined* (not perceived) *as one's own*. In this situation the will, always directed towards the future, *may desire it* – the touching of the intellect (consideration, imagination) according to the "theory of relativity" will appear in it as an appetition or desire. On the other hand, the definiton of joy underlines the joy from good, *presented* to the soul *as its own*. When we keep the intellectual aspect of the soul ("the intellect recognises good as its own") in mind, and ask about its will, it will turn out to be oblivious – it has no reason to desire something that is a subject to the soul. The affect will not start and will not move the will.

Cupiditas and *appetitio* throw the will out of immobility; is it aware, however, what it experiences – joy or sadness? The soul is unified, as the intellect it makes itself aware of the kind of feeling and knows whether joy merely overtakes it (*yoje, qui est une passion*), or it is a sensation included into a reflection, a purely intellectual joy (*la yoje purement intellectuelle*).[12]

What would a purely intellectual joy be? Descartes realises that, according to his theory, the soul, unlike the body, achieves practically no profit from its actions other than a pleasant emotion or enjoyment it feels when realising its own activity. The aims and movements of the body regard its well-being; what the soul achieves for itself, compared to the favours done to the body, is not much indeed.[13] This small bit is the intellectual joy – not a *passio*, but an *actus*, an act of the soul, originating "by the sole action (of the soul)"[14] and for that reason called "a pleasing emotion in her".[15]

In the state discussed here the soul does not regard any other object than itself, so the only good considered by it as *its own* may be *its action* only. The intellectual joy would not then fit – despite a common name –

[11] PS, art. XCI.

[12] PS, art. XCI, p. 90.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 91; see also art. CXLVII – being under the influence of a book or a play we experience various passions "but withal we take a delight to feel them excited in us and this delight is an intellectual joy, which may as well spring from sadness, as all the rest of the passions" (ibid.).

[15] PS, art. XCI.

into the category of an *affect of joy*, a passive state of the soul, dependent as all other affects on the movement of the life breaths. If it were to depend on them, it would be in a negative way only – when the motion is not too violent, the soul is able to direct its attention onto itself.

The first shaking of the intellect is, as it was said, astonishment. Thus moved, it can experience *love* or *hate*. Where does the idea of having the intellect experience "*purely intellectual joy*" come from, since joy belongs to the affects of *will*? It is self-cognition that seems to be the inspiration to such an re-ranking of the affects seems to be self-cognition. An *aware* experience of joy (as well as sadness) shows that the recognition of these sensations by the intellect indeed either brightens it, enhancing its functioning (possibly in an excessive fashion akin to bravado or mania), or disables it, pushing it into a state similar to dimming. Apart from that, joy and sadness have no power of *claiming* and repulsing, typical for desire, love and hate; those affects are more reminiscent of light or darkness, showing up in the mind when as the intellect *it understands that it understands*, or even when *the only thing it knows, is that it knows nothing*.

According to the mentioned rule of "one thing, two names" the *affect of joy* might be seen by the intellect as its own motion, shaking noted in the context of an influx of ideas filled with the content of sensoric observations or as an *act of the soul* called for that reason *will*. It is pleasant to act according to one's own rule, but less pleasant to be subjected to an action – the pure joy of the soul (perhaps a more proper phrase than "the intellectual joy") would be possible when it would always have all its objects "in itself" and could perceive those which the will currently wants to perceive. The object of the action and the "acting nature" would be then parts joined together by the force of love.

While the body is alive, such a unification remains unreachable, and in its place we experience a varied multiplity. The intellect grasps its parts and in a form of image-ideas places them at will's disposal. The mass and speed, with which they appear and disappear is a sheer earthquake to the mind, a hell of affects, a boiling mixture of astonishment, joy, anxiety, hope, desire and disgust, over which neither the idle reason nor the active will have any control. When everything goes the way it should not and nothing ends as it ought to, instead of joy, the mind experiences an "intellectual sadness". Descartes says – and he probably knows what he means – that it is not a feeling, but something accompanied by the feeling of sadness. To see its own im-potence is to a soul a state too unspecified, ambivalent, for will to lean towards *yes, I do want it* or *no, it is not what I want*, and at the same time not sufficiently aimed at the *entire relation* of its powers, to cause in

it the terror of an imminent madness. To watch itself drowning, but not be ridden of hope for rescue – it is the state in which the soul experiences sadness.

One of the peculiarities of the discussed theory of affects is a thesis that sadness and hate are feelings more *primal* and necessary than joy and love. By warning of dangers and helping to remove what is harmful to the body, they are more beneficial than joy and love. These latter make the life more perfect, but it is possible to exist without perfection, and all more so without the means leading to it.[16]

It could be asked whether an "unpleasant weakness" in the form of upset feelings we feel when we notice something bad or lacking in ourselves (it is an approximate way the sadness works) warns of something in itself and helps to get rid of anything or quite the opposite, directed not towards the future, but revealing the current state, does it not take away the strength necessary for dealing with lacking, removing what is bad – in other words, action? Are not the feelings of the sort of joy "foremost" in the sense they allow to survive an amount of time in sadness and hate thanks to a hope for turning the fate? Descartes convinces that joy (as well as feeling akin to it) "joy is *commonly* more hurtful than sadness, because this, enduing a man with reserve and wariness, does in some sort incline him to prudence, whereas the other render those who give themselves up thereunto inconsiderate and rash".[17] Sadness, angst and cautiousness certainly often accompany each other, it is doubtful, however, whether such a coincidence of experiences "makes one prone to be reasonable", or rather, when as a result of a habit they become permanent marks of one's soul, they do not turn into suspiciousness, a character trait. The conclusion saying that joy, by making us rash and careless, *usually* is more *harmful* than sadness, which is "an unpleasant languishing, wherein consists the discommodity the soul receives from evil, or defect, which the impressions of the brain represent unto her, as belonging to her. And there is also an intellectual sadness, which is not the passion, but which wants but little of being accompanied by it",[18] appears similarly doubtful. Lack of sensibility might result from the temperament, speed, strength and permanency of the stimulations and the reactions of the organism to them, and therefore from the inborn way of the circulation of the animal spirits. The disastrous effects of careless course of action should cause anxiety, sadness and carefulness, but not necessarily reasonable disposition;

[16] See PS, art. CXXXVII.

[17] PS, art. CXLIII, (italic mine).

[18] See the definition of sadness, ibid., art. XCII.

both it and the sensibility do not demand the banishment of joy form the mind. Pushed into an affect of unpleasant weakness, convinced of being bad or lacking, from where and by the force of what would the mind draw the strength outweighting its shortages, but necessary to move the will, so that it would want to examine, compare and judge all "pros" and "cons"?

Descartesian rules of proper dealing with the active function of the mind, the free will, standing at the foundations of morality required the will not to be exposed to unnecessary and violent influences of "animal spirits". To this end, it was prudent to avoid exaggerated, unhealthy body movements and ensure a peaceful surroundings for it. Normal life situations, to which the soul is exposed, practically ensure its enslavement as long as it remains in the service of the body. Why must it be so? The thesis of a fallen, sinful and immoral to the very core human condition, worsened yet by the ways of the world, is not sufficient as an answer to the question of "*what should we do?*".

The question above summarises the central problem of *Ethics* as well. In an attempt to answer it, Spinoza introduces his own assumptions, changes the arrangement of notions and equalises the meaning of some of them. An important trait of the Spinozian theory of nature is its immanentism. It has many premises, both practical and theoretical; among the first we can find the then-modern idea of infinite, unlike just unlimited nature, among the latter an axioma of *Everything that is, is either in itself, or in something else*. An infinite nature can be comprehended only as what is *in itself*; ourselves – as *what is in something else*. The similarity of the meaning of this notions and the meaning of "substance" (or that which is in itself and comprehends itself *per se*, without resorting to the meaning of other ideas) enabled to introduce the famouse *sive* into the language of *Ethics*. Assuming the viewing point to be a place inside an *infinite* nature a possibility of thinking anything apart from it is excluded – therefore God is included into the infinity and assumes an immanent position towards nature as well. All three notions express the same eternal, timeless, infinite being. Having no borders, permeating everything; what is, what is in it and out of it. Spinoza assumes as well that the terms *God, nature* and *substance* set a context for other descriptions and order thinking about the area of so-called extended things, taking part in movement, their cognition and cognition of cognition, finally they set the borders of meaning of the idea of *existence* (an act constituating the *modi* of nature). The considerations of affects find a relation to the original unity, viewed from a different angle and from a different point of view each time, in these notions (God, substance, nature).

In Spinozian system of nature, there is no place for an idea of soul (*anima*),[19] as the animate objects *are not composed* of inert matter that would need to be animated by an immaterial factor. We ourselves and all things known to us exist *in* and *out of substance* (according to the rule: what is, is in itself, or in something else) as its *modi* (examples, varieties, ways of existence). *Modi* do not split up from the substance; everything that benefits from existence makes an epifany, a blossom, a flare in the substance, nature, or, if we have courage to think of it – in God. Thus understood, the nature lives *for itself*, everywhere one and everywhere the same, with nothing as its aim, but also without rejecting anything that belongs to the manifestation of its existence. While introducing new simplifications to the terminology, Spinoza will say of this very *existence* that it differs in nothing but the name (i.e. the point of our view) from force, and therefore necessity. In relation to the concept of "God" existence means as much as will, and so knowledge, or force – obviously, the borders of meanings of the mentioned terms are crossing.

Spinoza's terminological reductionism does not end here. Def. VI of the second part of *Ethics* reads: "Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms". This sentence will be crucial to understanding the affect of joy, "the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection",[20] or, as we would say nowadays, to a fuller realisation. To avoid a mistake of premature interpretation, the meaning of the concept of "perfection" needs to be explained. In *Preface* to the fourth book of *Ethics* there is an explanation basing upon the Latin word *perfectum* – done, finished, perfect. We think of the reality as of a process of purposeful changes; we search for pursuing aim especially in the animate nature, we see their completion and cease to function when a "life purpose" is accomplished. This kind of thinking habit forces us to believe that an organism of more advanced progress is more perfect, and one that developed all the qualities imprinted into it by nature – as perfect in its own kind. One can be therefore *perfect* from time to time, though s/he is *real* constantly. Such an understanding of perfection turns our attention to the final aspect, while the infinite nature knows no "finals" (*finis* – the end, the objective, the finale, the destination), it has

[19] *Anima* is 'soul' in a very specific meaning. Its task is to move, to enliven, but not necessarily "to think". In the philosophy of Spinoza any associations connected with animation aspect of soul would dim the principal thesis, according to which organic bodies are nothing else but bodies as such, or, in other words *affections* of the substance when considered as the extended thing.

[20] B. Spinoza, *Ethics*, translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes (http://frank.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/ethica3.html).

no tasks or aims ahead of itself. Reality is a *current* (functional) nature, *natura naturans*, a fulfillment *finished* in any given moment of its changes is therefore *natura naturata*. There are no contradictions in this sentence. It expresses the same state of affairs observed from various points of view. An obstacle preventing the acceptance of it as correct appears to be a score of certain concepts from the everyday language, assimilated and accepted by metaphysics. One of them is a "thing" understood as a singular, separate entity made of parts, meaning different "things", from material theoretically infinitely divided and from uncountable quantity of forms. Meanwhile, nature in Spinoza's understanding is indivisible, in other words, it exists only as a one whole but infinite copy. How would be what is commonly believed to be "things" related to it?

Instead of "things", *Ethics* mentions varieties of substance. This concept requires a broader explanation – it will not be understood *as such* without telling *what is being varied*. The variety is in God as a whole nature at one time, or a game of interdependant exemplifications of the substance. In its metamorphoses, or acts, its power, or its nature, action and perfection is expressed. The condition of the synonimity of all these concepts is relating to the eternal, indivisible, infinite whole, comprehended as One, and not to its infinite exemplifications (modifications).

Where do the constant modifications in the eternal nature come from? Spinoza proposes to tie the meanings of the terms *substance, modi* and *affectio* and says that nature is stimulated in infinite number of ways, among which two allow us to recognise themselves – the stimulation by extending and by "thinking". By this we received the answer to the most troubling question – how to understand the relation of man and nature. First of all, let us not speak of a relationship, ties, binds etc. These phrases assume a separate existence of independent things, from which a new whole can only be formed, while it exists infinitely. It should not be therefore said that we are *tied* to God and nature. According to Spinoza this relationship is too "weak" to show the real state of things. In every moment of our life we are exemplifications of nature, and by that means of God, a living, stimulated being of infinite power.

It is also needed to discard our imaginations of continuity of our own existence or of the psychophysical identical state throughout our entire life. While nowadays the idea of multiple, complete change of the matter of our bodies causes no angst, the possibility of losing the personal identity constantly appears to be terrifying. Ever since we discovered the meaning of the word *I*, each time we use it we reinforce a conviction that it describes ever better a familiar entity of a peculiar character and constant and unique

traits. In a confrontation with the facts known to everyone from autopsy this view is impossible to hold, but even in this case we are prone to ignore the facts to be able to sustain a convention of interpreting the experiences, ensuring a communication with the human community.

Community, much like "relationship", assumes a whole to be made out of many. If we miss that feeling so much, since it is a need displayed in so many various situations, it appears that the easiest, and at the same time most radical, of its fulfilments would be creation of such a system of putting our experiences in order that will lead them all to one source and would allow to draw them all from it. Spinoza assumes that the source term of such a system would be the triad of *God, nature, substance*. Existence has been equalled in it to force, force to reality, and this – to perfection. Perfection, action means being stimulated, occuring in an infinite number of ways. The multitude becomes a way of existence of unity, let us remark – with no necessity of dividing it to parts. It can be said that *modi* of the substance are the symptoms of stimulation, not creations existing separately from the creator. There is an infinite number of the *affections* in the infinite nature. Spinoza assumes that when considered as a sentient thing, it "has" all the ideas of every single of its *affections*, as well as the ideas of those ideas; to speak humanely, the substance is self-knowledge.

And human? Well, this word has been created for a simpler management of the ideas, it is an universal lacking a designation in nature. The question is about a *really existent* human. As it can be seen, the linguistic image suggests "someone" singular, possessing an identity of self despite the passage of time, gifted with a personal character, etc. If someone like this were to *rejoyce*, crossing from a minor to a greater perfection, it should be believed that s/he would keep the individual character and identity, and will gain skill or trait s/he has not possessed before. Gain – but where from? If out of nowhere, s/he must have had them before, either being unaware of them (where from would s/he then learn that s/he "has" them, and how would s/he recognise them?), or knowing, but not putting them into reality. Perfection is reality (an act, an action); therefore joy works by shifting from a poorer to a fuller reality, from acting with a lesser force to using a greater one and in a broader scale. To be able without doing, and then to "enable"; just to assume, and then to gain a certainty – thus is joy expressed. Whose? Certainly not that of nature or God. The substance, or God, being everything does not pass from "lesser" to "greater" *affections*. The human joy?

The one who suspects is not the one who has the *proof*, even being "the same" person. When *suspecting* that the air presses the mercury in a bowl and pushes it into a glass tube, but without knowledge how to

design an experiment proving this hypothesis, one *is not the same* human that designed and conducted the appropriate research, or the one who after many trials and calculations brought the observation to a formula written down with the use of symbols. Does it mean "Blaise Pascal" was a multitude of people? Which one of them, by God, was the *real* Pascal, rejoycing with the discovery of a new law of nature?

If the discourse constructed for the needs of *Ethics* could replace the scheme of thoughts imprinted together with the structure of the language in early childhood, questions as this one would not be necessary (or possible). Blaise Pascal would turn out to be infinite collections of *affections* (*modi*) of the substance, the two kinds of which – extended and "thinking" – might be partially known to us. The nature realises them by the means of all the possible variations concerning for instance the being of "extended Pascal" – starting from mixing the genetic material of the parents, through all the stages of growth and development, reaching maturity, through the forms of the body health and its possible illnesses, recovery from them and expirations caused by them. Parallelly to them the substance modifies itself as the ideas of all these forms and the ideas of their ideas. Blaise Pascal is an infinity. A different one, as it is filled with different forms and ideas, is the infinity known as "Rembrandt van Rijn".

Their joys are the *affections* of *their bodies* (in fact: the sequences of *modi* discussed in all the nature as extended thing), in which the force of action increases "locally". Parallelly to the stimulations of the extended nature *affections* of its ideal aspect occur, which is why Spinoza will say that the affection of joy expresses itself also as the idea of the increase of force.

How does the activity (reality, act) of a given body work? The activity of nature understood as a whole are all its aspects. A *body* is a part of this whole artificially divided from it by us, concerned as extension. The fact we grasp it in such a way does not change its nature in any way and does not separate it from the substance. The possibility of the fragmentarisation of the infinity comes from it itself – its ideal aspect is filled with essences (ideas) expressing something aking to an algorythm, using what makes it possible to place the singular ideas in sequences. An example of such a system of forms and their essences might be a *mountain* and a *lowland*. Both in space and among ideas the mountain assumes the existence of a lowland and one enables understanding what the other is. If a lowland is covered, the mountain will disappear; their reality (*in actu*) and force with which they dwell in nature, resisting erosion and human activity, demands that the nature expressing itself in both those aspects cared for

their existence by being affected. A granite rock stroked by lightnings that resists their force and remains untouched *enjoys* the existence. The idea of its force is a modification of the substance; it is true that the mountain will not learn it, but the ideas of the human bodies (our minds) might grasp the other ideas of substance by perceiving them and comprehending their contents.

The *act* of an idea is an expression of its essence by it; all the ideas claim and deny something about themselves. The activity of extended things will be expressed in space, which essence (action) is giving place in three dimensions. By acting, the extended things of the nature prove the being of extension, and above that they add to it something coming from them alone: the rock – a drive to emerge upwards, the granite – the solidity, the rain – the humidity falling down from the clouds, etc. What results just from their essence in a sequence of events in space is called *adeqate cause*. When a thing is such a cause (when an event would not take place without its participation) we speak of its *affection* in a sense of an action; the lightning strikes the peak of the mountain, the rain pours to the ground, Rembrandt paints the portrait of Saskia, Pascal creates an original metaphor. When an event would not take place without a different, active thing, we speak of a partial (inadequate) cause.

It is hard to understand what would be the *idea of joy* and *joy* of a dry land on which the rain starts to pour. It can be grasped by the poets, and by the means of their talent by some of the readers. The soil poured with water becomes heavier and muddy, stretches in a way borrowed from water; broken by heat it becomes stony, as though looking up to the ideal of a stone, a granite nudget. *Affection* of nature, modifying itself to a dry or muddy soil cannot be concerned as its action – in all of these examples it is not the sole cause for its state.

It is easier to understand the idea of joy and joy as an affection experienced by a human. When Spinoza claims that there is a part of *joy*, or crossing from a lesser to a greater perfection (force with which one acts) even in such *affections* of human mind as realisation of one's own finity, the powerlessness of a body consumed by a disease or of ignorance, he pronounces a thesis opposite to that by Descartes, of the nature of the "intellectual sadness" and of the feeling of sadness accompanying it.

Perception of the sadness, or a hampering of the rise of the force or even a shift from a greater to a lesser perfection, by the mind as *its own* state happens by the medium of the *idea of sadness*, joined to the idea of the mind hampered in its drive to learn. It is, however *the mind itself that recognised* that the reduction of the percieving force is taking place *in it*, so it *makes*

something happen. Its force, or perfection, or *joy*, is raised by the degree of that knowledge. This property of the human mind has been used in a variety of cognitive therapies, in which the patients are taught to control their actions, starting from, for instance, making distinction between and naming experiences. While doing it it is assumed (as Spinoza always did) that an own successful action (for example, an adequate recognition and naming of a phenomenon) not only does not reduce our strengths, but paradoxically multiplies them. One who accomplished something will find it easier to do it again – as though the knowledge of succeeding once gave him/her and additional portion of force. A feeling that *I know "what and how" and I know that I know it* is something more than an intellectual certainty. When viewed as one of many states of mind in a sequence, it is a turning point, ending the losing of the force and beginning its recovery. When viewed as an event in the scope of thinking of the substance, or God, we should consider an infinite number of ideas expressing all the possible states of this specific mind (an idea of a specific body), and put into consideration a fragment of a sequence made of ideas expressing an ability to perceive, connect, name, etc. ever less clearly. This fragment of the sequence of ideas shows the declining ability to think, called sadness. When in a sequence of such fading ideas there occur an idea of an idea – called insight, an act of self-knowledge – the character of the sequence will change. The idea of an idea has an increased force, it is not a normal *a*, but an *a squared*.

The view of Descartes on sadness and hatred as of primal affects and more necessary than joy would prove to stand against nature according to the *Ethics*. Spinoza assumes that the first affect of every being is *a drive to sustain one's existence*. Sadness hampering *its force* cannot preceed joy or be more beneficial than it. In other case, instead of ever greater perfection, we would head for the diminishing of our existence.

translated by Konrad Żelazny

Summary

The following article summarises some of the aspects of joy as a spiritual state (Descartes), and as an affect/stimulation of the modi of nature (Spinoza). The psycho-physiological (Descartes) and ontological (Spinoza) placement of joy creates basic differences in evaluation of the said state by the two philosophers. As a result, the moral instructions provided by them to the reader vary in an approach to the emotions and their effect on human

actions. Descartes values the importance of sadness as an affect warning us from dangers; Spinoza claims that joy (as different from pleasure) can never be excessive and encourages pursuing it as a mean to achieve happiness.

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FAITH AND REASON IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PASCAL

Pascal, on the basis of Cartesian principles, created a practical philosophy answering moral and religious needs. However, he did not attribute to the human mind a cognitive power as strong as Descartes did, and he even emphasized his critical attitude towards the Cartesian ideal of knowledge, which he saw as exorbitant and above man's capacity. Reason is useful only in the realm which it itself defines with rules and regulations, within boundaries which it cannot overstep or negate. Pascal also disagreed with Descartes on identifying the logical order as being the same as the ontic order. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" was not, for him, the basis of all certainty. He wrote: "I feel that I might not have been; for the Ego consists in my thoughts. Therefore I, who think, would not have been, if my mother had been killed before I had life. I am not, then, a necessary being."[1]

Man's existence, as seen by Pascal, depends on two, basically different sides of human nature – the spiritual and the corporeal – and at the same time, it is not completely clear if the essence of man's soul in this philosophy is fully identified with thinking. Though Pascal calls for achieving self-consciousness, at the same time he doubts if the mind is capable of knowing the essence of the self.[2] The ideal of knowledge, to him, was geometry, but he quickly realized that its methods turn out to be completely useless when applied to matters of life importance because "they do not allow us to know the eternity which surrounds us, nor do they solve ethical or religious problems".[3] According to Pascal, such a method "would consist in two principal things: the one, in employing no term the meaning of which

[1] B. Pascal, *Pensees*, translated by W. F. Trotter, section VII (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/pascal/pensees.viii.html).

[2] Z. Drozdowicz, *Antynomie Pascala*, Poznań 1993, p. 30.

[3] W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii*, Warszawa 1978, vol. II, p. 58.

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had not first been clearly explained; the other, in never advancing any proposition which could not be demonstrated by truths already known; that is, in a word, in defining every term, and in proving every proposition."[4]

Pascal, the rationalist, admits with humility that even the greatest mind remains powerless in the face of certain issues. He wrote: "we burn with desire to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth opens to abysses. Let us, therefore, not look for certainty and stability. Our reason is always deceived by fickle shadows; nothing can fix the finite between the two Infinites."[5] The impossibility of settling the question of whether the presumptions made about transcendental reality are true or not – a result of man's place in the world – is the basic ontological obstacle preventing cognition.

Other difficulties arise, according to Pascal, from the blending of the spirituality and corporality in man. This duality of human nature does not allow us to precisely define simple issues, both spiritual and corporeal. Many obstacles arise from the innate as well as the acquired characteristics of the mind. These deceptive forces include not only the senses but also imagination and so called self-love. The senses by suggesting false images of reality distort what the mind knows. Imagination, which is an ability to create images and beliefs, fills man with anxiety, fear or desire, perverting our ability to distinguish the true from the false. Pascal wrote: "the entire theatrical apparatus of ceremony, dress and rites which men create to impress others, appeals to our imagination. Imagination dictates the rules of assessing beauty, goodness, and justice".[6] And further: "no less dangerous is the deceptive force of self-love in man, which makes us want to seem better, wiser and more beautiful than we are. And not just to others but to ourselves. That is why it forces us to wear a mask and disguise ourselves".[7]

Because of all this, man, in a constant anxiety and inner struggle, overestimates the meaning of trivial things and overlooks the important ones. "Tangled in tragic inner indecision, dependant but longing for freedom, he searches in vain for light and peace".[8] In the essay *De l'art de persuader* the

[4] B. Pascal, *Of the Geometrical Spirit*, in: *Minor Works. The Harvard Classics. 1909–14* (http://www.bartleby.com/48/3/9.html).

[5] B. Pascal, *Pensees* (72).

[6] I. Dąbska, *Sceptycyzm francuski XVI i XVII wieku*, [in:] "Prace Wydziału Filologiczno-Filozoficznego" 7 (1958), z. 2, p. 65.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Ibidem.

philosopher points out that we are more prone to believe that which plays into our desires and feelings and to reject all that goes against them. The impossibility of creating sure knowledge leads to skepticism. And – according to Dąbska[9] – because the skeptical arguments remain insurmountable to Pascal in the realm of rational cognition, the philosopher, searching for a solution to the problems which are tormenting him, decides to introduce the notion of "knowing through the heart". Rational human knowledge therefore seems to him but another variation on the vanity of the world. It is especially interesting that such a conclusion is reached by a man of science who realized that "physical science will not console me for the ignorance of morality in the time of affliction."[10]

Exhibiting excessive trust towards the knowledge of "physical science" as well as towards philosophy itself seemed madness to Pascal. He wrote: "The last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it. It is but feeble if it does not see so far as to know this. But if natural things are beyond it, what will be said of supernatural?"[11] and therefore "There is nothing so conformable to reason as this disavowal of reason."[12] According to the philosopher we should simultaneously use reason and question reason because there are questions to which reason knows not the answers. In Władysław Tatarkiewicz's interpretation, Pascal's skepticism grew from rationalism, because empiricists, who believed that knowledge is to know the facts, had no reason to end in doubt. Knowing the facts without understanding them cannot constitute cognition for a rationalist. Pascal's doubt is therefore the result of a disappointed rationalism leading to despair.[13]

Doubting means despair and unhappiness. Nevertheless, a thinking man's duty is to search when in doubt. Doubt gives a sense of the insignificance of thought, the nothingness not only of its results but of the process of thinking itself. The only remedy to this is to constantly search for the truth. In the case of Pascal, it led to the discovery that there is a separate order of cognition, the order of the heart, different from the order of reason, which scientists believe to be the only one. This does not mean that Pascal doesn't appreciate the importance of reason. He believed that reason can lead you to ultimate matters, but only when you keep it within bounds

[9] Ibidem, p. 66.
[10] B. Pascal, *Pensees* (196).
[11] Ibidem (466).
[12] Ibidem (465).
[13] W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii*, Warszawa 1978, vol. II, p. 59.

and accept its limitations. Such was, for the French philosopher the essence of the "reasonable mind", which gives man a chance to create truly wise knowledge.[14]

Reason is able to reject certain metaphysical concepts, but it cannot do anything more, even when relying on a specific concept of God because it would have to be only a rational God of scientists, abstract and impersonal. Whereas, as Pascal wrote, "wisdom sends us to childhood".[15]

Reason must therefore bow with humility before infinity and accept the authority of Revelation and faith. According to Pascal, true wisdom is characterized by the possession of a powerful, clear mind, which, in situations which surpass it can see its limitations and then, with a child's submissiveness surrender to the Revelation. Wisdom is to "know where to doubt, where to feel certain, where to submit. He who does not do so, understands not the force of reason."[16]

To put things simply, the power of mind amounts to the strength of its arguments. Aware of this, Pascal searches with his intellect for the strongest possible arguments in order to settle his bet regarding God's existence. He writes: "You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then without hesitation that He is."[17]

The argumentation used in the wager isn't based on giving convincing proof. The issue is rather to prove that even consequent and logically sound reasoning cannot force man to believe. Pascal strove to prove that reason is not only unfit to decide in the matter of God's existence, but even to motivate faith or the lack of it. It is not reason which prevents man from believing, even if the mind claims so itself. The choice to believe or to renounce belief is made on a different level. The role of reason is to reveal these circumstances and to draw the borderline between the things which it can address, and the ones which remain beyond its reach.

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[14] L. Brunscgvieg, *Le Genie de Pascal*, Paris 1924, p. 180.

[15] B. Pascal, *Pensees* (464).

[16] Ibidem (461).

[17] Ibidem (451).

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According to Pascal "Nothing is so important to man as his own state, nothing is so formidable to him as eternity; and thus it is not natural that there should be men indifferent to the loss of their existence, and to the perils of everlasting suffering. They are quite different with regard to all other things. They are afraid of mere trifles; they foresee them; they feel them. And this same man who spends so many days and nights in rage and despair for the loss of office, or for some imaginary insult to his honor, is the very one who knows without anxiety and without emotion that he will lose all by death. It is a monstrous thing to see in the same heart and at the same time this sensibility to trifles and this strange insensibility to the greatest objects. It is an incomprehensible enchantment, and a supernatural slumber, which indicates as its cause an all-powerful force."[18] Because "between us and heaven or hell there is only life, which is the frailest thing in the world."[19] Indifference towards the ultimate matters astounded the philosopher and he found it absurd that not only simple people but philosophers as well put their own, impermanent existence above God. He wrote: "Shall it be that of the philosophers, who put forward as the chief good, the good which is in ourselves? Is this the true good? Have they found the remedy for our ills? Is man's pride cured by placing him on an equality with God?"[20]

Man's realism lies in seeing oneself for who one really is. As man realizes who he is, and what his limitations are, he draws nearer to discovering the ultimate sense and purpose of life and to the chance to escape doubt and despair. But this, however, is only possible thanks to grace, for only grace can overcome man's weaknesses and limitations. Reason clears man's path towards believing, but it cannot, even under the best circumstances, grant it. The necessary precondition is "inspiration". "Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning"[21] Pascal wrote.

Therefore faith is a gift that comes from God's inspiration. The notion of a heart "inspired by God" means nothing else than the state of God's spirit penetrating the individual. God first persuades man to receive grace, and only later bestows it upon him. The individual is capable of knowing God, but "the knowledge of God is very far from the love of Him."[22] A quali-

[18] Ibidem (335).
[19] Ibidem (349).
[20] Ibidem (483).
[21] Ibidem (480).
[22] Ibidem (476).

tative leap must take place because there is no passing from the order of reason to the supernatural order of love given by God directly.

"The heart has its own order; the intellect has its own, which is by principle and demonstration."[23] If faith is a feeling of the heart, then how should we understand this notion? J. Russier[24] interprets the notion of heart as a will, a tendency towards love. Also for L. Brunschvicg[25] the heart is the domain of passion and spontaneity, while Per Lönning[26] believes that the knowledge of the heart comes from man's self-consciousness. An even more rationalistic interpretation comes from W. Marciszewski,[27] who describes the "heart" as intensified intellectual intuition. A similar view is held by D. von Hildebrand[28]. W. Tatarkiewicz[29] separates the order of the heart from the order of the intellect, treating the "heart" as a separate ability to asses supernatural goods. Dąbska[30] ascertains that the impossibility of formulating rational criteria for the truth proves only the weakness of the mind and not the uncertainty of all cognition. Ascertaining the intuitive assuredness of the heart's truths constitutes to her an overcoming of normative skepticism – she sees the heart as an intuitive, instinctive knowing of certain facts. In M. Scholtens'[31] interpretation it is something of a mystic sense.

These varied interpretations point to the fact that Pascal's notion of the heart seems wider than it is in the view of those who interpret it, but nevertheless, they all agree on one thing: the heart searches for the signs of God in the world, and finds them.

The meeting of God and man is only achieved through love, being the only way to knowing God directly. Jeanne Russier in her work titled *La foi selon Pascal* notes that if we examine this matter from the perspective of the individual, two notions come to mind: inspiration and persuasion.

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[23] Ibidem (72).

[24] J. Russier, *La foi selon Pascal*, Paris 1949, pp. 153–154.

[25] L. Brunschvicg, *Le Génie de Pascal*, Paris 1924, p. 180.

[26] P. Lönning, *The Dilemma of Contemporary Theology: Prefigured in Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche*, Oslo 1962, p. 62.

[27] W. Marciszewski, *A Rationalistic Interpretation of Reasons of the Heart. A Study in Pascal*, "Dialectics and Humanism" 4 (1980), p. 161.

[28] D. von Hildebrand, *Serce*, Poznań 1985, p. 33.

[29] W. Tatarkiewicz, *Porządek dóbr. Studium z Pascala*, „Przegląd Filozoficzny" 23 (1921): Księga pamiątkowa K. Twardowskiego, p. 297.

[30] I. Dąbska, *Sceptycyzm francuski XVI i XVII wieku*, [in:] "Prace Wydziału Filologiczno-Filozoficznego" 7 (1958), z. 2, p. 66.

[31] M. Scholtens, *Le mysticisme de Pascal*, Arsen 1974, p. 27.

These constitute the two concurrent and complementary aspects of God's actions.[32]

The meeting of God and man happens in absolute solitude. In solitude, which Pascal considers to be an expression of religious experience, the "tenderness of the heart" – the very essence of faith – manifests itself.[33] Therefore, faith is a specific inner act of man directed towards God. The encounter of God and man can only happen through love because Love can only be recognized and grasped by love. "It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason"[34] – writes Pascal. The essence of the spiritual connection to the Absolute is "feeling with the heart". And so, faith is such an act of acknowledging the transcendent Being that allows man to create a direct connection with God through inner commitment and acts of love. And love, in turn, is not only the source of feelings but also the source of so called direct cognition which – despite the fact that everything in it takes place "without rules or observations" – constitutes the basis of beliefs. Belief, usually realized in speech, in this case comes through silence because it is "an eloquence of silence, which is more piercing than speech could ever be. Love recognizes through barely decipherable signs – which it finds infallible – that which remains invisible to others".[35] The speech of faith, the speech of the heart is in silence.

According to Thomas More Harrington[36] there are two types of faith to be found in the philosophy of the French thinker: human faith and divine faith. This differentiation clearly ties in with the problem of the foundation of faith in Christianity. "Divine faith" is a result of grace, "human faith" is achieved through habit and reasoning. This kind of faith needs argumentation but its drawback is that it remains on the level of the intellect. Without a change of heart, without a moral change, human faith is condemned to be futile or even to wane away. According to Pascal, true faith, stronger than conceit, comes only from the love of things divine. Human faith, typical of overly rational individuals, remains shallow even in its intellectual aspects. Rationalistic optimism entails the overlooking of the tragic, which is an inseparable element of human existence. An intellect formed in such a man-

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[32] J. Russier, *La foi selon Pascal*, Paris 1949, p. 155.

[33] L. Brunscgvieg, *Le Genie de Pascal*, Paris 1924, p. 185.

[34] B. Pascal, *Pensees* (481).

[35] J. Russier, *La foi selon Pascal*, Paris 1949, p. 162.

[36] T. M. Harrington, *Vrite et methode dans les „Pensses de Pascal"*, Paris 1982, pp. 137–138.

ner knows not paradox, and only paradox expresses the true condition of man. Paradox requires of man special abilities to understand matters which exceed the limits of man's cognition. E. Tielsch claimed that: "Paradox is a characteristic pathos of intellectual life, and just as only great souls are capable of developing passion, so only a great mind can find themselves in the face of what I call paradoxes, which are nothing else than infinitely free thought."[37]

Only with the category of paradox can one describe the human condition, filled with contradictions, because man's natural state is both misery and greatness. Knowing the former breeds despair, and knowing the latter – conceit. Despite being aware of the misery, man possesses an instinct which lifts him up. He suffers from the incapacity to find out, but has a undefeatable sense of the truth. He longs for the truth but finds uncertainty. His mind fights an everlasting battle against passions. We have faith and goodness only partially, mixed with evil and falseness. For Pascal there is no liberation from these contradictions other than through faith, because for him "all contradictions are brought together and unified in God and in God alone".[38] Only through knowing God can all doubt and despair be removed. As man realizes who he is and what his limitations are, he approaches the discovery of the ultimate sense and purpose of life.[39]

Abstract

The paper analyzes Pascal's understanding of the relation between faith and reason as the two possible ways in which man attempts to establish whether God exists and how He may be reached. Pascal departed from an analysis of "physical knowledge" and its possible application to the questions of faith and things infinite. Discovering the limitations of reason, the philosopher turned elsewhere to search for both proof of Gods existence and the possible ways in which man can strive to be closer to Him. The paper analyzes the meaning and various interpretations of Pascal's notion of "knowing through the heart". The author shows how the French philosopher's concept developed, departing form a critique of Cartesian philosophy, his concept of faith and love as essential elements of creating a real relationship with

[37] E. Tielsch, *Kierkegaard Glaube*, Göttingen 1964, p. 162.

[38] M. Tazbir, *Świadomość heroiczna*, „Życie i Myśl" 9–10 (1962), p. 7.

[39] In this paper, I also drew upon my book *Pascal i Kierkegaard – filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary* (*Pascal and Kierkegaard – Philosophers of Despair and Faith*), Kraków 2001.

God. Later, the paper presents Pascal's thought on the human condition and the acts which are necessary to achieve the "leap of faith" without which man cannot attempt to surpass doubt and despair inherent in the human experience. Finally, the paper describes the philosopher's differentiation between "human" and "divine" faith, which once again ties into the critique of pure reason and its limitations, such as the inability to reconcile the various contradictions and paradoxes experienced by man.

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ARNOLD GEULINCX ON THINKING SELF AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

Arnold Geulincx (1624–1669) is known as the one who laid foundations for a modern theory of Occasionalism. He belongs also to a group of philosophers for whom the reference point was the system of René Descartes. We will not concentrate here however, neither on theory of Occasionalism (even though we might mention it) nor on inspirations by Descartes (even though they will of course impose themselves). We will consider what is Geulincx's answer to the question: who am I?[1]

Geulincx comes to the answer to this question through search of an indubitable and true knowledge which he calls prime knowledge (*scientia prima*), metaphysics or simply wisdom. Having gone through the sceptical stage, Geulincx gains first and fundamental and unquestionable knowledge 'I think therefore I exist' (*cogito ergo sum*).[2] The analysis of this first truth will show him who he is not only as a subject of metaphysical considerations. Let us think what is the process of thinking for Geulincx. Above all he understands it broadly. He connects it to senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste and also to the activity of mind: affirmation, negation but also feelings: love, hatred, fear. Geulincx connects various ways of thinking to human consciousness of them. He writes: 'And I am at the same time aware that

[1] In the present article we base on the following texts of the works of A. Geulincx the original version: *Arnoldi Geulincx Scholae Academicae ultimae ab auditore anonymo descriptae*, manuscript, Leiden University Library, Western Manuscripts, ms. BPL 1255; *Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis opera philosophica*, recognovit J. P. N. Land, Hagae Comitum apud Martinum Nijhoff, 1891–1893 (reprint: A. Geulincx, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. J. P. N. Land, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1965–68); *Arnoldi Geulincx Metaphysica vera et ad mentem peripateticam. Opus posthumum iuxta manuscriptum iam editum Amstelaedami apud Joannem Wolters*, 1691; and on translations to English: *Ethics with Samuel Beckett's Notes*, translated by M. Wilson, edited by H. Van Ruler, A. Uhlmann, M. Wilson, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2006; *Metaphysics*, translated by M. Wilson, The Christoffel Press, Wisbech 1999.

[2] A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Prima scientia*.

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each of these modes may vary within itself. (...) I understand that I see light and colours, that I hear sounds, that I love, or hate, because all this means is that my consciousness has a certain modality; and in one and the same act of having this modality, I am immediately aware of what kind of modality it is.'[3] There are then infinite and various kinds of the process of thinking, it often depends on time and circumstances and man is only conscious of the fact that it takes place. Then according to Geulincx, thoughts are not provoked by a thinking subject and because they cannot exist without a reason they are generated by something different from the man, something which is conscious, something that understands how it is executed. He refers here to a rule which he accepts axiomatically and which reads as follows: What you do not know how to do, is not your action (*Quod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis*).[4] I do not know how my thoughts come into being though I am not their creator. Moreover various things beyond me (Geulincx gives the examples of fire, Sun and stones) as deprived of consciousness cannot all the more be creators of these thoughts in me. Then there is something or (as Geulincx notices) someone who is the originator of these thoughts – the God. This is the way Geulincx proves the existence of God.

How does God cause the thoughts to rise? According to Geulincx there may be theoretically three possibilities: he causes them to rise with the help of the thinking self, he causes them himself or by means of something third being both beyond the God and beyond the thinking self. First possibility is excluded because I (self), as a thinking subject, am a simple thing and thoughts are diverse. The same argument excludes the second possibility. The creator of thoughts is also simple for he is united to whatever he wants and whatever he knows, he is solely a thinking thing. There is only the third possibility left: thinking takes place by means of something else than thinking self or God. This thing should satisfy one condition: it has to be capable of transitions in order to awake various thoughts. The possibility of transition Geulincx connects to motion and extension – to occupy a place

[3] *Quos omnes modos esse cogitationum mearum inter se diversos, quosdam etiam magis, quosdam minus diversos esse, conscientia ipsa notissimum et evidentissimum mihi est.* (...) *Clarissime, inquam, intelligo me videre lumen et colores, et me audire sonos, etc. me amare, me odisse, etc.; quia hoc non est aliud quam hoc vel illo modo me habere, cuius modi hoc ipso, quo illum habeo, intime mihi conscius sum.*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Secunda scientia*.

[4] See A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Quinta scientia*; *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem primam, Quintam scientiam*; *Ethica, Tractatus I, caput 2, sectio 2*, §2, 4 and *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §2, 9 and 14.

in space. And since he thinks that there are only two kinds of substance:[5] thinking substance and extended substance then the answer is: God in order to cause various thoughts in the thinking self uses the extended substance – the body as an instrument. Here Geulincx demonstrates the necessity of the existence of bodies.

One body presenting itself in a specific way can cause only one effect. It is necessary for a body to be changing, that means to be moving in order to cause various thoughts. Various thoughts are caused in a thinking self by means of the body and thanks to motion. Various movements of the body are caused by thoughts. Geulincx emphasizes that body is an instrument and only an instrument to cause thoughts. He specifies also what kind of instrument it is. Since there are three types of these tools.[6] First are the instruments which achieve the effect or the aim from necessity (e.g. a mountain in relation to a valley), second are the instruments which achieve the effect for the reason of capacity and therefore sometimes the effect does not occur (e.g. a pen in relation to writing), the last type are the instruments which achieve their aim for the reason of ineffability of someone who uses them, and man cognizes these instruments not through reason but through consciousness (e.g. eye in relation to seeing). Body in this context belongs to the last of the discussed types.

Among various bodies one is specific namely the one in the matter of which the thinking self is deeply conscious of direct influence and experience. The self is conscious of full influence on the body and is also subject to its actions. It qualifies the body as theirs: 'This, then, I call my body, by which I am thus affected. (But note that in the strict sense, I am not affected by my body, but by the cause that employs my body as an instrument: I have already shown that a body cannot act on me directly, but only as an instrument of a cause acting at will on me in an ineffable way). I also act on my body in some way. (But note also that I do not truly act on my body, but only my will: parts of my body are frequently moved about, though not by me but by the real mover; and what that may be will be explained later.)[7] Through body we experience what the thinking self cognizes as

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[5] Geulincx occasionally uses in his considerations the term 'substance'.

[6] See A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem primam, Septimam scientiam.*

[7] *Hoc igitur voco corpus meum, a quo ego sic patior quodammodo (non enim proprie ab eo patior, sed a causa quae tali instrumento utitur; iam enim ostensum est corpus in me non posse agere, sed tantum assumi ut instrumentum, a causa per ipsum in me ineffabiliter agente) et in quod ago quodammodo (nec enim vere in illud ago, sed ad arbitrium voluntatis meae, quaedam subinde partes in corpore meo moventur, non quidem a me, sed a motore; quique ille sit, infra patebit)*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Nona scientia.*

ideas. The lack of body would not impoverish the man when it comes to knowledge: 'If I lacked a body I would no doubt still have ideas of motion arousing various sensations in my mind, but I would not actually have the appropriate thoughts or sensations.'[8]

What am I then? From the fact that I am not conscious of some of my parts, in other words I comprehend myself as a unity, it results that 'I am a simple thing, undivided and without parts.'[9] What it thinks, even though it thinks in different ways, is one and the same.[10] As a matter of fact I am a thinking self, namely a mind (*mens*). This self however is directly connected to a specific body, which it calls theirs. This connection constitutes a man.

Geulincx in his philosophical considerations consequently identifies the self with the mind. The thinking self is a subject in situations when the subject talks about itself. The thinking self in its earthly existence is however always directly connected to a specific body which it considers as its and this way a human being is created. According to Geulincx the man is an 'incorporated mind' (*mens incorporata*).[11] Emphasising the essentiality of the body he notices that without it man would not be what he is. Both mind and body constitute a man. He claims also that in order to indicate properly what is the matter in a man and what is the form one needs to assume that the mind corresponds to the matter and the body to the form. Since it is not because of the mind that we say that the man is what he is but because of the body. The one who is not incorporated cannot be a man.

The man is the thinking self directly connected to a specific body, which he considers his own. Geulincx not only states this unity of the mind and the body (he calls it human condition – *condicio humana*) but also he emphasizes the fact that this unity ensues from the will of the One who

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[8] *Si corpus non haberem, essent quidem in me ideae motus, qui tam varios in me sensus excitat, non haberem autem ipsas illas perceptiones seu sensus*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem primam, Nonam scientiam.*

[9] *Simplex quaedam, indivisa, et partium omnium expers res*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Tertia scientia.*

[10] Geulincx rejects the concept of tripartite soul. In *Annotata ad "Ethicam"* he puts it unequivocally: 'Away, then, with that doctrine of some of the Scholastics, which endowed us with three souls, a vegetable, a sentient, and a rational soul. We are certainly not the subject of a vegetable soul: we are nourished, we grow, we generate, without any knowledge or consciousness of any such things. But we are indeed a sentient and a rational soul so long as we are in the body; though these are not two things in us, but one simple thing, since we feel quite clearly that we are one and the same thing, feeling and reasoning at the same time (...)'; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §5, 38.

[11] See A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §2, 45.

is above the thinking self and the body – the God. Human condition is awarded to the man without his will and similarly it will one day be taken from him. Moreover, what seemingly happens by order of human will in reality happens because God wants it to happen: 'I am persuaded, then, that my human condition depends not on some natural necessity, but on the operation of a will: not my will, obviously, but on another's, namely, God's will.'[12] We shall pay attention here to the fact that for Geulincx the man is born in the moment of connection of the body to the mind, which happens in the moment of conception. We read: 'for "to be born" is not for me to emerge into the light, but to be joined to a body, and to enter the World, the World in which I already was when I was enclosed in my mother's womb.'[13] When he explicates this thought Geulincx combines his medical knowledge with a conviction of philosophical nature that the man is gifted with knowledge from the moment of conception. He writes: 'In case you should be tempted to believe that an embryo, as it is called when it has been formed in its mother's womb and has received its principal organs, such as the brain and the heart (which occurs round about the fortieth day from conception, or the carnal union of its parents) is an automaton, which is alive only in the sense that a brute or a plant is alive, and moves without consciousness or understanding, the sheer number of our prejudices, which we absorbed once from having been enclosed in our mother's womb, proves that an embryo is even then endowed with understanding, and is a true human being, enjoying a rational mind and a body.'[14]

The union of the thinking self and the body (being a man) may be taken away by the God. It does not consist in annihilation but in deprivation of human condition through setting apart the thinking self and the body which it considered their own. After this separation God may give the thinking self another condition. Geulincx indicates two possibilities: connecting it to

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[12] *Pendet igitur humana condicio mea non a natura aliqua seu necessitate, sed ab arbitrio, non meo, ut clarissime vidi, sed alterius, utique Dei*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars prima, Duodecima scientia*.

[13] (...) *"nasci" enim mihi non est in lucem edi, sed corpore iungi, et intrare in hunc mundum, in quo etiam eram, cum matris utero inclusus eram*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Tractatus I, caput 2, sectio 2*, §10, 1.

[14] *Ne forte putes embryonem, ut vocant, dum iam formatus est in utero matris, et partes principes, veluti cerebrum et cor, sortitus est (quod fit circiter die quarto decimo a conceptione, seu carnali coniunctione parentum), esse automa quoddam, quod instar bruti, vel plantae, tantum vivat, sine conscientia et cogitatione moveatur. Ostendunt quamplurima nostra praeiudicia, quae ex eo hausimus, quam primum matris utero inclusi fuimus, embryonem et tunc praeditum esse cognitione, esseque verum hominem, anima rationali et corpore constantem*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §10, 2.

another body or leaving without a body. He presents Pythagoras as partisan of the first possibility even though he points out that it is a very popular view among philosophers. He underlines however: 'But it is only opinion and speculation, not science, Reason being profoundly silent on it (...).'[15] And since it is like this then as a result of the lack of certainty about the truthfulness of this view the philosopher should reject it. Another indicated possibility was revealed by God in the Bible and although our reason lacks certainty then Geulincx inclines towards accepting that it is so and that: 'we shall remain with God at least for a time, divested of our body, until we take it again (...).'[16] Considerations about the existence of the thinking self after separation from the body are not essential for Geulincx as the matter of fact. The man should not be interested in what shall happen with him after death for it is exclusively God's domain. The man should obey God's command who withdraws him from human condition. The following words express that: 'Now that He calls me forth from among the living, calls me to Himself, I must come, and nothing more will remain for me but to come. How He will receive me, I do not trouble myself, as I no longer trouble about myself at all. Whether He will in due course infuse me into another body? Whether He will keep me with Himself, divested of a body?'[17]

Human condition consists in the unity of the mind and the body, manifested in action and passion. The body acts in connection to the mind, the mind feels in connection to the body. Geulincx writes: 'that through the medium of our body we are affected by various perceptions; and that through the medium of our will we can choose to move the various members of a certain body in diverse ways; and in these two principles consists the union of the mind with the body that makes us men.'[18] Being submitted to actions through the body includes senses and feelings. Senses come

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[15] (...) *opinio tantum atque suspicio; nulla scientia, cum altum hic sit rationis silentium; A. Geulincx, Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §6, 13.

[16] (...) *saltem ad tempus aliquid exuti corpore remanebimus apud Deum, donec illud resurgendo rursum assumamus*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §6, 14.

[17] *Vocat me nunc e vivis, vocat me ad se; veniam igitur, et nihil longius erit quam ut veniam. Quomodo me accipiet, non laboro, qui de me non laboro. An protinus in aliud corpus me refundet? An me exutum corpore retinebit apud se?*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Tractatus I, caput 2, sectio 2*, §6, 3.

[18] *Nempe in eo, quod ratione corporis certe modo moti certas et diversissimas patiamus perceptiones; secundo etiam in eo, quod ratione voluntatis nostrae certum aliquod corpus pro arbitrio nostro varie moveatur et secundum diversas suas partes varie agitetur; in his enim duobus consistit unio illa mentis cum corpore, qua homines sumus*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars tertia, Prima scientia.*

into existence in a man in relation to different movements caused in different parts of human body by other bodies. Geulincx claims that: '(...) only through sensation that we have a lodging in the World (...).'[19] Being deprived of one of the senses a man's existence in the world becomes difficult, he is deprived of knowledge about certain spheres of the world. Even if for instance a blind man has known since the day he was born such terms as the sky, the stars, a colour he does not have in his mind a thought corresponding to these names. The senses are indissolubly connected to motion. Geulincx clearly refers to his knowledge of medicine when writing about this: '(...) the vibration of certain nerves in a certain way conveys motion to the brain, and to a certain part of the brain, as a result of which we see and hear all those diverse kinds of light, colours, and sounds that are aroused in our mind.'[20]

The cause of senses is beyond man, and so the feelings are originated in him even though they are not within his power. Geulincx relates to the cognation of Latin words while matching feelings to undergoing actions through the body. Verb *pati* has several meanings among which there are: 'to bear', 'to endure', 'to experience', 'to suffer', 'to succumb'. Man through his body bears something, experiences or even suffers from something. A noun *passio* derives from this verb, which can mean 'suffering', 'a sudden feeling', 'passion' or even 'lust'. Geulincx however, uses it in a very neutral meaning – feeling, interchangeably with another Latin word *affectus* a 'spiritual state' or more rarely 'physical state', 'feeling', 'emotion', which comes from the verb *afficere* – 'to inflict something on somebody', 'to dispose somebody to something', 'to affect'. Then a feeling similarly to the senses (*sensus*) is some kind of an experience, an internal sense of oneself which he experiences through the body. If man was deprived of body, he would not have any senses or feelings.

Geulincx when talking about feelings postulates to discriminate the nature from the behaviour. Feelings considered in relation to nature are something good because as he writes '(...) for a good part of the human condition consists in these passions, and it is almost entirely through them that we exist as men. If they were to be withdrawn from us along with the

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[19] (...) *per sensum nos hunc mundum incolere*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars tertia, Quarta scientia.*

[20] (...) *videmus enim his aut illis nervis certo modo vibratis, cum per eos motus ad cerebrum, certamque cerebri partem pertinere potest, omnes illas diversissimasque species luminis, colorum, sonorum, etc. in nobis suscitari*; A. Geulinx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars tertia, Quarta scientia.*

senses, we would no longer be able to regard ourselves as men.'[21] In other words human condition was created by God thus everything connected to it is good. Feelings in relation to behaviour are neutral: neither good nor wrong. What may be wrong is that man lets them guide him and yet God ordered him to follow reason and His laws. Reason (*ratio*) in Geulincx considerations is the most internal part of the mind in which are contained laws, orders, rules and tasks given to the man by God. We read: 'This is manly: not to allow oneself to become preoccupied with one's own passions, that is, never to grant them the right to dictate or inhibit any action of ours, but to cede that right wholly to Reason. For Reason alone has the vision, Reason alone has the capacity to guide our actions; and not our blind passions.'[22] In like manner, even though God gave the man senses, in search of the truth he told him to base on notions innate to mind. Similarly, according to Geulincx, wrongly do those who follow their senses in philosophy as those who follow passions in ethics. He is conscious of the fact that men repeatedly follow their passions, moreover he notices some inclination to what he calls idleness which causes the man not to pay proper attention to the commands of reason. The man hesitates whether he wants to follow the reason and so he turns more willingly to what he is drawn to by passion. Geulincx says that the bodily lust for instance as an experience is not wrong but an inclination to stay in it, or satisfaction, is the source of sin. The inclination to follow the passions originates in babyhood, to the subject of which we will come back later.

The attitude towards passion assumed by the man enables Geulincx to characterise different ways of life. We have then the life based on actions from passion (*action ex passione*), action contrary to passion (*action contra passionem*) or action above passion (*action praeter passionem*).

Actions of vulgar people arise from passion. The first impulse for them to perform their basic duties like learning and choosing a certain mode of life is fear (*metus*), the fear of their parents and teachers. It is under the stress of fear that they choose a way of life to which they get used to while remaining in it and this makes them love it. Thus the first grade of the

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[21] (...) *consistit enim in his passionibus bona pars condicionis humanae, et fere potissimum per illas homines sumus, et demptis hisce una cum sensibus, non est quod nos amplius homines esse existimemus*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Tractatus IV*, §1.

[22] *Hoc masculum est, non sinere se praeverti a passionibus, id est, nunquam illis hoc iuris dare, ut actionem aliquam nostram aut iubere aut inhibere possint, sed totum illud ius rationi integrum relinquere. Haec enim videt, haec dux esse potest actionum nostrarum; passiones omnes coecae sunt*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 1*, §1, 16.

vulgar holds on to duty out of fear and when they get used to it, out of love. This kind of people seem to be restrained and sedate. The second grade of people are characterised by another kind of fear, it is a fear of their conscience, the conscience understood as a kind of urge or instinct in human soul to fulfil what the reason commands. The conscience is calm when the man is obedient, when however, the man goes counter it, the conscience troubles him. This is not a proper understanding of conscience and that is why these people interpret the commands of the reason wrongly. For instance the reason commands to despise oneself and these people additionally trouble themselves, or the reason forbids killing other people and they add the prohibition to move mortal remains from their burial place. The conscience understood this way similarly to other passions weakens with habit. This second type of people is guided by the fear of non-habit and they are wrongly called religious or saints. The third grade of the vulgar are those who overcome the fear of non-habit with audacity and recklessness. They expose themselves to danger and often change they mode of life. Their fear awakes everything which is stable. Colloquially they are called ambitious and smart. Such a behaviour may – having got used to danger – lead them to think that death is nothing and they often become soldiers or if they do not care about their reputation bandits. The fourth grade of the vulgar restrain one feeling with another contrary to it. If they fear that they are too obedient they become audacious and whenever they feel prone to delight they restrain it with the spectre of infamy. These people are labelled wise and farsighted.

Life of philosophers consists of action contrary to passion and this results from the fact that they want to draw a distinction between them and vulgar people. But, as claims Geulincx: '(...) thereby they showed that they were not really wise, but merely deluded in a more ostentatious manner than the vulgar (...).'[23] There are four grades of philosophical life: Cynics and Stoics, Platonists and two grades of *mortifiers* (*mortificati*). Cynics and Stoics think that it is necessary to uproot every passion. Their fault resides in the fact that human condition out of its nature is connected to passions and by rejecting passions they reject human condition. Platonists recommend not to reject passions but to restrain oneself from action wherever the man is conscious that he might be urged by passion. Geulincx gives as an example a story about Plato, who apparently said to a mischievous boy

[23] (...) *et sic quidem non sapuerunt, sed splendidius et aliter quam populus insaniverunt*; A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Tractatus IV*, §3.

that he would beat him if he was not angry.[24] In spite of the penalty being just, Plato restrained from inflicting it because he was seized with a feeling of anger.[25] But those go astray as well for firstly sometimes one might forsake the good actions while acting this way and secondly the man might give up an action only because of the command of the reason and not because of passion. Certain philosophers tell not to uproot passions but to act contrary to them. There are two ways to do it: act against all passions or against specific ones and particularly against these which are related to eating, bodily love and honours. In reality everybody acts because of passions even though they are not conscious of that. Man is not each time guided by reason in his actions, he lets passions move him. In this classification Geulincx knowingly omitted Aristotelians for he claims that as far as this subject is concerned they are not exactly philosophers but wiser people and they should be on the fourth grade of life of the vulgar.[26]

Actions above passion fill the Christian life. Christians, namely honest people, somehow neglect passions, they do not recognise them worth considering. Being concerned about doing what reason tells them they do not worry whether a passion exists or not. Thus when they punish for offences it is only because the reason tells them to do so and not because they are angry, either they do not restrain themselves from punishment because of the anger but because the reason tells them to do so. Such people never act because of passion even though their actions are accompanied by passion. However they have to be very careful for it is easy for a passion accompanying a certain action, whether it is anger or satisfaction, to take the control over the action and to become a reason of staying in it. What has started because of the command of reason may transform into an action out of anger or satisfaction. Passions as well as senses may also disturb obeying the reason. Within the power of man is not to let the passions become the reason of his actions and this is what Christians do. To want to get rid of passions is to desire to get rid of human nature. One should not fight passions, for the more they are fought with the more powerful they become. Only not paying attention to them may make them weaker. So when one thinks about God, a certain image of Him comes to mind and it is not good to fan it whereas it is impossible to withdraw it, the only way is not to consider it and to refer to innate ideas.

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[24] Compare *Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum*, III, 39 and *Seneca, De ira*, III, 12, 5.

[25] Compare Cicero, *De officiis*, 1, 25, 89.

[26] See A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum IV*, 2.

The connection of mind and body influences the state of mind. Geulincx points out that human mind learns how to function in human condition given by God. He takes up this question while commenting article 71 of the Part One of *Principles of Philosophy* by Descartes, he refers also to the article 72. Descartes presents human state of mind in two periods of his development: in his childhood (*prima aetas*) and in maturity (*maturi anni*). The initial state of mind he describes as follows: 'In our early childhood the mind was so closely tied to the body that it had no leisure for any thoughts except those by means of which it had sensory awareness of what was happening to the body. It did not refer these thoughts to anything outside itself, but merely felt pain when something harmful was happening to the body and felt pleasure when something beneficial occurred.'[27] In the maturity human mind works differently: 'In later years the mind is no longer a total slave to the body, and does not refer everything to it. Indeed, it inquires into the truth of things considered in themselves, and discovers very many of its previous judgments to be false.'[28] Geulincx describes this subject in a more detailed way. He distinguishes three states of human mind connected to three periods in human life. These are: the state of numbness (*status stuporis*), the state of impudence (*status proterviae*) and the state of discernment (*status discretionis*). The first one is related to a period which Geulincx calls *infantia* in Latin and it is, according to him, the fetal and babyhood period. In this state human mind concentrates on itself and does not relate its thoughts (we shall remember about the extensive range of this term in Geulincx) to anything laying beyond it.[29] As confirmation of his belief Geulincx gives the example of an accidental bringing of a baby's hand near the fire. A baby does not take the hand away from fire, which is burning it but cries informing about the pain it feels. The second state of mind is connected to childhood (*pueritia*) which starts according to Geulincx when one starts to talk. Then the mind relates all its thoughts to the things beyond it and this is caused by the conviction that senses come to it from the outside – and are caused by things beyond the mind. Geulincx considers

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[27] R. Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy, Part One, 71* (*Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Ch. Adam, P. Tannery, Paris 1897–1913 (AT), VIIIA, 35). About the close relation between the mind and the body in childhood Descartes writes also in articles 47 and 73 Part One of the mentioned work. Translation into English according to: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985, vol. I.

[28] R. Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy, Part One, 72* (AT VIIIA, 36).

[29] See A. Geulincx, *Annotata latiora in Principia philosophiae Renati Descartes*, *Ad Partem Primam art. 71.*

this state as an especially dangerous, chiefly if it is prolonged and disturbs in achieving the third state. The third one is connected to adulthood (*aetas adulta*). It consists in realizing that thought may be caused by things beyond mind as well as by the mind itself. The competence to subordinate thoughts properly Geulincx calls wisdom.

The above-mentioned states of mind are connected obviously to the question of human knowledge. Geulincx above all draws attention on two elements: what cognizes, namely knowing (*cognoscens*) and what is known (*cognitum*). The existence of knowledge determines the existence of the first of the two elements – what cognizes has to exist. It does not determine however, the existence of what is cognized. Geulincx claims: 'Even something that we always know, is not always just as we know it (otherwise it would be impossible to err). (...) I can know something that does not exist; but it is impossible for me to know, and yet for myself not to exist.'[30] Geulincx shows also some grades of knowledge leading from images to ideas. The lowest are sensual images. They do not relate to the thing in itself, they might truly show the man the utility of the thing or not. Next is knowledge which is deprived of clarity, it does not penetrate things, for instance: we learn that God made us humans, but we do not know how He did that. Then comes the knowledge connected to some evidence but stopping at the surface of things, for instance knowing that something is beautiful, good etc. The last grade of knowledge consists of grasping things except everything related to human way of thinking, denominations used by men, that is knowledge of the thing in itself – in its idea. Next grades of cognizance constitute a way of knowledge. The lowest grade connected to senses does not bring any knowledge, the second one is related above all to consciousness though it brings some knowledge. The third gives the man knowledge: 'This third kind of knowledge is learning proper, which gives us clear knowledge of things, though not as they are in themselves, but under the external qualities that derive from our consideration of them. For example, we recognize the difference between acclivity and declivity, high and low (...).'[31] Owing to this kind of knowledge the man is educated. The last of the grades

[30] *Etiamsi enim cognitum semper sit aliquid, non tamen semper sic est ut esse cognoscitur (alioqui enim impossibile esset errare)* (...) *Possum cognoscere aliquid quod non exsistit, sed impossibile est ut cognoscam et ego ipse non exsistam*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem primam, Secundam scientiam.*

[31] (...) *in quo clare cognoscimus res, non quidem secundum se, sed secundum extrinsecas denominationes, quas habet a considerationibus nostris. V. g. clare cognoscimus, quomodo differant acclive et declive, altum et profundum* (...); A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem tertiam, Sextam scientiam.*

of knowledge described by Geulincx is based on: 'understanding something through an idea, that is, knowing the idea of something'[32] and brings about knowledge in exact sense and makes people wise. According to Geulincx: 'If we want to understand anything we must pay attention to ideas. Wherein we have no idea, therein we must not conclude anything about the nature of a thing.'[33] Having ideas is separated from our sensual sphere and with our corporality: 'Even deprived of our senses, we could still form an idea of a World, and its parts, in fact even of this World (...).'[34] Since 'to be wise is to apprehend and understand a thing as it is in itself'[35] and only the one who is the creator of things possesses it, wisdom understood precisely relates to God uniquely. Medical knowledge seems to make Geulincx cautious while glorifying excessively human mind and wisdom. He writes: 'Whatever we suffer from injuries to the body is not natural to our mind, in common with reasoning, memory,[36] and even wisdom, which desert us when we are delirious. So it is foolish for teachers to recommend study to their pupils by saying that the learning and wisdom they acquire can never depart from them; when the lowest ruffian can deprive us of them with one blow of a cudgel (...).'[37]

Thus the man is a composition of entirely different substances: of a thinking self and extended body: '[Mind] does not presuppose a body, but is completely independent of body: it is only a thinking thing, which the inner

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[32] (...) *cognitionem per ideam, seu cognitionem, qua aliquid cognoscitur in idea sua*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem tertiam, Sextam scientiam.*

[33] *Quotiens volumus aliquid intelligere, debemus consulere ideas. Ubi nullam ideam videmus, ibi non debemus statuere naturam*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem primam, Decimam scientiam.*

[34] *Sensibus etiam destituti, ideam tamen mundi, partiumque eius habere possemus, imo etiam ideam huius mundi* (...); A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem tertiam, Quartam scientiam.*

[35] (...) *qui capit et intelligit rem ut est in se*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Pars tertia, Sexta scientia.*

[36] On the subject of memory Geulincx says: 'Memory appertains to the body, that is, to ourselves only inasmuch as we are incorporated beings; it can hardly be that we are in ourselves minds by virtue of anticipating incorporation' (*Memoria ad corpus pertinet, seu ad nos ipsos ut incorporati sumus; minime vero, ut in nobis ipsis praeveniendo incorporationem mentes quaedam sumus*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem alteram, Duodecimam scientiam*).

[37] *Quicquid corpore laeso laeditur, non pertinet ad nostram mentem; ut ratiocinatio, memoria, etiam ipsa sapientia, quae per delirium a nobis aufertur. Ridiculum itaque est, quando praeceptores discipulis suis commendant studia, dicuntque eruditionem et sapientiam a nobis non posse auferri; cum quivis pessimus nebulo facillimo negotio et uno ictu lapidis, ferri, etc. eam nobis eripere possit*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera, Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem alteram, Duodecimam scientiam.*

experience of our consciousness teaches us can be modified in diverse ways by body and its motions, but which in substance or essence is completely independent of body.'[38] This experience or consciousness show that the two different substances influence each other in a way. There is thus a problem of possibilities of the mutual influence to be solved by a philosopher. The Geulincx's answer results from his metaphysical image of the world and rule: 'What you do not know how to do, is not your action'. Every mutual influence is based on motion and its cause should be conscious. This cause of the motion is unique and it is God: 'Our will has no influence, causality, determination, or any other effect on motion (...). Accordingly, this leaves God as not only sole First Mover but as sole Mover, ordaining and disposing motion, and simultaneously monitoring our will, so that at the very instant at which it desires, for example, to swing forward our feet when we walk, our feet are duly swung forward.'[39] Moreover the fact that the man is composed of the mind and the body is based on a certain necessity. Two minds not composed – God and the man, even though the one is mind in the proper sense and the other is 'something mental',[40] something limited 'by other minds, just as every mode terminates in another mode: as, for example, motion terminates in rest'[41] – cannot influence each other directly by means of motion, which is connected to change and the change necessitates composition. Hence God as mind, namely a simple spiritual substance, in order to cause in the mind of the man, namely in human spirit which is also a simple substance, various changes needs a direct factor which would be composed and therefore would be subject to changes, and the body is such a factor. The body is changeable but passive at the same time, it cannot act on its own but it can be subject to changes. Thus it becomes a instrument

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[38] *Neque enim mens nostra praesupponit corpus, sed penitus independens est ab illo (cum mens nostra nihil aliud sit quam cogitatio, quae quidem, teste intima experientia et conscientia, potest a corpore eiusque motu varie modificari, sed ipsa nihilominus in substantia seu essentia sua penitus a corpore independens esse intelligitur)*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera*, *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram", Ad Partem tertiam, Nonam scientiam.*

[39] *Voluntas nostra nullum habet influxum, causalitatem, determinationem, aut efficaciam quamcumque in motu* (...). (...) *Restat igitur Deus solus primus motor et solus motor, qui et ita motum ordinat atque disponit et ita simul voluntati nostrae licet libere moderatur, ut eodem temporis momento conspiret et voluntas nostra ad proiiciendum v. g. pedes inter ambulandum, et simul ipsa illa pedum proiectio seu ambulatio*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera*, *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram"*, *Ad Partem tertiam, Octavam scientiam.*

[40] *Aliquid mentis*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera*, *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram"*, *Ad Partem tertiam, Secundam scientiam.*

[41] (...) *ad aliam mentem, quemadmodum omnis modus ad alium modum terminatur, e.g. motus ad quietem*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera*, *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram"*, *Ad Partem secundam, Sextam scientiam.*

in God's hands, an occasion (*occasio*) to actions or motions of the spirit. This process occurs the other way: the spirit is the occasion to the motions of the body. Geulincx writes: 'The union of the mind with the body is in the first intention the will of God, who decides when the mind acts on the body, and when it is affected by the body; in the second intention it is the very interchange of action and passion.'[42] In order to explain the way in which this mutual correspondence, this mutual being an occasion takes place Geulincx presents two well-known comparisons. The first comparison is a baby laid in his cradle which wants to be dandled and at the same time the mother or the nanny dandles it. In reality it is not so because the baby wants to but because the mother or the nanny want it. Their will is in accordance with the will of the child in the action of dandling. However the two wills do not influence each other. It seems that Geulincx thought this comparison was accurate, for he comes back to it repeatedly.[43] In the second comparison Geulincx presents two clocks which indicate always the same hour. It is so not because the one influences the other but because they were produced in such a way and they work the same way.[44]

To the question: 'who am I?' asked at the beginning Geulincx answers: 'I am a thinking self (mind)' as a subject of any philosophical consideration and 'I am a man' for to function in the world from necessity the thinking self has to assume a form of 'an incorporated mind' – a man.

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[42] *Unio mentis cum corpore in actu primo est arbitrium illud Dei discernentis ut mens agat in corpus et patiatur a corpore; in actu secundo est illa ipsa reciproca actio passioque*; A. Geulincx, *Metaphysica vera*, *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam veram"*, *Ad Partem primam, Decimam scientiam*.

[43] See A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Tractatus I, caput 2, sectio 2*, §5, 2 and *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §2, 19 and §5, 6–7.

[44] See A. Geulincx, *Ethica, Annotata ad "Ethicam", Ad Tractatum I, caput 2, sectionem 2*, §2, 19 and 48; *Metaphysica vera, Pars tertia, Tredecima scientia; Annotata ad "Metaphysciam veram", Ad Partem tertiam, Octavam scientiam* and *Annotata ad "Metaphysicam ad mentem peripateticam", Ad Partem primam*, §3.

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THE IMMEDIATE COGNITION PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES, KANT, AND FRIES

The philosophical turn towards the subject made by Descartes initiated a large and multi-branch current of the philosophy of the subject. The followers of Descartes's method described their projects from the perspective of reflective paradigm of philosophizing. The research into human reflectiveness and the phenomenon of self-cognition from the critical perspective of transcendentalism led Jakob F. Fries to present in his philosophy a new way of argumentation supporting immediate cognition, which I would like to describe in my essay.

Jakob Friedrich Fries belongs to the branch of psychologistic Neo-Kantianism due to the fact that he referred to the sources of transcendental philosophy from the psychologistic and anthropological point of view. Fries studied philosophy in Leipzig and Jena and was also a physicist and mathematician. He became a professor of philosophy in Heidelberg (1805) and Jena (1816) and in 1812 he also received a professorship of physics at the university of Heidelberg. In 1819 he was deprived of the chair of philosophy as a result of his anarchism, however in 1824 he returned to the university of Jena as a professor of mathematics and physics and, from 1825, also philosophy.

Emphasizing analytical, descriptive and methodological aspects of critical philosophy, he polemicised with constructive-speculative idealism claiming that the goal of philosophy is not speculation but description based on self-observation and close to logical or phenomenological analysis. Fries derived immediate cognition from the possibility of distinguishing philosophical logic from the anthropological one. In philosophical logic, which is a system of analytic judgments, the laws of thought are objectively laws of the possibility to think a thing. On the other hand, anthropological logic based on inner experience, explains the relationship of thinking with

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other activities of human spirit. In Fresian continuation of Kant it was demonstrated that metaphysical propositions are not only assumptions of our judgments in sciences and everyday life but they have their own principle of validation and are consolidated by the psychological theory of reason.

Attitude of Descartes towards immediate cognition

In order to present Descartes' position towards immediate cognition, it seems necessary to define the core of his description of cognition, that is the act of reflection and intuition. Following Wojciech Chudy, I assume that all transformations and shapes of reflection have their structural genesis. They are shaped differently by a type of reflection defined already in the classical paradigm of philosophizing.[1] Reflection in the epistemic sense is a quality of human consciousness with a distinctive cognitive function thanks to which a man who approaches an object in an actful way (firstly, an object transcendent towards itself and secondly towards its own inside) is able to formulate both the act of this approach and the manner in which this act is carried out.

From the ontic side, reflection is a self-appearing or self-perceiving basis for all conscious human acts. Descartes undoubtedly intuisionizes *cogito*. The author of *Meditations* interprets reflective consciousness as a turn towards itself. It is, according to him, a turn towards intellect but only as much as it is connected with the reference to the I and the existence of the I, i.e. as much as it refers to I think.

Cogito self-consciousness is connected with the notion of thinking *cogitatio*. Thinking manifests itself through two kinds of modifications: perceptions and acts of will. It is not, however, formulated through reflection but is grasped when on is anchored in the I "with a simple perception of the mind as an obvious thing."[2] Self-consciousness in this broad and primary sense is a direct and straightforward presentation of diversities and processes happening in the I. It is a subjective obviousness which has the properties of intuition "patterned" after natural cognition linked with external reality.

Wojciech Chudy notes that the absolutization of subject plane which was started by Descartes has its determinants in the sphere of reflective

[1] Chudy, W. 1995. *Rozwój filozofowania a pułapka refleksji. Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przezwyciężania*, Lublin, p. 140 and following.

[2] Descartes, R. 1948. *Rozmowa z Burmanem.* in: *Metytacje o pierwszej filozofii. Zarzuty uczonych mężów i odpowiedzi na nie. Rozmowa z Burmanem*, translated by M. i K. Ajdukiewiczowie, S. Swieżawski, I. Dąbska, Kraków, vol. 2, p. 239.

cognition. Transition from the acts of external perception and perception of one's own body to *cogito*, which takes place under the methodological pressure of the doubting principle, is nothing else then the transition from perception to refection. Furthermore, Descartes identifies intuition with reflective cognition. This is a peculiar intuitionization of reflection which significantly strengthens the status of *cogito*. It is because, whereas any intuitive cognition is a direct, intuitive and straightforward expression of the object, the reflection is immediate cognition and in a certain (weak) way also intuitive but non-straightforward. Claiming that *cogito* has reflective character would necessarily weaken the cognitive value of the whole Cartesian structure which has properties of natural intuition.

Descartes neglected in his theory the reflective side of *cogito* in favour of intuition whose epistemologically strong apodeictic value was the most significant for the principal criterion of valuable cognition: criterion of certainty (*certum*). This is what the Cartesian intuitionization of reflective cognition was all about. Describing cognition as such an easy and clear notion of pure and careful reason that we cannot actually doubt what we get to know, he somehow patterned it after the *cogito* notion of cognition, that is after reflection.[3] This is because reflection, which realizes the *cogito ergo sum* thesis, delivers a perfect undoubtedness of cognition; it is – as the second part of the above definition states – "an undoubted notion of pure and careful mind which derives from the very light of reason by virtue of cognitive validity". Thus it is not the affirmation of being or – to use the language of epistemology – objective obviousness but subjectively certain cognitive obviousness which is rooted in the knowing subject.

The straightforward and non-straightforward cognition is what provides Descartes with undoubted point of departure for his philosophy, and almost since first editions of the works of the French philosopher it has been under discussion together with the problem of immediate cognition.

Cogito ergo sum is a linguistic expression of reflective cognition. Reflection being that simple intuition in the I, which results in obviousness and undoubtedness of cognition of existence, is dual in its nature. The act of reflection directed to its proper subject: thinking (*cogitation*) is accompanied by non-act reflection stating constantly ("at the same time") during the realization of the acts of consciousness the existence-presence of the knowing subject.

[3] Chudy, W. *Rozwój filozofowania...*, op. cit., p. 143.

The unity of the *cogito* act consists in the inseparable connection of two forms of reflection. Directing the intention of reflective consciousness to *cogito*, I get to know the *sum* fact ("I think, I am") and I draw my attention to the fact of my own subjectivity (*sum*); in the background of this feeling of oneself I constantly experience *thinking* ("*I am, I think*").

The two kinds of reflection taking part in cognition are not, however, equal; it also would not be possible to replace at its point of departure the fundamental formula: *cogito ergo sum* with *sum ergo cogito*. In the genetic (psychological) aspect it is the act of consciousness which appoints ("awakens") simultaneously the accompanying reflection: the subjective consciousness is genetically primal in comparison with the consciousness itself. Thus it exists together with thinking – by the very epistemological essence of reflective cognition – in the structure of *Cogito ergo sum* argument it reflects a two-levelness and in the *ergo* reflection it draws the line between act reflection and the accompanying one, at the same time pointing to metasubjective character of Cartesian point of departure in relation to the world of things (outside the knowing subject).

Jakob Friedrich Fries – continuing and going beyond Kant's transcendental philosophy

The position of critical transcendental[4] philosophy occurred in the early stages of Neo-Kantianism as antagonistic to main currents which, according to Fries, developed the ideas of the great master in a wrong way. The philosopher of Jena believed that Hegel and his disciples tended towards logicism and treated reflection as the only source of cognition. Similarly, K. L. Reinhold moved towards formalism demanding the foundation of critical philosophy on pure presentation of descriptive analysis of "the fact of consciousness". F. W. J. Schelling, on the other hand, tended towards mysticism accepting only intuition as a source of knowledge, whereas G. E. Schulze and F. E. Beneke to empiricism rejecting any possibility for the existence of rationalistic and pietistic metaphysics.[5]

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[4] Jakuszko, H. Neofrezjańska Szkoła, in: *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 7, pp. 574–579.

[5] Reinhold, K. L. 1789. *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen.* Reinhold, Karl Leonard. 1790. *Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Erster Band.* Reinhold, K. L. 1791. *Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens*; Georg Wilhelm Hegel. 2002. *Fenomenologia ducha*, translated by F. Nowicki, Warszawa; Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *System*

1. What is cognition?

What is nature? – asks Fries:[6] it is our intuition of reality determined by pure forms of intuition and rules of our thinking. He agrees with Kant that "human intellect is not in itself an ability to *possess* [italics D. J.] intuitive data"[7] and our "intuition is not primal, i.e. it does not even assure us of the existence of the object intuited (which, inasmuch as we have insight into it, is only accessible to the Primal Being).[8] Therefore we do not have original intellectual intuition (*intuitus orginarius*), but only derivative intuition (*intuitus derivativus*) which has to rely on what is given in the presentation primary to the act of cognition. Fries agrees with Kant that this intuition is imperfect due to the very nature of the subject which is cognitively imperfect and existentially finite. At this stage we have to ask a question: what cognitive elements constitute cognition? Cognition takes place in the distinction between cognizing subject and the object of cognition. To get to know anything, the subject has to have access to the representation of an object. It has to present the object to oneself and distinguish oneself from it. The notion of representation possesses therefore three necessary elements: a knowing/representing subject, a conscious act of presentation and a represented object.[9] Cognition is presentation of object's existence or presentation of a principle thanks to which the being of the object exists."[10] For Fries there exists a directly subjective reference of sense representations which does not have a status of indirect knowledge but direct certainty.

2. The view on Kant's transcendental idealism

In his main critical work *Neue oder antropologische Kritik der reinen Vernunft* Fries points out that Kant's study of sources, scope and limits of rational cognition requires the critique of reason to distinguish the content of

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idealizmu transcendentalnego, translated by K. Krzemieniowa. Warszawa 1979; Gottlob Ernst Schulze. 1826. *Psychische Anthropologie*. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen; Friedrich Eduard Beneke. 1832. *Kant und die philosophische Aufgaben unserer Zeit*, Repr. d. Ausg.: Berlin: Mittler; see also: Dłubacz, W. 2002. *Jakob Friedrich Fries* in: *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 3, Lublin, pp. 642–643.

[6] Fries, Jakob Friedrich. 1828. *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft*, rep. in: *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. G. König, L. Geldsetzer, 1967 Scientia Verlag, Allen, vol. 1, p. 75.

[7] Kant, I. 1986. *Krytyka czystego rozumu*. B 153. translated by R. Ingarden, Warszawa.

[8] Ibid. B 72.

[9] Cf. Fries: *Neue Kritik* 1. Bd., 132 (WW 4, S. 68). With this guideline concerning necessary references to the object Fries anticipated Brentano's science of intentionality.

[10] Fries: *Neue Kritik*. 1. Bd., S.128 (WW 4, S. 64).

this critique and its object.[11] Fries wants do defend transcendental idealism but in his opinion it is possible only by developing a science of antinomies of pure reason, and not, like Kant, by transcendental aesthetics which wrongly assumes the object to be the basis for presentation and image. Analyzing Kantian antinomies he claims that Kant fails to notice that the content of an antinomy is perceived in the inner experience which is of assertoric character, whereas the object of critique, which concerns a priori cognition, is apodeictic.

According to Fries, Kant's description of presentation-object relationship, which was developed in order to reach objective (subject independent) validity of synthetic judgments a priori, was also incorrect. The critical question about the relationship of representations with their objects and the fundaments of conformity between them leads Kant to a conclusion that it is not the object which is a fundament for cognition but reason and its laws which are thought of as "laws of nature". The justification of objective validity by way of finding evidence for the harmony between presentation and object is declared impossible by Fries. That is why he wants to deal only with *the truth of conciousness*. The truth is a matter of self-observation since it does not compare cognition to its objects but merely compares our representations with one another.[12]

An a priori proposition possesses its own truth criterion. This *criterium veritatis* is of such a kind that we can perceive it as formal conditions for getting to know objects in general.

In the treatise *Wissen, Glauben und Ahndung*[13] Fries distinguishes three kinds of relationship with reality: knowledge, faith and apprehension. He develops the psycho-transcendental motive of intuition in his work *Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie*. In his works he builds a bridge between knowledge and faith inspired by Jacobi's irrationalism and, similarly to F. D. E. Schleieremacher, he stresses the role of emotional experience. In the sphere of faith, knowledge and apprehension (or, in a wider sense, the sphere of feelings and emotions) we remain, according to Fries in a state of immanent consciousness. In all three areas one question remains unanswered: "**Is there any object which in any sense refers to the**

[11] Fries, J. F. 1935. *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft*, Neudr. d. 2. Aufl. Berlin.

[12] See also: Bloching K.-H. 1969. *J. F. Fries' Philosophie als Theorie der Subjektivität*, Münster, p. 134 and following.

[13] Fries Jakob Friedrich. 1805. *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung*, Neu hrsg. von Leonard Nelson. – Jena, Göttingen 1095.

inner experience?" Is there any objective reality behind the spheres of knowledge, faith and apprehension, even though they do not have any evidence?

Fries claims that if we answer these questions positively we in fact take advantage only of the trust of human reason towards itself that it is really so. What is important is that according to Fries faith and intuition are not only a system of individual ethical and moral convictions but they are subjectively necessary assumptions which cannot be ultimately justified but are nevertheless crucial. Neither science nor knowledge could exist without them.[14] Regulative ideas of human reason are neither more nor less real or obvious than sensual experience or pure forms of perception and thinking. All the three ways of reference to a multilayer reality are similar sources of certainty and to a similar extent can be either supported or demolished by skeptical arguments.

Reading *Critique of pure reason* Fries notices that Kant wants, as he himself puts it by means of **dialectics of the idea** to show on the one hand there regulative application to subject knowledge but, on the other, he wants to equip them with objective meaning in the face of doubts when, for instance, they are expressed from a different point of view than the sensual and intellectual one. Kant wants to achieve this goal also in the field of moral ideas, in the form of practical reason imperatives. This aim, however, according to Fries, is not fully achieved. His main argument ultimately revising Kant's status of regulative ideas – God, soul and freedom, is a thesis that the certainty of our sensual perceptions does not rely on provable *connection* of representation with object but exclusively on perceivable *order* (or mutual conformity of data coming from our experience). The possibility of experience is only a psychological fact which is only possible to analyze by intuition and a priori concepts if its a priori is acknowledged without reservations. Although we project our experience onto objects, the reference to objects is only *given* secondarily in representation.

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[14] According to Fries we experience immediate cognitions in the medium of feelings; Fries, J. F. Neue Kritik D. 1. p. 482. Cf. also Fries *Neue Kritik*. Vol. 1, p. 55 (WW 4, S. XXVII) f. As Elsenhans puts it the acknowledgement of objective validity of our cognition consists ultimately in feelings and motivation of the will Elsenhans T. 1902. *Das Kant-Friesische Problem*. Heidelberg, p. 54, so ultimately on the conviction that the world makes sense. Moreover, Klaus Sachs-Hombach writes even that Fries is under Leibniz's theory of obscure representations (*dunklen Vorstellungen*) when he claims that cognition is given as feeling and becomes transformed into knowledge by reflection. Refection is understood here as realizing a cognition. See: Sachs-Hombach, Klaus. *Kant und Fries*. 2002. *Erkenntnistheorie zwischen Psychologismus und Dogmatismus*. "Kantstudien" 93, Jahrg, Walter de Gruyter, p. 210.

Similarly to Jacobi[15] Fries points out that observation of sensual perceptions as objects affecting senses through affects contradicts fundamental theses of Kantian critique,[16] i.e. the thesis that it is impossible to apply the category chart to thing-in-itself. This is because the thing-in-itself is in fact finite immanent consciousness of subject thinking of itself. If one wants to get from possibility of experience evidence for reality of thinking forms, one ends up in a dead end street. Acknowledging a priori forms of intuition and thinking as suiting each other is a false conclusion since it applies the principle of causality of thinking and of thing-in-itself which is immanent finite consciousness of self-knowing subject.

Everything what is realized in cognition is represented in sensual intuition, pure mathematical perception or in indirect judgments of reason. Methodological demands from metaphysics that its explanations should achieve the highest level of obviousness and necessity are possible to be satisfied only on these planes. For Fries, as well as for classical idealists of who came later, reason critically analyzing itself, that is its own absolute a priori cognitive conditions, is rigorously called the thing-in-itself.

All progress in rational cognition is governed by definite, constant, common rules to which there are no exceptions. That is why reason has to be thought of as a creator of rules determining its activity and thinking about the world, which is shown by Fries. In this way reason as a function becomes reason "as a substratum"[17] as Cassirer puts it. Immediate cognition is where functions and determinants of this substratum are accessible. Purely functional connections which exist in the framework of rational cognition are reinterpreted in the transcendental philosophy as a substantial being.

3. The justification of immediate cognition existence

The Copernican revolution of Kant changed the paradigm of reciprocal reference existing between the subject and object within cognition. In the cognitive process the object is not so much reflected as constructed by abso-

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[15] Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich. 1816–1980. *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2000, and idem, *Jacobi an Fichte. Über das Unternehmen des Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen. Über eine Weissagung Lichtenbergs. Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung. Briefe an Verschiedene*, Werke; Bd. 3, Nachdr. d. Ausg. Leipzig.

[16] See remarks on this subject in: Bousset, D.W. 1909. *Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die Theologie* ed. D. W. Bousset and D. W. Heitmüller Theologische Rundschau XII Jahrgang, 12 Heft, Tübingen, pp. 471–488.

[17] Cassirer, E. 1971. *Siebentes Kapitel. Fries.* in *Das Erkenntnisproblem* in: *der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit*, vol. 3, *Die Nachkritische Systeme*, Hilesheim. New York, p. 448.

lutely a priori structures which the subject has at its disposal. Objects are given to a man thanks to perceptive ability of sensuality and mind's ability to be stimulated by objects. The effect is that sensations are gathered together and organized according to definite rational rules. The reason for objects' representations is the existence of objects themselves and the objects affect subject's perceptiveness.

Fries notes, however, that not only our representations but even the simplest intuitions refer to objects, in the sense that they contain propositions through which one knows the activity of cognition and what is distinguished from this activity, that is the object. Primary type of such simple proposition is a proposition stating the existence of an object of cognition. It is not the object which is a formal reason that it exists for the subject in the representation form but it is made possible by natural equipment of the subject.

Fries emphasizes however, that intuition is not given to us as a pure a priori structure but only its modification thanks to which one's cognitive equipment process external projections into an object which is real to us. Intuition brings into cognition its own features thanks to which it assures us of the object's real existence. Fries disagrees with Fichte presenting his own arguments *per exemplum*: Let us consider an example: I can see a green tree in front of me by which also impressions reach my cognition. I am only asking: What is going on? What do I get according to a usual reaction to the question? The tree stimulates my eyes through which a sensation of greenness reaches me. Since it has to have a reason I conclude on the basis of the tree, which is a stimulant, the reason for perceiving something green. Some add, following Fichte's argument: "If I call a tree green and sugar white, I am utterly false because we name the greenness and the sweetness [...] the tree is green and the sugar sweet because otherwise, if I see a tree and I see it in a direct sensation of something green, nobody would have any reason to ask me about my sensations".[18]

This argument is based on an assumption that in intuition there is a presupposed possibility of experiencing something extra-subjective, and the representation of object and its real existence is not passed to us as late as in the reflection but is given first in the fact of cognition. "The perception in intuition has a direct evidence for itself in such a way as it imagines an object as being present".[19] For Fries the object, before it is represented,

[18] Fries, J. F., *Neue Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, §15 (I.52 ff); cf. §71 (I, 290 ff).

[19] Cassirer, E. 1971. *Siebentes Kapitel*. p. 446.

stimulates our subjective receptiveness in the intuition, not as affecting the mind but as given directly in the perception according to its properties. Every cognition is a creation of the subject's cognitive abilities. Therefore, according to Fries, every cognition is an object of inner experience, i.e. psychological anthropology. Every subject can "observe" all cognition from the anthropological point of view because it belongs to subjective activities of his mind. "I can examine here their transformations, variety, regularity which are the properties of these cognitions which are, in turn, activities of the mind. The observation of cognitions is a directness if every object can be for me a subject of cognition. Cognitions are the properties of our mind: objects are presented to our mind only through cognitions in accordance with the conditions of our mind."[20] If immediate cognition is indispensable to the finite mind and it is necessarily present in the mind, we have to ask a question: How is it possible to prove immediate cognition by way of psychological and empirical self-observation which is not contained in the content of consciousness?

First question we have to ask is: What is given to us in the consciousness? Four different elements are distinguished here: direct knowledge coming from sensual perception, direct knowledge from pure perception and indirect knowledge coming from reason and reflection. The elements can be most adequately characterized by anthropological theory of thought which provides insight into logical forms of thinking. It does not only determine their place but also where each form of thinking begins within the whole structure of reason.

Presenting justification for the existence of immediate cognition, Fries notes that the basic a priori form of our cognition surpasses a purely synthetic unity in variety of intuitive data.[21] This form does not only concern the location of objects close to each other, or sequence of events in time but it also refers to their dynamic correlation, objective and necessary relationships which they create with one another and through one another, the relations we assume basing on the law of substantiality, causality and mutual influence. "Judgments which concern this kind of connection can be neither demonstratively shown nor logically proven. They can be only deduced if we understand deduction as this very inductive-psychological[22]

[20] Ibid., p. 446.

[21] See Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason...*, A 103.

[22] We do not mean the induction in the contemporary psychological sense, that is induction which means in psychology the transfer of emotions and other psychical contents between given people in the communication process.

demonstration which tells us in what place a given knowledge occurs within our cognitive framework."[23] Fries stresses here that cognition which we, in accordance with its pure content, call immediate because, not being justified by any other "medium", it is its own ultimate justification and it is not, in the psychological sense immediately given. "It does not occur to us in any different way than by means of judgment and reason with its forms of reflection. It is once we have made this reflection that we are aware of its repetitiveness; we become aware that what the reflection contains is not created by itself but comes from primary creative spontaneity of reason, which we cannot grasp directly but we characterize it on the basis of its results and achievements, reflecting it in logical consciousness".[24]

4. Immediate cognition and indirect cognition. The kinds of immediate cognition

If apodeictic determinations in our cognitions are to exist and if the notion of necessity is to exist at all in our imaginations, then reason must possess some primary and permanent activity by which all its cognition will be described as an activity of natural cognitive predisposition. Otherwise we could not at all discuss the whole of the history of cognition. For Fries, *the immediate apodictic cognition* must exist simply in such an original activity. Other cognition can remain valid thanks to its dependence on apodeictic cognition.

"Immediate cognition lies hidden in the inner essence of our reason; it cannot perceive reason immediately in itself but is connected with inner sense with which it carries out reflection and which gradually leads us onto the level of abstract thinking. The whole secret of philosophy lies in this relation".[25] In these words Fries distances himself slightly from Kant's position. For Kant it is the reflection which, not being only a purely arbitrary connection of representations, is a primary spontaneity which contains source principles of reason. This principle does not give real existence to any thing nor does it give real properties to our reason. It only means a higher and superior rule for the validity of any synthetic a priori judgments, and it is valid only *as long as* it *is*. The overall objectivity of reason principles is in their formal *meaning* for the system of absolute a priori cognitions – for the justification of the possibility of experience. Hence, reason is not

[23] Fries, J. F., *Neue Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, §18 (I. 55).
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

any *container* in which primary principles lie but is only a *combination* and unification of representations for the functional unity and functional status of cognition itself.

Fries distinguishes immediate cognition from indirect one. The immediate one, which includes constitutive rules of rational acting, should be absolutely certain and apart from being demonstrable it should not need any evidence because, as Fries often argues, the sole fact of its objective existence allows any possibility of theoretical and cognitive considerations. Necessity which *manifests itself* in the thinking process, in the reflection process exists only successively and thus fragmentarily, and has to be given as a source entirety of all the reflection inside reason. The act of reflection does not give anything new; it merely repeats this what is. Hence the consciousness of cognition in the immediate cognition is another pure realization of consciousness in which we have already assimilated this what is finitely existing.[26] Fries's notion of immediate cognition assumes that there exist certainties in which there is no point to doubt. They include, on the one hand, the contents of perception, and on the other, Kantian (formal) synthetic a priori judgments. Thus immediate cognition is justified either by the manifestation of perception, or by deduction, and since it is equipped with doubtless certainty, it can ensure the truth of knowledge in the indirect judgment.

"Intuition is its own witness of truth: I know something about the being of actual objects only as much as I trust intuition".[27] Fries considers justification by intuitive demonstration as unproblematic since immediate cognition is given itself in perception and the judgment is only its official confirmation. They can be proven neither from basic principles, nor from perceptive demonstration, although Fries understands deduction, similarly to Kant, as a subjective method, which in fact seems to him a notionally-rational reconstruction of methodological primary determinations within human cognitive abilities.[28]

Serving as an authority justifying judgments immediate cognition remains problematic because it is not given differently than a judgment but is realized in a judgment. Fries' deduction of synthetic a priori judgments

[26] Cf. Fries: *Neue Kritik*. vol. 1, pp. 302–321 (WW 4, pp. 238–257), especially, p. 313 (WW 4, p. 249).

[27] Here we can find the project of autointerpretation of reason in a new anthropological sense: Fries: *Neue Kritik*. vol. 1, p. 56.

[28] In comparison to subjective and objective deduction in which we do not deal with empirical deduction and especially in Kant's version A of *Critique of Pure Reason*.

consist, as a result, in showing that judgments actually correspond to immediate discursive cognition.[29]

According to Fries "authority to judge is as good as intuition in the direct, actual possession of metaphysical cognition when it takes nothing from intuition."[30]

It has to show within the reflection framework that principles really express actual, formal structures of rational cognition. "Deduction can solely consist in the fact that we conclude from the theory of reason which primary cognition we have to necessarily possess and what principles in our reason must follow from that".[31] What deduction do we have in mind?

Fries writes about the deduction of metaphysical primary principles – the deduction which should, according to him, consist in that we show in our immediate cognition the laws that fundamental to it. If we realize this law only through the basis it may only mean that we derive it from the theory of reason as primary cognition. It is essential that we are equipped with it. What basic principles, however, have to follow from them in our reason? He writes only: "I do not prove that every substance is permanent, I only point out that the axiom of substance permanence lies in every finite reason: I do not argue that God exists but I merely point out that every finite reason believes in God".[32]

If the fact of the existence of absolute conditions of a priori cognitions is not obvious and is ultimately undetermined by the structure of pure reason, Fries contemplates a possibility of accepting an unobvious status of immediate cognition and, what is more, accepting it as unexpressable and obscure for itself. As Fries emphasizes: "It lies beyond any cognitive error as a simple *Dasein* existing in our reason. Immediate cognition consists in acknowledging as axioms certain basic metaphysical theses, for example the one that in the limited human existence we cannot think in a totally different way than by contrasting it with another, more-embracing being, which would have to primarily exist as existentially and cognitively unconditioned.

Immediate cognition, when it ceases to be immediate, enters the sphere of indirect reflections and looses thus its essential, principal character. What

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[29] For these reasons Fries calls judgments transcendental if they hold a priori judgments as a necessary element of reason, as an assumption which we have to yield to. These judgments are of a different sort because dealing with them we have to demonstrate the first kind of cognition, they are not a priori themselves but they are a result of anthropological clarity of notions.

[30] Fries: *Über die Aufgabe der anthropologischen Kritik der Vernunft*, (S.4 71).

[31] Fries: *Neue Kritik...* vol. 1 5.406 (WW 4, 5.342).

[32] Ibid., p. 7.

is, for Fries, the obviousness of immediate cognition about? It reflects the *actual* (not hypothetical) *state* of natural cognitive equipment and, as this equipment, it exists in every mind in the same proportion.[33]

Summary

The contribution of Descartes to the development of philosophical tradition is undeniable and widely known today while Fries's contribution can be summarized in the assertion that the traditional dichotomy of immediate cognition as intuitive and indirect as unintuitive has to be supplemented with immediate non-intuitive cognitions. This thesis led him to a trilemma expressing primary epistemological dilemma: how to justify our convictions? If we demand every conviction to be justified, we have to reject dogmatism, i.e. accepting anything without justification. On the other hand, however, any attempt at justification by way of logical procedure leads to regress *ad infinitum*. We have to refer to a third method: anthropological analysis of reason. It became a source of regressive method understood as a special way of justifying our convictions through immediate experience. The regressive method consisted in selecting appropriate premises for the justification of a proposition whose truth we otherwise acknowledge.[34] Not rejecting the a priori elements in cognition it attempted at explaining them by the analysis of human cognitive abilities introducing what is a priori in cognition and justifying fundamental metaphysical theses. It is especially important today because the ways of dealing with linguistic material led to the same postulate in the field of cognitive research: to broaden the notion of experience with a kind of non-intuitive immediate experience as a basis for insights into language and the tools stabilizing information: semantic memory, grammatical categories, recognition of phonemes etc.[35]

What do the philosophers ultimately have in common when it comes to immediate cognition? Both Descartes and Fries focus in their cognitive ef-

[33] Cassirer stresses the fact that with this actual state of our reason we gain nothing fort he explanation of our absolute cognitive determinants. They remain their own problem from whose inside they are given to us only in our consciousness by becoming aware of them. Casirrer asks, therefore, how can anything be true for myself if it lies in the dark inside of my thought.

[34] For Fries it is a revision of Kant's transcendental deduction form *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is not a purely deductive procedure, in the formal logical sense of deduction, but rather regressive.

[35] See remarks on this subject in an excellent book of Woleński J. 2005. *Epistemology*, Warszawa, p. 458.

forts on the justification of knowledge and the nature of convictions. Both of them take an a priori position when it comes to the question of justification. Descartes applies it to truths constituting obvious and universal principles and Fries additionally holds that a priori is constructed by the structure of human mind. Both philosophers claim that there exists such a group of convictions which play a fundamental role in gaining and, above all, justifying knowledge. This fundamental role consists in our privileged access to fundamental knowledge which is a starting point for our cognitive activity. Fundamental knowledge is, after all, directly justified. From this point of view Cartesian thought is perceived as rationalistic fundamentalism[36] whose main argument is that its formulation is the only one free from Fries's trilemma, that is *regressum ad infinitum*, vicious circle and dogmatism.

However, focusing on the process of justification, Descartes thinks rather about its properties and an answer to the question how to understand its sufficiency. Fries, on the other hand, wants to concentrate on the character of appropriate processes or mental states and perhaps their causes.

Cartesian cognitive method is shaped after mathematics and is supposed to lead to undisputed cognition whose point of departure and axiom for further epistemological analysis is the *ego cogito, ego sum* formula. This cognition is possible, however, only thanks to the trust in perseverant mind, similarly to Fries, to the conviction that we have direct and unquestionable access to the content of our own mind. In the content of consciousness certain ideas are discovered as innate. These ideas are understood as notions in the psychological sense. Innate and, therefore, peculiar, the data of consciousness are expressed in an act of intuition which Fries understands in the same way as his great predecessor, as the one which captures its object in its integrity, embraces its dynamics and thus delivers immediate cognition capturing the essence and free of symbols.

translated by Grzegorz Milecarek

[36] Cf ibid. p. 375.

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ON SOME OF THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LEIBNIZ'S PROGRAMME OF ENLIGHTENED SOCIETY

1. Introduction

In one of the first points of *Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken*, treatease written in the latter part of the nineties of the 17th century and published only after the death of the philosopher, Leibniz observes that 'after science became powerful and military discipline had been established in Germany, German bravery distinguished itself once more in our times in great God-given victories against Oriental and Occidental enemies. The larger share of these victories was often fought by the less victorious and should receive recognition. Now it is desirable that the German intellect should also be no less victorious and should receive recognition. This must come to pass in the same way through good planning and diligence'.[1] Leibniz refers to the heritage of the past when Germany was covered with glory. Since – he says – we were capable of victory, we are also capable of triumph in the domain of intellect, this however requires a scrupulous plan. One of the points of the plan is the restoration of language and enhancement of its social and cognitive functions, but this is only a part of Leibniz's plan the aim of which is to create an enlightened German society. His significant condition is a permanent and unlimited access to any human knowledge. The knowledge collected above all in libraries but also in the archives or documentation centers.

[1] *Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken, betreffend die Ausübung und Verbesserung der Teutschen Sprache*, w: G. G. Leibnitii, *Collectanea Etymologica, illustrationi linguarum, veteris, celticae, germanicae, gallicae, aliarum inservientia*, cum praefatione Johannis Georgii Eccardi, Hanoverae 1717, point 4. (cited as UG, point).

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2. Library

One should take into account that *Informal Thoughts* came into being in the period of Leibniz's important engagement in management of prince's library in Wolfenbüttel since in 1691 he was appointed to the post of the manager of this institution and acted as one until his death.[2] The August's Library which was founded by August the Younger, was at the end of the 17th century one of the richest collections of print and manuscripts in the whole Empire.[3] Leibniz was an experienced librarian. His contact with collections of books began in his childhood. His father Friedrich Leibniz professor of the Leipzich University had at his disposal an abundant collection of books, which was the foundation for education of the prospective philosopher. After his death, only his son was authorized to use the library whereas before, its owner would give the run of the library to anyone interested. Leibniz was librarian for the first time being on duty on the court of baron von Boineburg. Thanks to the protector he had access to one of the richest private collections of books, and his duty among others was to make up a subject catalogue for the needs of its users.[4]

Cataloguing the knowledge and the universal access to it became from that moment one of the ambitions of his life. The second half of the 17th century was the time of reconstruction of German library stock. The Thirty Years War not only killed enormous number of people but also irrevocably destroyed abundant books collections. On the turn of the 16th and the 17th century Germany excelled in Europe in respect of heterogeneity as well as in respect of the size of libraries. After the war, the imperial collection of books in Vienna, the court library in Munich, private collections, and the only municipal library in Augsburg were the only library centers. It was only possible to restore this part of cultural heritage thanks to financial measures being in hands of enlightened elites. Soon duchy courts and Jesuit libraries became the only esteemed cultural centers.[5]

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[2] See A. J. Aiton, *Leibniz – a Biography*, Adam Hilger Ltd, Bristol, Boston 1985, p. 175.

[3] See L. M. Newman, *Leibniz and the German Library Scene*, The Library Association, London 1966.

[4] G. W. Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und briefe*, herausgegegeben von der Preussichen (jetzt Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 6 Reichen, Darmstadt 1923, Leipzig 1983, Berlin 1950 – (cited as AA, cited as vol, part, page) I, i, p. 380. Leibniz was extremely proud of his work, unfortunately it is difficult to evaluate the quality of this enterprise since the catalogue was destroyed.

[5] See A. Hessel, *A History of Libraries*, Scarecrow Press, Washington 1950, p. 55.

Leibniz was lucky to have spent most of his life in service of sovereigns who understood the need for scientific development the indispensable requirement of which was a permanent access to sources and materials being part of collections of books of courts and also its development through purchase not only of historical works but also books and studies concerning latest achievements in all fields of knowledge. The kind of ruler was undoubtedly Johann Friedriech the duke of Hanover, who proposed Leibniz, apart from the post of counselor, also the post of the first librarian of the duke's library.[6]

After a few years abroad where he worked in libraries of Paris and London and learned new techniques of collecting scientific information he began vigorous reformatory activity. Having taken over the care of duke's library he proposed to transform the existent collection of 3310 volumes and manuscripts into a cohesive collection including every scientific field of knowledge. Quality of books was in his opinion more important than quantity so extending library collections was to be treated with a lot of caution and consideration. He presented his ideas in writing mentioning in particular a pressing need to complete the contents of the library with basic texts connected with theology, public and private law, medicine, mathematics, philosophy, literature and history. Leibniz declares to choose only valuable publications and he undertakes to keep track of new publications on the European publishing market thanks to private contacts with scientists publishing in English and French scientific periodicals. One of his most significant declarations is elaboration of easy methods of effective access to library resources through a system of catalogues or registers designed by Leibniz himself.[7] Another concept the realisation of which he undertook was to prepare short summaries of books issuing currently, as well as summaries of content of all books in library. Unfortunately many of his ideas were not accepted by the duke though it must be admitted that owing to Leibniz's financial contribution and energetic actions, there was a necessity to move the enlarged collection of books from summer residence in Herrenhausen to Hanover. Unfortunately the duke Johann Friedrich dies the same year and the new sovereign, duke Ernst August considerably limits expenses on the development of the library.[8]

Leibniz's dream of common access to library resources for everyone interested did not come true on the court of Hanover. The library was accessible

[6] See AA I, i, p. 508 and p. 515–16.

[7] AA II, vii, p. 15–16.

[8] See L. M. Newman, *Leibniz and the Library Scene*, publisher qtd., p. 19.

exclusively to court officials. Besides, it concerned the majority of the dukes' and private collections, though it is worth adding that some of the Imperial libraries were opening their doors to readers needs through introduction of fixed opening hours. For instance the library of Wittenberg was open every day since 1534 similarly to the electoral library in Berlin founded in 1661. University libraries worked the same way as well. There was theoretically a possibility to borrow books and manuscripts but it depended solely on the goodwill of the owner of the collection. Scientists who wanted to use Imperial library contents in Vienna had to get a written agreement from the Emperor himself. Students and professors of the University in Konigsberg needed the same kind of agreement but from the rector.[9] Leibniz himself during his work on the history of Brunswick dynasty sustained numerous hardships and limitations in the access to materials from libraries and archives of the Empire. Even his high scientific position did not help him; during the weeks or even months he waited for the access to sources in libraries in Frankfurt, Augsburg or Munich.[10]

The fact that he accepted the post of the chief librarian in one of the best organized German libraries – the August Library in Wolfenbüttel – gave Leibniz a chance to build a modern scientific centre collecting and elaborating data of all domains of science and culture. Its essential function was also to popularize knowledge and promote culture and art. In one of the letters to Friedrich von Steinberg Leibniz describes his vision of the institution. The library is for him a kind of archive assuring an easy access to its collections unlike other big archives. It is a stock of richness of human mind accessible to anyone. One can find there information on the art of war, medicine, minerals, plants, animals, secrets of nature, astronomy, geology, civil and defensive architecture, decorative art as well as information on law, order, good administration, ancient and modern history, duke's affairs and general culture, that is, on nice, practical and necessary affairs, and particularly on the affairs that contribute to the fight for the truth. The library, as he writes metaphorically, is a team of the most important people of all generations and nations who transmit to us their best thoughts. The library should be used not only by the nobles but also everyone in need for studying.[11]

However the creation of a centre promoting science and culture requires meeting at least a few conditions. Firstly – a wise and enlightened ruler,

[9] Ibidem, p. 10.
[10] Ibidem, p. 20.
[11] Ibidem, p. 25.

secondly, adequate funds, thirdly, a constant inflow of new books, periodicals appearing on the publishing market. Leibniz was of course aware of all these criteria of which only one was partly fulfilled. For, it may be admitted that both duke Rudolf August and his successor duke Anton Ulrich were enlightened people, not enough however to understand the essence of the relationship between the development of science and any knowledge and the expenditure of money on generally understood education. Until 1708 it was hard to speak about important funds allocated to the development of the duke's library since 200 thalers did not cover current needs. Leibniz was trying to secure additional resources as he had done in case of any other of his organisational activities. The idea of raising silk-worms should not be surprising as well as allocating the stamp tax from stamp duty in favour of the institution which he ran. Income from selling the duplicates, even if poor, seemed in this situation the most realistic. If we measured the degree of enlightenment of a sovereign by the expenditure of money, we should undoubtedly give the palm to the founder of the library the duke August who spent on maintenance of the library 15–16 thousand thalers every year, while in years 1705–1708 duke Anton Ulrich would spend on purchase of books exactly 851 thalers, and the annual budget of the electoral library in Berlin until the end of the 17th century was scarcely 1000 thalers.[12]

The only way out for Leibniz was to create an optimal strategy of development of the collection of books through a scrupulous selection of new titles. One of the crucial criteria was quality and originality of the works acquired. It was also important to include all the branches of knowledge present in the library in the development, bearing in mind that the price of books was a fundamental factor. In one of his letters Leibniz writes that he prefers of course, those with a lower price, moreover, he would prefer 30 less interesting books than one voluminous work, which does not contain anything new, anything which was not already said.[13] Since the most important, according to Leibniz, is the contribution to the world of knowledge. Pretty original are his preferences concerning the size of the works purchased. Contrary to fashion he would often choose little publications, containing novelties, and postulated taking care of them in large libraries so as they do not get destroyed.

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[12] Ibidem, p. 26.

[13] G. W. Leibniz, *List do Hertera z 1708 r.* (*A letter to Herter from 1708*), in: J. Burckhard, *Historia Biblithecae Augustae* Leibzig 1744–46, vol. III, p. 352, cited after L. M. Newman, publisher qtd., p. 27.

Leibniz was a great admirer of printed word. He was also a connoisseur of books and his extensive knowledge enabled him to make conscious choices in almost every branch of science.[14] Leibniz took part in auctions, penetrated bookshops, carried on correspondence with scholars from other countries asking them for information concerning new publications. Little is known however about all his efforts concerning his activity in this respect. On the basis of the correspondence it can be only assumed how much energy he devoted to negotiations with booksellers, owners of private collections or on participation in book fairs.

Leibniz knew what kind of library he wanted. During his stay in Italy in 1689 he prepared a list of basic content of a well designed collection of books. The bibliography comprised about 2500 entries, was not however to be printed. Leibniz intended supposedly to present its idea to the Emperor Leopold I during his visit in Vienna. Administering an institution, which in the day its founder died in 1666 comprised 118000 volumes[15] and despite financial problems was still expanding, Leibniz was forced to catalogue its content and to arrange it according to his own concept. It is worth to know that the August Library was one of libraries of that time organised in the most modern way, and the duke himself took part in classification of works of the collection of books. A friend of duke August, baron von Boineburg even persuaded him to publish the completed parts of the catalogue which would ensure a wider knowledge of the content of the library. For it included among others a valuable collection of books on reformation. Leibniz wanted to go even further and planned to prepare a full bibliography and complement it currently.

His plan to build a scientific centre, collecting and elaborating collections of periodicals, books, manuscripts and other documents, with a duty to universalise knowledge Leibniz included in two of his letters directed to duke Rudolf August and his brother Anton Ulrich. The first one is from 4th June 1695, the second is not dated.[16] In these letters he repeats the ideas and assumptions present in letters to Friedrich von Steinberg and other addressees and in the notes he kept. The most striking thing in the first text is a clear formulation of the fundamental purpose of the duke's library. Firstly, it should serve everybody. Secondly – here Leibniz uses a persuasive argument – it will augment glory of sovereigns who collect and preserve this treasure for the common good.

[14] GP VII, p. 161.

[15] A. J. Aiton, *Leibniz*, publisher qtd., p. 87.

[16] See G. W. Leibniz, *Two memoranda from Leibniz to Dukes Rudolph Augustus and Anton Ulrich on the Library at Wolfenbüttel*, in: L. M. Newman, publisher qtd., p. 41.

Library, Leibniz writes, is a stock of all branches of knowledge and information, which can be helpful to all professions and all experts in human, divine, spiritual and secular concerns. In other words, it is a place where genuine religion can be propagated, the Bible can be interpreted, the history of the Church can be elucidated, but it should also serve studies of public order and good governing, research concerning the laws of nature which would enable to improve the quality of living. One of the assignments mentioned in the first text is promoting books containing descriptions of new achievements in domain of science and inventions.[17] Library ought to not only teach but also give pleasure so it should contain essays on rhetoric, languages and poetry as well, apart from scientific dissertations devoted to history or geography.

Library, underlines Leibniz, should constantly extend its content. He enumerates publishing novelties which are in his opinion worthy of notice. These are among others, admirable commentaries to the Bible, texts by the Church Fathers not published before and also important works in the field of theology. He points out works in the field of public and international law, helpful studies concerning public order, finance, trade and politics. Leibniz also proposes to collect court judgements and other decisions of courts, which would serve the studies on application of the law in practice. Above all however, in one breath almost he mentions new studies from domains such as natural science, medicine, mathematics, engineering, optics, astronomy and practically from all remaining fields of knowledge.[18] The extensiveness of his knowledge and his great erudition is clearly visible in this part of the text which also certifies excellent familiarity with the publishing market.

Functioning of a library should be closely connected with academic life. Professors, students and every lecturer would be then able to benefit of its content. Moreover, according to Leibniz, public access to its resources will contribute in effect to the development of the whole duchy.[19] Again we deal here with the postulate of accessibility to knowledge which often appears in Leibniz's journalistic texts concerning scientific life in Germany. The said common access is a necessary condition of formation of a new enlightened German society conscious of its culture, and equipped with modern knowledge and competence in applying new technologies. Let us take notice here of the fact how incredibly up-to-date are Leibniz's views, the lack of understanding of his educational postulates and activities is not surprising,

[17] Ibidem, p. 41.

[18] Ibidem, p. 42–43.

[19] Ibidem, p. 47 and p. 50.

noteworthy however is his optimism and determination in propagating ideas the fulfilment of which will not be brought about before the next century.

Passion for order

In order to perform culture-forming, scientific, popularising and social functions library should be subject to rules of a particular order which would ensure an easy and effective access to appropriate information.[20] This postulate of Leibniz ought to be considered in the context of the number of books and materials printed in the whole Europe which increased extraordinarily thanks to development of printing techniques. Inventories made up after death of the owners of private collections and estimated content of libraries let us assume that between 1680 and 1780 in Western Europe where the book appeared relatively early its supply increased tenfold.[21] In the 17th century appeared at least a few important essays concerning methods of classification of library resources, catalogues, indexes and bibliographies indispensable in organisation of modern libraries. Leibniz undoubtedly familiarised himself with the work of a French librarian Gabriel Naudé *Avis pour dresser une bibliothèque*,[22] he knew the essays by Georg Draudius and Martin Liepinus whose ideas he submitted to a critical examination in his essay *On division of sciences*.[23] When writing to the dukes on his project of access to library information he had a grounded knowledge both in the sphere of theory as well as practice. We would not go into the subject of Leibniz's ideas at length – it is an ungrateful work for the historians of librarianship – we would only observe that he proposes to create a subject catalogue giving information on all authors engaged in a given subject matter, the works of whom are in the library, and being an essential support for deceptive classification scheme demanding radical improvements proposed by the founder, the duke August.[24] Leibniz even if he had at his disposal great organisation and substantial experience he did not publish in his lifetime any of his ideas concerning modern librarianship, his remarks on this subject would appear only in his private correspondence and naturally had a limited reach. How-

[20] Ibidem, p. 43–4.

[21] See P. Chaunu, *La civilisation de l'Europe des Lumiéres*, B. Arthaud, Paris 1971, chapter IV.

[22] L. M. Newman, *Leibniz and the German Library Scene*, publisher qtd., p. 10.

[23] Ibidem, pp. 44–45, footnotes.

[24] G. W. Leibniz, *Two memoranda...*, publisher qtd., pp. 43–4.

ever, irrespective of foundations of methods of classification of collections of books, apart from this passion for order the aim of which is a direct access to knowledge, there is actually in actions of Leibniz something extraordinary, for these actions are reinforced by a belief that the key to happiness of the whole humanity is a common action of the scholarly community which will contribute to the development of all societies and their secure future. This co-operation of people of science is possible thanks to a web of integrated libraries, learned societies and academies.

3. Public information

Access and cataloguing of knowledge and a successful management of the collection of data is not limited purely to the library itself. Leibniz valued the importance of information which would contribute to building of a new community. In this matter there are three very interesting Leibniz's memoranda addressed to the duke of Hanover Johann Friedrich concerning improvements in administration of public affairs.[25] Leibniz believed that social welfare and harmony depends to a great extent on the knowledge of the sovereign about the state of economy. He postulated then, to introduce systematic research regarding natural resources possessed and also human resources in the context of numerical force as well as professional specialisation. Permanent monitoring of the currency value is extremely important in his opinion, as well as keeping balance between import and export. These instructions seem obvious today but Leibniz asks the duke to keep them secret because the whole reform of the country demands a very detailed knowledge which is for the time being inaccessible.[26] Creating and storage of knowledge in the sphere of public affairs demands creation of a web of institutions collecting and transforming data. And so Leibniz postulates keeping official registers of mortality, central administration of archives and in this, creation of a system of easy access to this data. Another idea is to print systematically all current regulations in the sphere of law and administration in order to ensure common access to them. There is also an interesting proposal to create an information centre which would collect all data related to material property, raw materials and articles as well as books, and where every person interested would be given instructions on

[25] AA, I, ii, pp. 74–79.
[26] Ibidem, pp. 79–89.

how to access the goods which they are looking for. Such a centre should also, in his opinion, publish information materials. In these works we deal undoubtedly with a daring project of a reform leading to construction of what is called today a 'knowledge society'.

An essential element of creation of an enlightened community is also a permanent contact with the newest scientific achievements. Specialist scientific periodicals should serve this purpose. The second half of the 17th century brings a new quality of information circulation. There are learning societies emerging along with periodically published collections of scientific reports. At the beginning of the century the only information channel was private correspondence and direct contacts between scholars. Scientific periodicals constitute a bond of minds community which extends to the whole civilised world. Two first periodicals start appearing almost simultaneously in 1665 – these are the French *Journal des Savants* and published in English, London's *Philosophical Transactions* which are translated into Latin in Amsterdam for the use of the scholarly world of Eastern Europe. First German scientific periodicals appear in the seventies and are devoted to medical questions. In 1682 thanks to the support of the duke of Saxony is created in Leipzig and published every month one of the most important German periodicals *Acta Eruditorum*.[27] Even though he was not its direct initiator, Leibniz took part in works on the program of the periodical from 1681 when he met for the first time the originator Otto Mencke, professor of philosophy, a man of great knowledge who corresponded with eminent European scientists. The aim of the periodical was to ensure a permanent access to the most recent scientific achievements to German scholars. Aside from substantial co-operation Leibniz was a regular author publishing in the periodical under the initials G.G.L.[28] *Acta Eruditorum* was a comprehensive paper, different from *Philosophical Transactions* which concentrated mainly on *science*. Its formula corresponded to a far more capacious German notion *Wissenschaft* since there were also published from the fields such as theology, law, history or religion. Even though *Acta* was published in Latin, which ensured an international reach to the periodical, the first issue was translated into French. It had also an admirable authors staff – works of Leewenhoocke, Bernouille, Boyle, Hevelius and of many others were published there. One of its main goals was documentation of the achievements

[27] M. Ornstein, *The Role of Scientific Societies in the Seventeen Century*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1928, pp. 203–4.

[28] See A. J. Aiton, *Leibniz*, publisher qtd., p. 115.

of the German science. After a relatively short time it became one of the leading European scientific periodicals.[29]

Another extremely interesting enterprise is Leibniz's project of a great encyclopedic inventory of arts, which came into existence out of the respect to human invention in solving practical problems of everyday life and its influence on the development of scientific theories. If – he wrote – Galileo did not talk to waterworks constructors and did not learn from these artisans that the suction pump which sucks in water should not be lifted more than 30 feet we would not be familiar with the secret of the weight of air, the vacuum machine, and barometer. While studying bandeaus which surgeons used to ligate veins Harvey got the idea about blood circulation.[30] For when it comes to technical knowledge as opposed to speculative sciences we are not engaged in words but in things, the progress however, achieved in mechanical arts in great part, is as he claimed, still unknown to educated people. Since on the one hand technicians do not know the possibilities of application of the results of their observations and experience, on the other hand scholars and theorists – he writes – do not know that the work of mechanics may contribute to realization of their desideratum. If it was possible to assemble engineer's experience in a form of a body of information, then humanity, according to Leibniz, would be surprised by its might.[31] Practical experience diffused among people who are devoted to different kinds of technical activity both in respect of quantity as well as importance, is superior to what has been written in books. Leibniz proves that the most valuable part of the treasure of which human race would be able to dispose is not still recorded. Each, even the most trivial mechanical craft has a significance of the first rank to science.

Compared to speculative knowledge employing itself in general considerations, the history of practical activity of man seems to Leibniz the type of research that turns to things durable and useful to a community. Many scientists – he writes – entertain themselves chewing general considerations while there exists a vast area where they could exercise their minds with durable and real things and to the advantage of the community at large. We need a *Theatre of Human Life* derived from practical experience of people, different from the one we were handed down by some scientists and which –

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[29] See M. Ornstein, publisher qtd., pp. 205–207.

[30] G. W. Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, VII Vol., ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Halle 1849–1863 (repr. Hildesheim 1960), cited as GP, qtd. as: volume, page, vol. VII, p. 69.

[31] Ibidem, p. 69–70.

even if so great – may be useful only when drafting court speeches and sermons. If at least one of the plays was lost, all our libraries would not make up for the loss. One of the most pressing assignments of the new culture is thus to record in writing all methods and procedures applied by technicians and craftsmen.[32]

4. Social communication

Access to scientific information similarly as to any remaining knowledge is limited not only by the possibility to use the resources. It is limited to a considerable degree by knowledge of languages. We shall notice an extremely interesting Leibniz's project of creating the Academy of Trade and Languages outlined in one of the mentioned memoranda to the duke Johann Friedrich. Leibniz sees the need to instruct young people both on trade as well as foreign languages enabling to develop international contacts. However the real and common access to sources of knowledge is ensured by a good knowledge of one's mother tongue. The programme of actions in this sphere is one of Leibniz's life priorities. He lectures it almost in one breath in his essay *Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken* repeating arguments and postulates which appear in other texts, he also sketches ideas which he will present in detail in later essays.

The programme of reconstruction of German language should include in Leibniz's opinion all use of the language. The nation – according to him – was for too long kept away from knowledge. The real scholars should not be afraid of the language of their compatriots all the more so as the more knowledge is accessible, the more there are witnesses of their might. A well-developed language is like a perfectly polished glass, it increases sharpness of thought and gives the mind a perspicuous clarity. Leibniz makes an appeal to the German scientists to present the results of their studies in their mother tongue 'to this effect it would help much to see the examples of those who have written well (...) It is thus not only necessary to draw on their writings and introduce them as models, but also to increase them, to set into good German the books of an old and even some new major authors, and to work out well all kinds of beautiful and useful materials'.[33] Even documents in archives manifest the weak condition of the national

[32] Ibidem, pp. 181–182.
[33] UG, 111.

language.[34] The mother tongue was left to itself, it developed exclusively thanks to uneducated people and this status quo demands, according to Leibniz, a pressing change and energetic actions undertaken not by single persons but by definite institutions.[35] Leibniz examines in detail the state of the German language and analyses causes of its bad condition, he presents definite actions of reparation. He does not know yet that he is at the beginning of his road and that he acts solitarily. The society of knowledge, enlightened society is an idea which will be fulfilled, at least partly only at the end of the 18th century. Written language has its own levels which overlap on the level of spoken language difficult of access. The first level is delimited by the language of great treatises of science and philosophy, for a long time it was an exclusive domain of Latin. Since the eighties of the 17th century Western Europe writes most often in mother tongues, at the same time French leaves behind English, whereas the East – German, Scandinavian, Danubian – has recourse to Latin as late as the 18th century. On the second level belles-lettres is placed, on the third the language of private correspondence and at last the language the most difficult to access, the language of users who have had some experience of written word present in archives thanks to preserved complaints, demands and permissions. Formation of enlightened societies proceeds gradually. As writes Pierre Chaunu, the dictionary of Enlightement is in Germany on the first level around 1700 and reaches the fourth only in 100 years time.[36]

translated by Marta Jastrzębska

[34] UG, 24.

[35] UG, 9, 30.

[36] See P. Chaunu, *La Civilisation de l'Europe des Lumiéres*, publisher qtd., *Introduction.*

STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 15 (28) 2009

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MORALITY AND REASON. SAMUEL CLARKE'S RATIONALISTIC ETHICS

1.

The British philosophy at the break of the 17th and 18th century was marked by a conflict which had very significant consequences. The developing civic society and the emerging public opinion were starting to be a power, which was gradually limiting the influence of the contemporary political and religious authorities. The above mentioned conflict took different forms. One of them was a debate over the place of reason in ethics. One of the key figures in this conflict was Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), a philosopher and theologian, an Anglican priest and a friend of Newton's. Clarke wanted to develop such a moral philosophy which would have the same conclusions as the orthodox approach, but use different argumentation. Being a theist, he obviously believed that revelation is an unquestionable source. At the same time, he believed that the contents of revelation could be translated into the language of reason. This would show the strength of both dimensions and prove that the proper way of reasoning leads in the same direction as faith. Thus, Clarke endeavoured to create two parallel ethics within one philosophical system: the ethics basing on Christian faith (this one was practically ready) and rational ethics, which would, in a way, duplicate and confirm the first one. The author's intention was that these two ethics should be created as separately as possible. At the same time, he thought that it was not possible to formulate an ethical system on the basis of a certain zero point, like Cartesian *cogito*, because what forms the grounds of "true" ethics is the metaphysical basis of all beings, which appears to be the reality of divine being.

Ethical issues are the subject of one of Clarke's two main works, i.e. *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.* This publi-

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cation was the second part of Clarke's most important endeavour as it was supposed to be an ethical development of metaphysics, which is the subject of his most famous work, i.e. *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.*

Clarke's ethics was supposed to be purely rational and demonstrative in every aspect, and its conclusions – practically significant. And its demonstrativeness was supposed to make it irrefutable. Clarke's intention was to show the rationality of morality itself by means of quasi-mathematical argumentation. He wanted to justify accurately and in detail the logical dependence of moral principles on the nature and attributes of the ultimate reality, i.e. God himself. But not the God of revelation, but the God of philosophy, i.e. on the basis of a supreme and ultimate being defined by the philosophical reason.

The essence of Clarke's ethical method is that moral distinctions and the resulting obligations are only acceptable when they appear to be obvious, i.e. when they are recognized by reason as unquestionable. Contradictory theses are either preposterous themselves or lead to preposterous consequences. And the notion of preposterousness is very wide here. Clarke simply defines its scope arbitrarily, according to the standards of apologetics he practices. "Absurd" – the notion he uses extensively in his texts, encompasses all beliefs which contradict his theses. He believes that moral truths belong to a general system of necessary truths, which also includes the truths relating to the existence of God and His attributes, as well as mathematical truths. According to him, all necessary truths belong to the system of rational truths. Morality, which is essentially intelligible, must by definition belong to such a common system of truths. This is the assumption which forms the foundation of his ethics. At the same time it is one of the fundamental weaknesses of his ethical system.[1] It is because Clarke's ethical rationalism is a rationalism entangled in theology even though the author of this doctrine is persuaded that the initial assumptions are strictly reasonable and do not, in any way, interfere with the purely rational character of ethical argumentation. Hence, it can be said that what we find in Clarke's are not so much two different scales of values (religious and secular) but rather two different ethical structures and one of them – the rational structure, is not, contrary to what the philosopher claims, independent because its initial assumptions include not only the reality of divine being (determined philosophically), but also some statements from the Gospel.

[1] See E. Albee, *Clarke's Ethical Philosophy. II*, "The Philosophical Review", Vol. 37, No. 5 (1928), p. 409.

2.

Clarke typically starts his argumentation not with the notion of God, but with the notion of the nature of things, which is construed as a system of the most fundamental differences and relations of beings. A component of such a nature are moral values and principles. They constitute what we call the law of morality. The law of morality is embedded in the deepest layer of the world, thanks to which it gains the status of objectivity. The law of nature and its moral principles are not autonomous as they are ultimately created by God, whose status guarantees their constancy and independence from historical and cultural circumstances. Thus, Clarke attempts to place morality in such a point of metaphysical structure that would make it both rationally graspable and unchangeable, i.e. absolutely certain and obligatory. He writes that if fundamental moral principles were not founded in the nature of things, which constitutes the causal layer of beings (reasons of things), morality would not be at all possible. Clarke liked very much to compare moral judgments with mathematical propositions, which he considered to be almost perfectly symmetrical. It would be absurd to explain mathematical truths as something that is the result of human conventions, which can undergo changes. To understand mathematical truths means to perceive them as necessary. Therefore, recognizing their truthfulness is not conditioned by whether everybody or only some people agree with the contents of mathematical statements. The same structure of argumentation should refer to proving the principles of morality.[2]

How does Clarke formulate his rationalistic ethics? Moral principles can be understood a priori, regardless of individual experience or religious beliefs. The notion of good and evil do not reflect the human expectation of happiness or the avoidance of suffering. According to Clarke, these notions are a logical consequence of the mere nature of reality. It contains a certain metaphysical code, a fundamental structure covering the basic relations and differences between beings. All events and all actions are either consistent or inconsistent with this metaphysical structure. If they are consistent – we deal with the fitness of event, action or being; if they are inconsistent – we talk about the unfitness. The notion of fitness is essential in Clerke's ethics. It is with our mind that we have to discover this harmony of relations and differences and understand the resulting moral categories, on which the ethical principles are built.[3]

[2] Ibidem, p. 409.

[3] See Peter N. Miller, *'Freethinking' and 'Freedom of Thought' in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, "The Historical Journal", Vol. 36, No. 3 (1993), p. 604.

Clarke writes:

> There are therefore certain necessary and eternal differences of things; and certain consequent fitnesses or unfitnesses of the application of different things or different relations one to another; not depending on any positive constitutions, but founded unchangeably in the nature and reason of things, and unavoidably arising from the differences of the things themselves.[4]

Thus, fitness is a quality of a certain action, which means that this action corresponds to the system of eternal relations, i.e. the nature of things as the nature of things is nothing else but these unchangeable relations. Hence, fitness is a moral category – the category of "good". Unfitness is the moral category of "evil". As a result, the human mind is able to recognize whether the entity's actions and its relation with other beings fall into one or the other category. It can also recognize the relations and actions of others and pass different moral judgments. This proposition of Clarke's is very abstract. One of the questions that may appear here is what we can read in the nature of things in the situation of a concrete choice, in the context of a given situation. Clarke's answers are always general and vague, they hardly ever contain any material illustrating the essence of the solution. A certain attempt at making this issue more precise is the introduction of two kinds of obligations, which will be done further on in this text.

Thus, Clarke's reasoning concentrates on showing the basis of all morality, where we should look for the validity of all moral notions and judgments. In other words, this basis is supposed to be the source of the objectivity of ethical norms understood with the help of reason. The law of morality (which Clarke also refers to as natural religion or natural morality) is embedded in the nature of things. This law is unchangeable, necessary and eternal. Contrary to what Hobbes says, it is infinitely more perfect and independent of any law imposed by human political power as it is a part of the metaphysical structure of the world. Its basic elements are moral principles and the related obligations. Among the former Clarke lists the principles of equity, righteousness, justice, goodness, truth (not caring too much about the clarity of the terms used). Their logical consequence is the obligation to respect them. These obligation refers to absolutely all people, all rational

[4] Samuel Clarke, *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation* (next as DISC), in: *A Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*, London 1732, p. 185 (reprint: Kessinger Publishing's Rare Mystical Reprints).

beings. Thus, by means reason itself, without any religious beliefs, we can characterize the law of nature as:

- common – i.e. binding for everybody regardless of religious, cultural or social differences;
- eternal – it has not been imposed by humans, it had existed "before first towns and empires were created, before first rights were written down";
- constant – "like mathematical truths, like darkness and light, like sweetness and bitterness";
- embedded in the nature of things;[5]

On numerous occasions, Clarke refers to a fragment of Plato's *Euthyphro*, where the Plato's dilemma appears – the dilemma relating to the final sources of morality. Does goodness result from reality itself or the divine arbitrary establishment? Clarke tries to reconcile Euthyphro's attitude with that of Socrates in the spirit of Christian apologetics, which is characteristic for this stream of British philosophy initiated by Plato's adherents from Cambridge. Clarke's compromise is as follows: the source of fundamental moral differentiations and ethical obligations is the deepest layer of nature, whose ultimate validation is God – the creator of nature, and, in particular His natural attributes (infinity, almightiness, omnipresence, eternity) as well as His moral attributes (goodness, truthfulness, justice, love, mercy and all other perfections), which are reflected in eternal and constant reasons and relations of things, i.e. the rules of common moral law.

This attempt of the English philosopher at the reconciliation of Euthyphro with Socrates becomes more clear in a slightly wider context. According to Clarke, the differentiation between the good and evil as well as the whole moral law are based on the metaphysical foundation of nature. Thus, in a way, they are reality in themselves, which is independent of particular human interpretations and desires. In relation to God, however, the law of morality is dependent – dependent on His will, but, to some extent... it is also independent. That is because God is the unchallenged creator of all beings. He creates the world according to His will, which is first reflected in those eternal and unchangeable relations, differences between beings and fundamental reasons of things. However, God's creative activity is not completely arbitrary, it is not motivated by a whim or random option, but rather by the well-being of the whole world: the well-being – if we may say so – regarding the whole world, not its particular fragments such as suf-

[5] Ibidem, p. 216.

fering individuals. At the same time, the nature of things, i.e. the aspect of essential relations, emancipates from God, with His consent, which is to say that once the world has been created on the basis of certain reasons, God respects them within His ruling power. Hence, the law of morality is a work of God, but once it has been established, God voluntarily accepts its requirements.[6] This conclusion of Clarke's can be described as the idea of self-limited voluntarism of God.

3.

The major component of Clarke's ethics is the concept of obligations. It is an attempt at showing the practical context of an ethical theory, which, for the British philosopher, was a matter of primary importance. He repeatedly writes that ethics should aim at influencing as many people as possible trying to make them feel a need for changing their behaviour if it is vicious. (He attached more importance, however, to religion believing that its impact is stronger than that of philosophy and that it is capable of changing the world, where vice and sin are so widespread).

The first and basic obligation ("formal" or "primary" obligation) is general in nature; it is a formal order to undertake only such actions which are consistent with the law of morality, which is decoded by means of reason. This is what Clarke writes about formal obligation:

> Thus it appears in general, that the mind of Man cannot avoid giving its Assent to the eternal Law of Righteousness; that is, cannot but acknowledge the reasonableness and fitness of Men's governing all their Actions by the Rule of Right or Equity: And also that this Assent is a formal Obligation upon every Man, actually and constantly to conform himself to that Rule.[7]

Then, the mind ("easily") deduces "secondary" (additional) obligations, which are the next stage of making moral obligations more precise. Clarke lists three types of such secondary obligations (arising logically from the law of nature):

1. We should worship and respect God, we should adore Him with all our power and skills as He is the Author and Ruler of all things. This obligation takes the form of piety. And its validation is based on divine

[6] Ibidem, p. 218.

[7] Ibidem, p. 199.

attributes of infinity, eternity, omnipresence and wisdom, which should be admired by all rational beings. At the same time, it is also a symptom of fitness to the law of nature whereas all disobedience and disrespect towards God are the synonyms and symptoms of unfitness to the eternal relations which constitute the law of nature. Therefore, the majesty of divine being is a metaphysical basis of this obligation.

2. As regards other rational beings – we should show others respect, goodness and justice as it is reasonable to expect that other people will treat us the same way we treat them. What is more, the reason tells us that in interpersonal relations we should imitate God in His relation to ourselves. This obligation takes the form of the love of one's neighbour and good will, which are grounded in the divine attribute of mercy,[8] but they can also be deduced from the analysis of the true human nature. Fitness realized in such a way must lead to universal well-being and happiness while unfitness leads to destruction and damage.
3. We should also show respect towards ourselves, which entails the necessity of restraining one's desires and curbing our passions as they are the source of all moral defects and depravation; but we must also develop the talents we possess. This obligation takes the form of continence.[9] In other words, fitness consists of self-perfection and unfitness – disrespect of oneself, the extreme form of which is suicide.

Clarke makes these three types of obligation even more precise and constantly emphasizes that all of this happens within the framework of a logical deduction performed by our mind. And so, within the first obligation (towards God), he lists the whole catalogue of additional duties, all of which are also grounded in different aspects of divine being. He talks about the duty of utmost admiration for God, which is supposed to result logically from certain divine attributes (eternity, infinity, omniscience, wisdom). The omnipresence of God imposes the duty of utmost respect, the fact of God being the Creator and the Preserver of the world – the duty of adoration and worship, also in the form of ritual cult. The singularity of God results in the duty of worshipping only Him. The attribute of divine power and justice imposes on us (logically) the duty of fear of God whereas God's mercy – (as paradox as it sounds) the duty of hope, just like God's goodness – the duty of love. Truthfulness and changelessness are the grounds for the duty of reliance or trust in God. Other duties are not based on divine attributes,

[8] Ibidem, p. 204–206.

[9] Ibidem, p. 209.

but on beliefs, which the mind has to acquire otherwise. Since we have received from the Creator our existence and talents we have a duty to develop ourselves in our service to God while the inescapable awareness of being completely dependent on God, both in our existence and in what we really need, obliges us to constant prayer.[10]

In Clarke's theological discourse, these conclusions are absolutely unquestionable – "as plain and conspicuous, as the shining of the sun at noon-day".[11] Those who cannot see that not only commit a sin towards the Creator, but also a mistake in reasoning because: "(...) 'tis the greatest absurdity and perverseness in the world, for creatures indued with reason, to attempt to break through and transgress this necessary order and dependency of things".[12] As regards the other two obligations, Clarke particularizes these imperatives by means of justification and explanation. The obligation towards others is reflected, as already mentioned, in love and good will or "universal" love and good will. And here the argumentation of the English philosopher resorts to the assumptions, which are, in Clarke's opinion, indisputably resolved in his metaphysics, where he proves the existence of God and His attributes, and, thanks to that – the objective difference between good and evil. Let us look at his typical argumentation, where very often he uses tautologies in the place of definitions of basic ethical terms.

Clarke writes as follows:

> For if (as has been before proved) there be a natural and necessary difference between good and evil; and that which is good is fit and reasonable; and that which is evil is unreasonable to be done; and that which is the greatest good, is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen: then, as the goodness of God extends it self universally over all his works through the whole creation, by doing always what is absolutely best in the whole; so every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the good it can to all its fellow-creatures.[13]

And for this purpose, the best and the most dependable means is universal love and universal good will.

The way of demonstrating the obligation towards oneself is slightly different. Here, Clarke once again resorts to God's metaphysics and claims that

[10] Ibidem, p. 200.
[11] Ibidem, p. 201.
[12] Ibidem, p. 201.
[13] Ibidem, p. 206.

the imperative of protecting one's life and the prohibition of suicide[14] result undeniably from the fact that God is the giver of life, which implies the obviousness of this imperative. Within this obligation, reason obliges man to "(...) take care to keep himself at all times in such temper and disposition both of body and mind, as may best fit and enable him to perform his duty in all other instances".[15] All these "other instances" are the situations determined by the first two obligations, i.e. we must take care of ourselves so as to best fulfill the duty of worshiping God and the duty of loving others in the name of universal happiness. It must be noticed again that the utilitarian context, interpreted in a Christian way, is very often present in the ethics of this English thinker.

Such is, in short, the moral philosophy of this Anglican philosopher, which pretends to the status of a purely rational doctrine. And for which the ethics formulated in the religious order is supposed to constitute a structure, which is independent, but fully consistent – a symmetrical reflection, in a way. We have seen, however, that this "secular" reasoning of Clarke relies on religious statements, which are not logical conclusions of his argumentation. It can be assumed then that ethical rationalism is not independent as it is entangled in religion and its hidden premise is the belief that morality needs the support of religion.

Samuel Clarke, just like Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, the apologists from the Platonic School in Cambridge, saw clearly the changes in the intellectual discourse of the second half of the 17th and the first decades of the following century. From the point of view of a Christian theist, these changes were alarming, to say the least, and their consequences must have seemed fatal for the revealed faith. Spinoza and Locke, to some extent, and, most of all, British deists were starting to be dangerous opponents that Clarke wanted to fight with their own weapons. Hence, from this historical context comes the inspiration of the English philosopher and theologian to defend Christianity on the grounds of reason, i.e. in the field which had been dominated by "atheists", as he often called them. However, the ethics, which had been intended as rational, eventually appeared to be a natural theology of morality.

[14] Charles Blount – a renown British deist, who in his essay *Defense of Self-murder* postulated the right to suicide, made Clarke especially furious.

[15] DISC, p. 209.

STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 15 (28) 2009

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ON THE ORIGINS OF THE BERKELEIAN DEFINITION OF 'EXISTENCE'

> 'tis on the Discovering of the nature & meaning & import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the Sceptics and me (*Commentaries*, Entry 491)[1]

The remarkable feature of Berkeley's philosophy is his extremely ambitious and challenging project to reformulate the metaphysical framework of the relation between mind and world, which was directed against the sceptical threat and culminates in his famous explicit denial of the existence of material substance. The definition *esse est percipi aut percipere*, 'to be is to be perceived or to perceive', labelled by Berkeley as the 'New Principle', plays the crucial role in this proposal.

This existential aspect of Berkeleian thought is surprisingly neglected by commentators. As rightly observed by Ayers, "Berkeley's claims about existence raise an apparently less than obvious question, or at any rate one which is seldom asked: why did Berkeley believe, or come to believe, that at the heart of his theory lies a theory about *existence* or, more particularly, about the meaning of the word 'exist'?" (1986: 567). The aim of the paper is to make an attempt to answer this question by determining the genesis of the Berkeleian definition of 'existence'.

[1] All references to Berkeley's works are to their critical edition by Luce and Jessop (1948–57). Besides *Comentaries* (which I quote by entries), *Principles* (quoted by sections), and Locke's *Essays* (which I quote by book, chapter and section numbers), all other quotations are by page numbers. In my paper the crucial role for the understanding of the arguments contained in the *Principles* and *Dialogues* plays Berkeley's private philosophical notebook (probably written during 1707 and 1708), given the title *Philosophical Commentaries* by Luce in his *editio diplomatica* of 1944 (hereafter quoted as *Commentaries*). In many points it is of an extraordinary interest and value because highlights (at least heuristically) Berkeley's preparatory work for his first major publications, which helps to reconstruct his motivation, development and tendencies of his consideration, and the proper design of arguments. Moreover, it reveals also explicitly the opposition to and agreement with other particular philosophers by names.

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The argument of my interpretation consists in the following four steps: (i) firstly, I reconstruct the Berkeleian position on existence by stipulating its role in his philosophical project; (ii) secondly, on that ground, I reconstruct its Cartesian intellectual settings; (iii) thirdly, I argue in more detail that his definition of existence was designed to block the sceptical consequences of Cartesian (Bayleian) thought; and (iv) finally, I explain the general character of Berkeley's proposal (of re-definition of 'existence') by placing it in the framework of possible anti-sceptical strategies. I will try to demonstrate that with respect to the existence of external reality, Berkeleian philosophy and his philosophical goals are most plausibly understood as Cartesian in a broad sense, i.e. as at least inspired by the issues and arguments of the continental metaphysics of the seventeenth century.

I

Scepticism takes different forms. It depends on the domain, which is taken into doubt. It might focus on the question about the validity of an inquiry or on the refutation of the possibility of knowledge in a certain field (e.g. in epistemology, ethics or religion), or on some particular issue (e.g. about the existence or nature of the external world). Berkeley was motivated antisceptically by problems, which were brought up by sceptics as regards the existence and the knowledge of the nature of the external world.

Berkeley was convinced that a separation of the world from the way it is experienced, in terms of the representational theory of perception, is a source of scepticism. According to him, it results from "supposing a two-fold existence of the objects of sense, the one intelligible, or in the mind, the other real and without the mind" (*Principles*, §86), since "for so long as men thought that *real* things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth *real* as it was conformable to *real things*, it follows, they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?" (Ibidem).

The key argument, showing how scepticism arises out of the representational theory of perception, is one that undermines the objectivity or mind-independence of primary qualities. If one were able to prove that both secondary and primary qualities are mind-dependent, that is, are perceptions, then a merely 'veil of our ideas' would be our only ground for believing that there is some world of objects represented by them, which world is ab-

solutely unknowable both in respect of its existence as well as its nature. And since our perceptions are subjective and variable, and moreover they constitute dreams and hallucinations as well as what is taken as a veridical experience, it follows that an absolute distinction between what we perceive and what we take our perceptions to be perceptions of arises. "So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things, existing *in rerum natura*" (*Principles*, §87). Following that reason, Berkeley argued that:

> So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking thing, but even that it exists. Hence it is, that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of every thing they see or feel, even of their own bodies (*Principles*, §88).

The same point is argued in the 'Preface' to the *Dialogues*, where Berkeley wrote that "[u]pon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived (...). Hence arise scepticism and paradoxes" (*Dialogues*: 167). In the *Second Dialogue*, he emphasises this point by saying to Hylas (a representant of materialism – in Berkeley's terms, a position that contains an insistence on the existence of material substance):

> You indeed said the reality of sensible things consisted in an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic (Ibidem: 11–2; see 228–9, 246, 258, *Principles*, §§92, 101).

For Berkeley, then, the source of the sceptical threat is a wrong definition of 'existence', which is the root of the thesis that what there is exists independently of perception. It results in arguments opening an unbridgeable gap between experience and experience-independent reality. It raises a serious difficulty as a knowing subject is only ever acquainted with his perceptions, with its own immanence ('private items'), and never with the items which putatively lie inaccessibly beyond his perceptions but which somehow give rise to them. Perceptions are therefore supposed to represent in some way or even resemble the beyond. But how could he know about this resemblance, since it follows from that inaccessibility beyond his perception that he has no justification for asserting that there are such 'external'

items, still less that he can know anything of their intrinsic nature. Moreover, a different way of existence is characteristic for each item: a mental or an intentional existence of perceptions, and non-mental ('material' or 'physical') existence of represented things. But both have an absolute or independent modality of existence as a consequence of an existential assumption of the Cartesian dualism of substance: mind or spirit and mater or body are equally real in their existence.

On that ground Berkeley concluded that scepticism arises directly from the philosophical view that there is matter, that is, corporeal substance, existing independently from our perceptions of it, and having properties which belong to it 'absolutely' – i.e. the primary qualities. However, according to him, "the supposition that things are distinct from Ideas thaws away all real Truth, & consequently brings in a Universal Scepticism, since all our knowledge is confin'd barely to our own Ideas" (*Commentaries*, Entry 606).

II

Among the modern philosophers, it was Descartes who initiated the discussion about the existence of a material world (see McCracken 1983: 18–9; 1998: 624–5; Burnyeat 1982: 3–40; Groarke 1984: 281–301). Although Descartes does not regard the issue as to be taken seriously in ordinary life, it must be taken into account by the philosopher, who wants to build knowledge on the basis of sure and infallible foundations, which are not vulnerable to sceptical arguments. Both Descartes and Berkeley designed their philosophical positions as tools for rejecting sceptical reasoning.

At two points of central importance for Berkeley, Descartes (1641/1984--5) was the thinker who focused his attention on the issue of whether we can know that there is a material world (see *Commentaries*, Entries 738, 784, 8222), and he also proposed the doctrine that the mind is an incorporeal substance whose nature consists in 'thinking' or 'perceiving' (in a broad sense of these terms, understood in seventeenth-century philosophy as any mental activity both of reasoning or sensing and willing) (see Descartes 1641/1984–85: 126–27). While Berkeley rejected Descartes' position that body is a material substance, he shared his view that mind is a spiritual substance and that its essence can be clearly known as a 'thinking thing' (*Commentaries*, Entries 429–429a; *Principles*, §§98, 141).[2] He argues that

[2] This view of mind as substance is firmly non-Lockean, as Locke argued that there is no essence of mind – there are merely its operations (*Essays*, IV.iii.6; see also Loeb 1981: 90–1).

the *esse* of mind is *percipere*, and mind cannot be imagined as existing without thought (*Commentaries*, Entries 650–2, 842).

Descartes held that infallible foundations of knowledge require proving that bodies exist, and he believed that in *Meditation VI* this was achieved. However, Malebranche claims that it is very difficult to prove conclusively that the things we see as external to our minds do have "a real existence, independent of our minds". Moreover, sustaining the high Cartesian requirements for knowledge, he denies that such proof is possible for either geometry (mathematics) or physics (Malebranche 1674–78/1980: 482–84). In the first edition of the *Search* (1674–5), he argues that these sciences are concerned with relations amongst our "pure" (non-sensuous) ideas of extension, of which we have indispensable demonstrative knowledge, whether or not there are bodies. Within the *Elucidations*, appended to the third edition (1677–8), he reconsiders the issue of the existence of the external world. In the *Elucidation VI* (Ibidem: 569–74), he explicitly denies that material things could be proved on the evidence either of sense or of reason. In support of this claim, Malebranche argues from versions of the ancient and Cartesian sceptical arguments concerning perceptual relativities, dreams and hallucinations, and feebleness of human reason. Eventually, his argument culminates in the conclusion that the ground for the belief in the existence of the material world rests merely on faith. That is, he argues that any certainty in this matter comes only through faith in God's revelation in Scripture that He did indeed create a corporeal world.

So far as testimony of the senses and the deliverances of human reason go, there is only a balance of probability in favour of being the external world. He qualified this claim, arguing that any kind of certain knowledge can be attained only by unmediated acquaintance with ideas-archetypes in the mind of God. In support of this, he considers the finitude and impotence of the human mind to demonstrate the inadequacy of Descartes' doctrine that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true because God, as a perfect being, could not deceive us. Distinguishing between *sensations* as modification or acts of our minds and *ideas* as proper objects of our knowledge (i.e. as set of necessary and general claims) Malebranche argues that ideas are, by their nature, the eternal and immutable essences of things, and hence cannot be a part of any finite mind. Finite minds, being powerless, cannot on their own possess clear and distinct ideas of things, for such power is to be found only in the divine mind.

Therefore, he concludes that the Cartesian account of knowing, without his improvements, must lead to scepticism. For ideas are regarded by Descartes as modifications of the mind, and the eternal essences cannot be

modifications of finite minds. Moreover, finite minds have to rely merely on an assumption that their ideas correlate adequately to represented things. Hence, they cannot be sure at all that any such correspondence holds. According to Malebranche, clear and distinct ideas could be saved then as the criteria of knowledge only if it is assumed that finite minds are in direct contact with the only power capable of apprehending the conformity between ideas and things, namely, the divine mind. Hence, the only plausible explanation of the origin of our knowledge is that "we see all things in God".

There is an interesting analogy at this point in the philosophical approaches of Berkeley and Malebranche. As we will see later, Berkeley was also motivated by the threat of philosophical scepticism. The central feature of Malebrancheanian and Berkeleian attempts to block that outcome is the denial of the distinction between ideas and things (appearances and reality), and in consequence, establishing material substance as something indemonstrable, unknowable and unimportant. For Berkeley, both these claims were immensely significant. Entries (265, 288, 288a, 358, 424, 686, 800, 818) in *Commentaries* show that what Malebranche proposed in the *Elucidation VI* captured his attention. However, as we will see in his reaction to Bayle's arguments, Berkeley was alerted by another possible sceptical horn established paradoxically by the anti-sceptical manoeuvre of the denial of the existence of material substance by Malebranche. Berkeley had to have it in mind, when he wrote: "Malebranche in his Illustrations differs widely from me He doubts of the existence of Bodies I doubt not in the least of this" (Entry 800; see 686, 686a, 818). And, although in some respect his answer was more radical – because he denied any rational or religious proof for the existence of external material reality (*Principles*, §§82–4; *Third Dialogue*: 250–6; see also Jessop 1938: 121–42; Brykman 1984: ch.1; Glauser 1999) – he wanted to save the claim that physical reality exists by reformulation of the notion of its existence. For Berkeley, the key point here is to reformulate the mode of the existence of the external world by denying the absolute character of the existence of material substance.

III

The culmination of the seventeenth-century Cartesian sceptics' attack on the putative knowledge of and the existence of the external world arrived in Pierre Bayle's *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697–1702/1974). Bayle is evoked in *Commentaries* in a duplicated entry, 358 and 424, which joins him with Malebranche, and expresses the contention that their arguments

prove decisive against material things. Indeed, Bayle's dictionary articles on Zeno and Pyrrho are arguably the prime source for the sceptical problem Berkeley sought to solve (see Luce 1934: 53–55; 1963: ch. 4; Popkin 1951–52; Grayling 1986: 14–5; McCracken and Tipton 2000: 76–89). I will argue that it provides the original motivation for Berkeley's definition of 'existence'.

In the remark B of the article "Pyrrho", and remarks G and H of the article "Zeno", Bayle uses every argument that had been advanced against Descartes' proof of the existence of the external world.[3] The two most important lines of arguments against matter that Bayle mentions are:

(i) that all the arguments posited against the reality of secondary qualities apply with equal force to the primary qualities as well,
(ii) that (mathematical) arguments from infinite divisibility are either false or prove at best that extension does not exist without the mind that perceives it.

Both of these kinds of arguments we find in *Commentaries*, in entries nos. 20, 26, 236. In my opinion, it is very likely that it was from Bayle that Berkeley learned 'the full force' of his first argument against the absolute or independent existence of matter.

The crucial point here is that all these arguments for scepticism are echoed, even in phraseology, by Berkeley. Both Bayle and Berkeley focused their attention on the fact that Cartesianism assumes that material objects possess in themselves such primary or 'original' qualities as extension, figure and motion, while the secondary qualities of objects exist only in relation to the minds of perceivers. The distinction was held to be important because even if secondary qualities – such as sound, colour, taste, etc. – are variable and at least in part subjective, as indeed they appear to be, knowledge of primary qualities, as measurable properties of objects themselves, were thought to provide access to mind-independent reality. On this the Cartesians insisted, for it played a crucial role in the Cartesian strategy of proving the existence of the external world, i.e., the world independent from perceiving minds.

Bayle, accepting the subjective character of secondary qualities, indicates, however, that there is no adequate argument for the objectivity of primary qualities either. He writes: "none among good Philosophers now doubt that the Sceptics are in the right to maintain that qualities of bodies which strike our senses are only mere appearances" (1697–1702/1974: 380). He goes on to argue that from this there follows a general scepticism about

[3] The arguments formulated by Foucher, Malebranche, Regius, Lanion, and Fardella (see McCracken 1998: 635).

all types of qualities, and *ipso facto* the primary qualities as well. He argues that if the secondary qualities are in the mind rather than in the objects, the same must be held of the primary qualities. Following Malebranche, Bayle writes:

> Cartesians agree that heat, smell, colours etc are not in the objects of our senses; they are only some modifications of my soul; I know that bodies are not such as they appear to me. They were willing to except extension and motion, but they could not do it; for if the objects of our senses appear to us coloured, hot, cold, smelling, though they are not so, why should they not appear extended and figured, at rest, and in motion, though they had no such thing. Nay, the object of my senses cannot be the cause of my sensations: I might therefore feel cold and heat, see colours, figures, extension, and motion, though there was not one body in the world. I have not therefore one good proof of the existence of bodies (Ibidem).

Aiming to 'overthrow of the reality of extension', in "Zeno" Remark G, Bayle again emphasises that: "the same body appears to us little or great, round or square, according to the place from whence we view it; and certainly, a body which seems to us very little, appears very great to a fly" (Ibidem: 381). The core of this argument relies on the claim that the conclusion must inevitably follow from accepting the view that secondary qualities are mind-dependent: for just as secondary qualities are relative to the state or situation of perceivers, so are the primary. As it is not possible to affirm which quality – whether sweetness or bitterness, largeness or smallness – belongs 'independently' or 'absolutely' to an object, then, *a fortiori*, it is not possible to affirm that the object has a general quality of 'taste' or a general quality of 'extension' at all.

In Remark H of the "Zeno" article, Bayle qualifies his conclusion about the 'unreality of extension', arguing that a belief in there being external bodies, independent from perceiving minds, is not in any case required to explain the nature either of experience or the existence and nature of the external world. Following Malebranche again, he goes on to argue that it is so because "whether or nor matter exists, God could equally communicate to us all the thoughts we have" (Ibidem).

Then, the main line of the sceptical argument considered by Bayle sought directly to impugn the view that, however relative or subjective secondary qualities may be, there can be assurance concerning the existence and the nature of an independent reality, namely, by means at least of empirical access to the primary qualities of things. His conclusion is to say that once a gap is opened between sensory experience on the one hand, and an

external material reality on the other, there is no philosophical foundation to suppose any kind of correlation between them, since external material reality cannot be known, given the inescapable subjectivity of sensory experience in respect not only of the secondary but of the primary qualities of what is sensed: that is to say, scepticism follows immediately.

It seems plausible to argue that these lines of the sceptical consequences of Cartesian philosophy were warnings for Berkeley. They could be regarded as leading to "the establishment of a very dangerous Pyrrhonism" (Ibidem). It is not possible to avoid total scepticism as the outcome, if it is combined the contention that the external world cannot be known given the indispensable subjectivity of sensory experience (either of secondary or primary qualities of what is experienced), and the Malebranchean doubts about the efficacy of reason. In the following, very early entry from *Commentaries*, Berkeley expresses his fear about these sceptical consequences:

> Mem. that I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics Fardella etc, in yt I make bodies to exist certainly (prima manu without us) wch they doubt of (Entry 79).[4]

Moreover, the striking entries in *Commentaries* connect Berkeley's 'New Principle', viz. *esse est percipi* (and the new turn that it gave to his whole philosophical project), with the danger of scepticism and his discovery of the way to undermine the sceptical arguments:

(1) In entry 304, Berkeley writes:

> The Reverse of ye Principle introduc'd Scepticism
>
> In that context, the reverse of the Principle is obviously that of *esse est non percipi*. As noted by Luce, "[t]he entry is repeated with amplification in No. 411, where scepticism, folly, contradictions and absurdities are traced to the same source" (1963: 73).

(2) In further part, in entry 491, pointing out that many ancient and Cartesian sceptics run into absurdities, Berkeley writes:

> [T]his sprung from their not knowing wt existence was and wherein it consisted this the source of all their Folly, 'tis on the Discovering of the nature & meaning & import of existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the sceptics & me.

[4] In "Zeno", Bayle records that M. Fardella, Franciscan monk and philosopher, asserts the same doctrine as Malebranche, i.e. that objects may not be like their ideas, and that God may have so disposed our senses that they represent non-existing things as existing.

On that ground, we can conclude that scepticism about the external world – the threat of this scepticism and the possible recovery from that scepticism, seems to play a large if not decisive role in Berkeley's formulation of the definition of 'existence'. It is very likely that it was a major factor that influenced his original project (in *Commentaries*), and later mature conclusions (in *Principles* and *Dialogues*); as Berkeley put it himself, both his "first arguings" and his "second thoughts". Bayle's articles were then probably his main source of information about continental Cartesian metaphysics and scepticism as its possible outcome. Therefore, it is very likely that they motivated him in making his revised and original version of immaterialism formulated in the 'New Principle'.

IV

In order to explain the above statements of Berkeley, let's turn now to place his proposal on the map of possible anti-sceptical manoeuvres. Following Dąmbska (1952), it seems to me that we can enumerate the following types of strategies for the refutation of scepticism:

(i) axiological type: tries to show that scepticism leads to moral consequences, which are impossible for us to accept (as undermining our morality, religion or science, or even our everyday life practices)
(ii) logical type: tries to prove a logical inconsistency in the sceptical argument itself
(iii) epistemological type: tries to undermine epistemological reasons for scepticism, mostly by:
  (iii.a) changes made to the conceptual apparatus assumed by sceptics – by redefinition or replacement of one element of the sceptical premises by another element, which is not vulnerable to sceptical threat:
    (iii.a.α) by redefinition of the notion of truth,
    (iii.a.β) by redefinition of the notion of knowledge, or
    (iii.a.γ) by redefinition of the notion of the object of knowledge;
  (iii.b) showing that even assuming the premises of sceptical conceptual scheme, it is mistaken to claim that there are no satisfying methods of saying what is true or false.

It is worth to note that there is some correlation amongst these types of anti-sceptical strategies. Firstly, the axiological type is not an adequate tool to refute an epistemological (theoretical or normative) scepticism, which is

Berkeley's aim, and could combat merely some practical consequences of the former. Moreover, though these practical consequences might be implied by theoretical or epistemological scepticism, it is not a necessary implication. Then, contrary to the intentions of anti-sceptics, which are trying to use this practical type of argument, they do not reach scepticism in its most fundamental form. It seems that a successful anti-sceptical strategy should be aimed at the refutation of theoretical (epistemological) scepticism. Secondly, the logical strategy does not seem a satisfying tool to refute the sceptical threat, either. It consists in proving a logical inconsistency of the sceptical doctrine, which could be in fact avoided by an adequate reformulation of the sceptical position.

The most fundamental strategy to refute scepticism seems an epistemological type, then. We can note that variant (iii.a) might take a form which could be regarded as a moderate (modified) scepticism. For many seventeen-century philosophers this was true of Descartes' position, whose methodological scepticism or his systematic consideration of a proof for the existence of the external world, were perceived as a new form of scepticism (see Jolley 1999: 393–423). On other hand, a change or a redefinition of the notion of the object of knowledge, which was transcendental according to sceptics, could lead within an epistemological anti-sceptical strategy to a form of idealism (by mentalizing the object).

Presumably, Berkeley's view on scepticism could be considered as the (iii.c) variant of an epistemological type of anti-sceptical strategy, namely, by changing the notion of the object of knowledge. It has to be emphasised, however, that the Berkeleian proposal implies a fundamental ontological assumption. For it is not merely a simple change in the meaning of the object of knowledge, but first of all it is the redefinition of a modality of existence of the object of knowledge. We have here not only an epistemological claim, but also a strong ontological thesis about the definition of 'existence', which in fact implies the former as more fundamental. If it were a merely epistemological thesis, it might be enough to say that a 'perceived thing' is an 'idea' or 'complex of ideas' (viz. 'obiectum est percipi'). But Berkeley said that 'to be (a physical thing) is to be perceived' (viz. 'esse est percipi'), which demonstrates his deep interest in a more fundamental or theoretically prior question about the meaning of 'existence': what it means for a physical object to exist.

*

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To conclude, the influence of a Cartesian metaphysics and post-Cartesian scepticism seems to provide a plausible answer to the question why

Berkeley came to believe that the theory of existence is the heart of his philosophical project. Berkeley's New Principle is intended to achieve the aim of refuting scepticism by demonstrating that the only substance there can be is mind or spirit. Metaphysical reformulation of the concept of existence or the meaning of existence is supposed by Berkeley to be a proper tool to undermine the claim about the existence of material substance, which is the source of the sceptical threat.

By showing the origins of the Berkeleian definition of existence, we have reached also an interesting philosophical moral on the general strategy of the refutation of scepticism. Berkeley's strategy seems very modern. In my opinion, it is possible to see this strategy as a kind of a proto-semantic approach, which resembles, at least to some extent, the dominant philosophical tendency associated with radical conventionalism. From such a perspective, we can describe Berkeley's strategy as an attempt to redefine the conceptual apparatus, which is understood as a list of the basic meanings ascribed to the terms of the given language. Interestingly, the motivation for doing this is the empirical fact that the meanings are not strictly stipulated by our experience, which is a source of the misuses and misunderstanding of our philosophical discourse. Berkeley seems to mean that a sceptical threat is a consequence of the fact that some of our basic propositions about the world, contain the meanings, which we assert and which in fact form our world picture, but which are not unambiguously stipulated by data of our experience. They depend on the conceptual apparatus we use to describe our experiential data. In other words, Berkeley probably realized that we have to choose some conceptual apparatus or other, and this decision will change our world picture. We can suppose that the definition of existence was seen by Berkeley as the most primitive notion, which presumably was expected to tie the proposed conceptual apparatus of his position with the experience. From his empiricist position, only this kind of relation might warrant the most adequate picture of the world, as it was supposed to be verified by empirical data. The empirical verification of the meaning of existence (by perception) was so important because it was presumably a way of undermining the gap between our conceptual or cognitive representations and the world of the things-in-themselves. In other words, how things are and how we experience them.[5]

[5] An earlier draft of this paper was presented in Polish at the conference on modern philosophy entitled "Oblicza filozofii XVII wieku" (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland, 17–18 September 2007), and subsequently published in Polish as "O genezie Berkleyowskiej definicji »istnienia«" in *Oblicza filozofii XVII wieku*, ed. S. Ja-

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Summary

The paper seeks an interpretation of Berkeley's metaphysics, which is characterised in terms of an attempt to formulate a kind of ontology of the existence. Although essential, this existential aspect of Berkeleian thought is surprisingly neglected by commentators, presumably due to the dominant epistemological tendency in the interpretation of his philosophy. The aim of the paper is an attempt to fill the above lack in the scholarship on Berkeley's philosophy. In order to accomplish this task, I will ask what is the motivation for emphasising the importance of the notion of the existence

and in particular its formulation by Berkeley. Considering the above, I will examine this concept in the respect of its metaphysical assumptions and possible influences by the closest metaphysical context to Berkeley's philosophy, namely, as I will argue, the rationalist continental tradition of René Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche and Pierre Bayle. I do not maintain that Berkeley ignored or that he was not influenced by Locke's philosophy, which is the traditional framework within which Berkeley's thought is discussed. My claim is rather that Locke's philosophy should not be overestimated in the readings of Berkeley because it tends not to posses the features which are specific to the issue of external world existence elaborated by Berkeley, which are the characteristics of a Cartesian tradition and indeed the metaphysical heart of Berkeleian philosophy.

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CARTESIANISM IN É. CONDILLAC'S THEORY OF SCIENCE

É. Condillac's sensualist epistemology used to be combined with J. Locke's empiricist accomplishments, following the opinion of Condillac himself. While appreciating this solution, the French philosopher sought to develop it, and in particular he wished to make it more profound. He wanted to formulate a special "metaphysics" of knowledge,[1] a synonym of genetic analyses that were supposed to answer the question: how and why is knowledge possible? Like in the case of Locke, the point of reference in Condillac's epistemology was Descartes' solution,[2] including his theory of science. Condillac's basic psychological starting point was continued after Locke as well.

It seems that contrary to the principal opposition between innatistic rationalism and Condillac's sensualism we may find some essential relations between his epistemology and Descartes' epistemology. We can do it on condition that we take into account not only the conclusions of Descartes as an epistemologist who builds the foundation for meta-

[1] See S. Janeczek, *Przejawy refleksji metafizycznej w filozofii Étienne'a Bennota de Condillaca (1715–1780)* [Some Manifestations of Metaphysical Reflection in the Philosophy of Étienne Bennot de Condillac (1715–1780)], in: *Z dziejów filozoficznej refleksji nad człowiekiem. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Jana Czerkawskiego (1939–2007)* [On the History of Philosophical Reflection on Man. A Jubilee Book Dedicated to Professor Jan Czerkawski (1939–2007)], ed. P. Gutowski, P. Gut, Lublin 2007, p. 257–274.

[2] Although Locke ignored Descartes' speculative physics, and approved of I. Newton's achievements instead, nevertheless he owed much to epistemology. On the relations between Locke and Descartes see C. S. Ware, *The Influence of Descartes on John Locke. A Bibliographical Study*, "Revue internationale de philosophie" 1950 no. 12, p. 210–230; N. Wolterstorff, *John Locke and the Ethics of Belief*, Cambridge 1996 (repr. 1999), p. 180–218; H. A. S. Schankula, *Locke, Descartes and the Science of Nature*, "Journal of the History of Ideas" 41:1980, p. 459–477 (the same in: *John Locke. Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1979*, ed. R. Brandt, Berlin 1981, p. 163–180; the same in: *Philosophy, Religion and Science in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. J. W. Yolton, Rochester 1994, p. 306–324); P. A. Schouls, *The Cartesian Method of Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding"*, "Canadian Journal of Philosophy" 4:1974–1975, p. 579–601; J. A. Passmore, *Descartes, the British Empiricists, and Formal Logic*, "Philosophical Review" 62:1953, p. 545–553.

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physical considerations, but also formulates a theory of science to validate natural science. Thereby he sanctions the role of experience that is an integral element of the method indispensable in constructing the system of science that is deductively conceived.[3] Usually, however, his merits are stressed in area of establishing analytical, intuitive, and deductive procedures. They found an ideal of knowledge defined by the categories of certainty, obviousness, clarity, and distinctness that appear in various contexts.[4] For Descartes, the requirement of certainty seems more essential than cognitive evidence,[5] nevertheless it is not by accident that the first of the four requirements of universal method is usually defined in the categories of obviousness (taken by of a subject), that is clarity and distinctness.[6] Descartes in one go indicates that his considerations with regard to metaphysics are not only equal as to their certainty and evidence with geometrical proofs, but even surpass them.[7] To a certain degree this

[3] See with documentation in: S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia? Uwarunkowania historyczno-filozoficzne nowożytnej koncepcji logiki* [Logic or Epistemology? Historical and Philosophical Conditions of the Modern Conception of Logic], Lublin 2003, p. 222–230, 246–255.

[4] See ibid., p. 198–206.

[5] No wonder that the most recent dictionaries of Descartes' concepts contain only the entry "certainty," not "evidence." *Certainty* in: J. Cottingham, *A Descartes Dictionary*, Oxford 1993, p. 29–30; *Certainty*, in: R. Ariew et al., *Historical Dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy*, Lanham 2003, p. 51.

[6] Descartes recommends not to accept as true any thing before it has not been recognised as evident ("evidemment"). We should be careful and avoid haste and prejudices, and not to include in our judgements anything beyond what appears for the mind clearly ("clairement") and distinctly ("distinctement") so that we should have no reason why we should doubt it. R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Ch. Adam, P. Tannery, Paris 1897–1913 (repr. Paris 1996), vol. 6, p. 18–19. The requirement of clarity is fulfilled when things are present for the looking eye and sufficiently strong act on it and without coverings. Now an approach is distinct, that is, isolated from others and strict, when it does not contain in itself anything else, except what is distinct. Therefore there may be clear approaches, but not distinct, when there are no distinct approaches that would not be clear. R. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. 8, part 1, p. 22. Cf. J. Kopania, *Proces myślenia a zagadnienie jasności i wyraźności w systemie Descartesa* [The Process of Thinking and the Question of Clarity and Distinctness in Descartes' System], "Studia Filozoficzne" 1984, fsc. 11–12, p. 21–36.

[7] The letter to Sorbone Professors that precedes the *Meditationes*. R. Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. 7, p. 4. Eventually, Descartes will find the foundation of epistemology in metaphysics specifically comprehended. It is connected with the constitution of "cogito" as a reflexive act whose discovery safeguards the validity of knowledge as the most certain truth and thus indubitable. The knowing subject is more certain of himself than of the thing that is to be known, therefore the knowledge of oneself is a condition of any other knowledge, and this further supports God's veracity who does not cheat us in this kind of knowledge. Cf. W. Augustyn's insightful remarks who notices a contradiction in Descartes' doctrine. On the one hand the French philosopher finds out that knowledge is principally fallible so much that even evident knowledge (intuitive) is not indubitable, and somewhere else he recognises knowledge currently evident, i.e. clear and distinct, as reliable by virtue of its structure. The drama

requirement may also be referred to natural science in which the deductionist model with regard to explication is put in accord with the inductionist model with regard to heuristics, and a specific game between reason and experiment may be postulated. In this case, despite the continuous stress on the requirement of the certainty of knowledge, Descartes agrees that some truths have only a probable character, they "attributed with moral certainty" (literary speaking, they are morally certain, "certa moraliter"), although they are insufficient with regard to life needs. This hypothetical character will not concern the most general principles of physics. Their value depends on their manner in which they are conceived, that is on "evident reasonings these things deal with," in analogy to theorems of metaphysics that correspond to standards of mathematics.[8] In the conclusion to *Principia philosophiae* he says even that "certitude métaphysics" concerns not only mathematical proofs, but also "knowledge that there are material things," or even "that such are all reasonings that deal with them and conducted in an evident manner," that is also those that concern their essence.[9] The interesting thing may therefore be to trace Con-

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of these quests, in the way that is not at least inconsequent, is indicated in the *Meditationes* in which (the first meditation) Descartes questions the validity of any knowledge to defend its validity through the evidence of the existence of the knowing subject (the second meditation). Eventually, he makes truthfulness of knowledge dependent on God's veracity. W. Augustyn, *Podstawy wiedzy u Descartesa i Malebranche'a* [The Foundations of Knowledge in Descartes and Malebranche], Warszawa 1973, p. 13–42. The opinion prevails, however, that Descartes had finally avoided vicious circle in the justification of the value of knowledge. As he demanded that God safeguard even the validity of mathematical or logical truths, he in fact did not refer to Him when he stated the existence of "cogito." See L. E. Loeb, *The Cartesian Circle*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, ed. J. Cottingham, Cambridge 1992, p. 200–235; P. Markie, *The Cogito and Its Importance*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, p. 140–173; the same in: *Descartes*, ed. J. Cottingham, Oxford 1998, p. 50–78; J. Krakowski, *Mathesis i metafizyka. Studium metodologiczne przełomu kartezjańskiego* [Mathesis and Metaphysics. A Methodological Study of the Cartesian Breakthrough], Wrocław 1992, p. 59–116; Z. Drozdowicz, *Kartezjusz a współczesność* [Descartes and the Present Time], Poznań 1980, p. 76–96. Cf. e.g. P. Markie, *Descartes's Gambit*, Ithaca (N.Y.) 1986; E. Curley, *Descartes against the Skeptics*, Oxford 1978; H. G. Frankfurt, *Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen*, Indianopolis (Ind.) 1970.

[8] Cf. D. M. Clarke, *Descartes' Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Evolution*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, p. 275–283. Cf. also the same, *Descartes' Philosophy of Science. Studies in Intellectual History*, Manchester 1982.

[9] "Talis est cognitio quod res materiales existant; et talia sunt evidentia omnia ratiocinia, quae de ipsis sunt" – R. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. 8, part 1, p. 328. In a more extended French version not only the certainty of the existence of material bodies is emphasised, but also that all, therefore not only mathematical, proofs of the theorems about bodies are certain, if they are evident (the same, *Principes de la philosophie*, in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. 9, part 2, p. 324). See J. Kopania, *Funkcje poznawcze Descartesa teorii idei* [The Cognitive Functions of Descartes' Theory of Ideas], Białystok 1988, p. 321, note 128.

dillac's less known considerations on the three types of evidence he had distinguished.

In his *De l'art de raisonner* Condillac focused on the understanding of the objects of our knowledge and the degree to which this knowledge is certain, that is, the issue on the theory of knowledge with its methodological applications in various types of sciences. The French philosopher distinguished three types of evidence each of which has its respective methods of verification, functions and limitations, hence the evidence of fact ("l'évidence de fait"), evidence of sentiment ("l'évidence de sentiment"), and evidence of reason ("l'évidence de raison"). They correspond to three valid methods that he supplements only with an analogy.[10]

Thus it seems at least strange that Condillac, a sensualist, attaches primary importance to the evidence of reason. This is yet more apparent at the end of his learned activity, when in the *Logique* (analogously as in the *La langue des calculs*[11]) is willing to identify the whole the art of reasoning ("raisonnement") with procedures modelled after algebra and he reduces the development of knowledge to an operation analogous to equations in which some concepts are replaced by other equivalent categories. This attitude is accounted for by combining the evidence of reason with the preference for analytical method, a method that is comprehended above all as a method of discovery and is inseparably linked with a method characteristic of algebra. It recommends to operate with the simplest language, for the language of solutions that make use of algebraic signs that are simpler and more precise than words. What is more, Condillac identifies all rules of the art of reason with this type of operation, and postulates to reduce to it the whole of cognitive operations, a procedure that is supposed to ensure a reliable development of knowledge by deriving in equations what is unknown from that which is given.[12]

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[10] The first part of chapter IX summarises the various types of evidence and their attendant methods in science. This part is entitled *La logique ou les premiers développments de l'art de penser* (Paris 1780; quoted in *Oeuvres phiolsophiques de Condillac*, vol. 2, ed. G. Le Roy, Paris 1948, p. 269–416), where he refers us to *De l'art de raisonner* (in: *Cours d'études pour l'instruction du prince de Parme*, vol. 3, Parma [actually Paris] 1775) that is "supposed to be a broader interpretation of the whole lecture." É. Condillac, *Logika* [Logic], p. 137–148, 174–180; the same, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvre philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 409–413. Cf. S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?* [Logic or Epistemology?] p. 514–534.

[11] Paris 1798; quoted in ed. *Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 417–529.

[12] É. Condillac, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophiques de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 410. Cf. S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?* [Logic or Epistemology?] p. 564–585.

Condillac conferred on the postulated method a universal character. Reducing its essence to techniques taken from algebraic equations, accounts for the evidence of reason that is understood in terms of identity.[13] A proposition is supposed to be self-evident or else it follows evidently from another self-evident theorem. We can see here how Descartes' intuition and deduction have been transformed through a more consequent reference to the spirit of the method applied in algebra, and algebra was also a model for the great antecedent of Condillac. It was Condillac's original contribution in relation to Descartes' understanding of intuition that he made use of the category of identity in this case. We may find in this procedure an anticipation of the analytical proposition in the Kantian sense, when the predicate of a proposition is hidden in the subject, therefore the proposition's veracity depends only on its terms. This corresponds with the category of rational truths in Leibnitz's conception. The German philosopher regarded them as true in all possible worlds, when actual truths are true only in the real world.[14]

A given theorem is self-evident only when the one who knows the value of particular words has no doubt as to its content: like in a proposition the whole is equal to its particular parts taken together.[15] A proposition is evident also when one proposition evidently follows from another one which in turn is self-evident. In this case also evidence has its source in identity. This time, however, it is the identity of propositions in which one proposition follows from another one. Condillac states: out of two theorems one is an evident consequence from another one, when the comparison of their theses proves that they demonstrate the same thing, i.e. when they are identical. This demonstration is therefore a series of theorems where there are the same ideas, one is different from another one that they are differently formulated, and the evidence of reason consists only in identity.[16] In both cases Condillac uses the idea of identity broadly understood, and it is not clear whether this idea refers to the range of contents. The reference to the language of algebra could indicate that identity was understood in terms of the range, yet the

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[13] "L'identité est le signe de l'évidence de raison," É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 619. In *Logique* he says the following: "We have already proved that... the evidence of reason... is relies only on identity," the same, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 411.

[14] M. Przełęcki, *Analityczność i syntetyczność* [Analitycity and Syntethicity], in: *Filozofia a nauka. Zarys encyklopedyczny* [Philosophy and Science. An Encyclopedic Outline], ed. Z. Cackowski, J. Kmita, K. Szaniawski, P.J. Smoczyński, Wrocław 1987, p. 27–28.

[15] É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 621.

[16] Ibid., p. 621.

jargon of associacionist psychology and the emphasis on the importance of the language to express the same idea and the proposition's reference to the subject that is thus variously defined, seems to show that the reasoning is comprehended in terms of its contents.[17]

Although both the language characteristic of algebra and the analytical method, in particular the technique of reducing all theorems to the form of equations, may be applied in all sciences,[18] Condillac is aware of their limitations. It is proper to God only to reduce the whole of knowledge to tautological equation from whom each truth is like an equation: "Two and two make four." If, however, God sees everything in one truth, then we are doomed to acquire knowledge by way of analysis of the elements of equations comprehended as a series of propositions whose truthfulness is verified by their ultimate reducibility to identity. To state identity that is tautology for God is in the case of human knowledge a painstaking process of discovery.[19] A proposition that is reduced to an equation comprehended by way of definition is true only because it is in accord with a complex idea, which in the form of an equation determines the nature of for instance gold: "That which is yellow, heavy and fusible is yellow, heavy and fusible".[20] According to Condillac, not only each true proposition is in fact an identity, but also each system understood as a series of true propositions, for it is "only one and the same idea" and may be reduced to the form of the equation: "The same is the same." The sensualist system created by Condillac was supposed to have such a character. It defines the nature of the cognitive faculties, for it is reducible to the proposition "an expression is an expression," therefore it is "self-identical"[21]. This is supposed to concern in the same way Newton's mechanics based on the analysis of movement. Condillac treats it in *De l'art*

[17] He does not specify this kind of identity in his *Dictionnaire des synonymes* either, repeating his formulations from *De l'art de raisonner*, É. Condillac, *Identité* in: *Dictionnaire des synonymes* in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 3, p. 320.

[18] It is not by accident that in the introduction to *La langue des calculs* he states that the subject matter of this text is mathematics whose language is algebra. At the same time he adds that it is closely linked with "a greater object" ("un objet bien plus grand"). He leaves no doubt what kind of object it is when he states that "the point is to show how to make all abilities equally accurate, the same accuracy that has up to now been granted only to mathematics with to the detriment of other sciences." The quote is from the supplement to É. Condillac, *La langue des calculs*, p. 420. Cf. the same, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 410–411.

[19] All our cognitive efforts, of which we are proud, are ridiculous in the eyes of God, as His proper apprehension is simple. É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 748.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p. 749.

de raisonner as the model of a proper system. According to I. F. Knight, this system may be reduced to the proposition: "A balance is a balance."[22]

Taking the "evidence of reason" in terms of identity expressed in the form of equations, Condillac is well aware that we can accomplish it on condition that we know very well the elements that compose those equations.[23] There are theorems in which the subject and the predicate are actually identical, a fact that obtains in relation to truths whose nominal definition coincides with the real one. Now the acquisition of knowledge characterised by the evidence of reason, taken in terms of identity articulated in an equation, is characteristic, above all, of such theorems. This is possible especially in mathematics where identity is self-evident ("L'identité est sensible en aritméthique").[24] It is differently in the case of the propositions that refer to substance, e.g. the body and the soul, where we can indicate in fact only their primary attribute, i.e. extensiveness ("le corps est une substance étendue") and thinking ("substance qui sent"). In the case of the knowledge of substances, we are most often doomed to define it by way of the enumeration of its attributes, e.g. gold is yellow, plastic, and malleable ("L'or est jaune, ductile, maléable").[25] And although this knowledge, an expression of a preference for the relational approach over the substantial one, suffice to compare bodies, nevertheless it does not ensure precision that is necessary to define the nature of bodies in the proper sense, or even precision with regard to their comparison. Since it is evident in the proper sense as evidence of reason, we are doomed to refer to experience as the only tool of "reasoning" with respect to the scope of knowledge about substances.[26]

Although reasoning is identified with a rationally comprehended analysis as a synonym of certain knowledge, in practical research we are often doomed to other learned procedures. Their task is above all to gain some

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[22] I. F. Knight, *The Geometric Spirit. The Abbé de Condillac and the French Enlightenment*, New Haven, 1968, p. 63. Now referring the system of macrocosmos according to Newton, Condillac compares it to the movement of machines. He states simply that "our cosmos is a great balance." This statement is supposed to be heuristically fertile, for the process of discovery is a transformation from a proposition that states equality, a process that ensures the unveiling of all possible truths, and that in an evident manner. The series of those propositions, like the truths, is ultimately reducible to the starting thesis. É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 676.

[23] Cf. I. F. Knight, *The Geometric Spirit*, p. 74–76.

[24] É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 628.

[25] Ibid., p. 628–629.

[26] Ibid., p. 630.

material that will then become an object of rational analyses. Since we cannot use a purely rational argumentation, we have to refer to experience. The sensualist Condillac, who belonged to the circle of the philosophy of subject, is apparently exposing the so-called evidence of inner sensation in the form of phenomena or facts that we learn, that we perceive in ourselves.[27] It is an ability to recognise sensations in ourselves, sensations of which we are certain in ourselves.[28] Even if he defines self-knowledge concerning sensations in terms of evidence, the sensualist Condillac is aware of its limitations. "Sensation is not evident for us each time we think that it is. On the contrary, we may be wrong if let pass a part of what is going on in us either because we presume what is not, or we wrongly interpret what is in us."[29] Condillac does not say categorically that "out of all means that we have to acquire knowledge there not even one which could mislead us" because "feeling in metaphysics, observation in physics, and calculus in mathematics mislead us." Nevertheless he adds: "just like there are rules (laws) of a good calculus and appropriate observation there are rules that allows us to properly feel and assess what we feel." Eventually, he reduces all mistakes in this respect to a situation when "we are governed by our feeling... and we are wrong in our interpretation of what we feel because misjudging what is in us means not to see what is and what is not."[30] The basic precaution to prevent mistakes, which could arouse on this way, is to make a precise distinction between what is in us a habit and what is a matter of nature ("il faut apprendre ne pas se confondre l'habitude avec la nature"). At the same time he postulates, a mode that is characteristic of empiricism, to trust experience that must be faithfully recreated in memory, for "the evidence of inner sensation has only the one who while being able to learn accurately what is in his soul acquired will never confuse habit with nature," when the failure to abide by this requirement gives rise to a prejudice ("préjugé"). Despite the catchwords of sensualism, Condillac claims that it is not in the least easy, and not so much with regard to the statement of the fact of existence, knowledge or action of the knowing subject, but with regard to "the manner of existing, seeing, hearing, and acting." In this respect Condillac states categorically: "That is why this evidence is not given to the majority of people" or he asks rhetorically: "who can avoid

[27] É. Condillac, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 411–412.

[28] É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 620.

[29] Ibid., p. 631.

[30] Ibid., p. 632.

a mistake" although all are used to referring to inner sentiment.[31] While evading the opportunity to recreate the history of knowledge of particular subjects of knowledge, Condillac would limit himself to justifying the universal character of knowledge. This knowledge concerns the very principles with regard to the genesis of human knowledge. Thereby Condillac referred to the universal character of human cognitive constitution and to the equally universal conditions attendant on this knowledge.[32] He also seemed to bring to mind the argumentation characteristic of the a priori justifications in the sense of the Scottish philosophy of common sense, and the justification of the objective character of the a priori conditions of knowledge in the sense of Kant's epistemology.

At the same time Condillac, who belongs to the heritage of empiricism and to the philosophy of the subject, seemed to integrate the evidence of the inner sentiment with the evidence of facts, or, at least in many case, the external sentiments. He stated: "I could as well call the evidence of fact the knowledge of some phenomena that I perceive in me: but because I know such facts ("faits") only through the inner sentiment, I call them the evidence of inner sentiment."[33] The evidence of fact is nothing else but their personal observation ("par notre propre observation") that must be at times limited to judgements on the basis of others' testimonies, whereas in relation to the latter only some of them can be attributed with evidence, hence knowledge acquired by way of personal observation, when in many other cases this knowledge if very uncertain ("fort douteux"). The value of this tradition, more or less certain, depends on the very nature of facts and the competence of witnesses, their coherence, and also the coherence between the different conditions of the message,[34] therefore it depends on the requirements determined by the methodology of history. The facts alone are "all things that we perceive." The sensualist Condillac is therefore forced to admit that this knowledge is limited, because those facts may equally concern things that exist and only such that only seem to us when they actually are different. This type of evidence concerns legitimately only the very fact of the existence of the body and its attributes, as to whose character our knowledge is insufficient. In particular, this means that, as mentioned above, we cannot come to know the absolute attributes of bodies because we do

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 633–634.

[33] É. Condillac, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 411–412.

[34] É. Condillac, *De l'art raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 620.

not know their inner nature. We are doomed only to know the relational attributes that obliquely prove the existence of absolute attributes by virtue of the principle of cause and effect, although we do not know their inner nature.[35] He states in more general terms: "the evidence of facts must attend on the evidence of reason,"[36] and that already in relation to the statement of the existence of bodies to which we come on the basis of inference, i.e. that our sensations, and here again the evidence of sentiments is necessary, result from the reaction of the bodies on our cognitive organs.[37]

Therefore indeed our knowledge of "facts" with regard to bodies deals only with phenomena ("phénomène") and their laws ("lois de la nature") which however, if this is possible, should be formed in a system (système).[38] Physics that studies them cannot be limited to a simple accumulation of facts, but they should be order in the form of a causal-effectual system, and the phenomena should be made into laws.[39] This knowledge is supposed to be methodical, for it is conducted first by way of observation ("observation"). This observation is comprehended as turning a particular attention to a thing under observation, an accurate comparative record of its attendant facts and circumstances under which facts are approached. Another form of the approach to facts is supposed to be experiment ("expérience"), which is most likely understood as a planned and designed operation.[40]

All the above limitations with regard to various kinds of knowledge account for Condillac's general methodological postulate. Following the traces of "good physicists" ("bons physiciens"), he wants to learn to combine the evidence of reason with the evidence of facts as instanced by some problems of the physics of his times. It was treated then as a conglomerate of sciences, in particular its respective inquiry methods comprehended as the knowledge of its proper reasoning ("raisonner," "raisonnement"), which to a large extent corresponds to Descartes' methodology which is also a "mix of conceptual analysis, empirical corroboration and metaphysical explana-

[35] Ibid., p. 636–637.

[36] Ibid., p. 637.

[37] Ibid., p. 636.

[38] É. Condillac, *Logique*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 412.

[39] É. Condillac, *De l'art de raisonner*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 637.

[40] Ibid., p. 637. In the *Logique* observation calls for all relations and circumstances of the respective phenomena. The same, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 2, p. 412.

tion".[41] This thesis seems legitimate even if we fail to forget the violent critique of the "esprit de système" made by Condillac. It concerned the systems of the second scholasticism, and also the solutions of seventeenth-century metaphysicians, or even the ambitions of modern science to build systems, if we operate with abstract hypostases. He would behave like an iconoclast when he placed on one level the accomplishments e.g. of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and Malebranche with the texts on astrology.[42] Although he saw in them a synonym of unjustified hypotheses or even illusions of metaphysicians, then nevertheless he did not avoid systematic explanations and sough to outline a whole, that is, systematic vision of reality. And that was not only with regard to natural science (physics), then thought to be a standard of a methodology competitive to traditional philosophy, and also with regard to technological disciplines, in the eighteenth century still defined as "arts," and politics.[43] The basic requirement is concern about their foundation on the basis of facts. Experience is supposed to provide proper facts ("premier fait"), the foundation of the first principles of a system ("ce fait sera le principe du système").[44] As regards further scientific procedures, it is possible to use speculations ("conjecture"), if they do not have an a priori character, like metaphysical systems, because of their empirical basis.[45] The correspondence between Condillac's epistemology and Descartes' solutions can be found also in relation to the ideal of universal method that the analysis (in both cases modelled on mathematical method) was supposed to be, but in fact it combined the procedures of analysis and synthesis.[46]

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[41] D. M. Clarke, *Descartes' Philosophy of Science. Studies in Intellectual History*, p. 97. As regards the bond of empiricism and rationalism in Condillac see F. Tethorè, *Condillac ou l'empiricisme et le rationalisme*, Paris 1864; repr. Genève 1971.

[42] See especially chapter XI that summarises the analyses of the previous chapters: É. Condillac, *Traité de système*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 194–195. As regards Condillac's understanding of a system see especially E. McNiven Nine, *A Critical Study of Condillac's "Traité de système"*, The Hague 1979, p. 22–47. Condillac's critical considerations concerning witchcraft see in the *Encyclopedia* under the entry *Divination*, in: *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une societé de gens de lettres*, vol. 4, Paris 1954, p. 1070–1073. On the context of this position see R. McRaye, *The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences. Bacon and Kant*, Toronto 1961.

[43] See especially the conclusion in: É. Condillac, *Traité de système*, in: *Oeuvres philosophique de Condillac*, vol. 1, p. 204–217.

[44] Ibid., p. 206–207.

[45] S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?* [Logic or Epistemology?], p. 501–514. Cf. I. F. Knight, *The Geometric Spirit*, p. 52–78. See more E. McNiven Nine, *A Critical Study of Condillac's "Traité de système"*, The Hague 1979. On the context of this position see R. McRaye, *The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences. Bacon and Kant*, Toronto 1961.

[46] See S. Janeczek, *Logika czy epistemologia?* [Logic or Epistemology?], p. 189–198, 564–585.

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THE SPINOZA INSPIRATION IN THE LATE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (*SPÄTAUFKLÄRUNG*)

> *Ein Gespenst davon* [of Spinozism – H. J] *geht unter allerhand Gestalten seit geraumer Zeit in Deutschland um, und wird von Abergläubigen und Ungläubigen mit gleicher Reverenz betrachtet. Ich rede nicht allein von kleinen Geistern, sondern von Männern aus der ersten Klasse... Vielleicht erleben wir es noch, daß über den Leichnam des Spinoza sich ein Streit erhebt, wie jener über den Leichnam Moses zwischen Erzengel und Satanas*[1].
>
> Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

According to the periodization of W. Schneiders, the late German Enlightenment (*Spätaufklärung*) was formed by the philosophical generation called the generation of I. Kant; it follows the generation of Ch. Thomasius, Ch. Wolff and G. E. Lessing, and spans the last two decades of the eighteenth century.[2] The essential generational experiences for the last phase of the German Enlightenment include the experience of *Sturm und Drang* (the 1770s) which strengthened the critical positions towards the rationalism of Wolffian popular philosophy and so-called neology within Protestantism. These attitudes were favoured by a different current of Protestantism, Pietism, which was named *verborgene Seele der Aufklärung*.[3] Some of its variants referred to Christian-Neoplatonist mysticism that – in contradistinction to abstract theological-philosophical knowledge – was considered to

[1] F. H. Jacobi, *An Herrn Moses Mendelssohn – Düsseldorf den 26. April 1785*, in: *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelsohn*, Hrsg. H. Scholz, Berlin 1916, p. 140.

[2] See W. Schneiders, *Hoffnung auf Vernunft. Aufklärungsphilosophie in Deutschland*, Hamburg 1990.

[3] See H. Bößenecker, *Pietismus und Aufklärung. Ihre Begegnung im deutschen Geistesleben des. 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Würzburg 1958; T. Namowicz, *Pietismus in der deutschen Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts*, "Weimarer Beiträge" 13 (1967), pp. 469–480; H. Jakuszko, *Pietyzm*, in: *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, red. A. Maryniarczyk, t. VIII, Lublin 2007, p. 196–199.

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secure a direct access to reality. Alongside the native tradition, inspirations from religious-aesthetic-moral British sensualism and Rousseauism were of considerable impact. The place of constructing intellect (*Verstand*) was to be taken by reason (*Vernunft*) whose etymology was derived from *vernehmen*, to accept, to listen, to reveal reality. All the mentioned influences were of great significance to the debates over the role of the Enlightenment and of the *lumen naturale* of human reason. I. Kant, M. Mendelssohn, J. G. Herder, J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, J. C. Lavater and others participated in the discussion. One can affirm without exaggeration that both the dispute over the Enlightenment as well as that over Spinoza – called *Pantheismusstreit* – marks the generational experience of the philosophers of the late German Enlightenment.

The sketched intellectual climate was conducive to the production of a new quality of discussion about Spinoza in the 1780s. The new quality of the Spinoza reception consisted in the fact that a question about the 'spirit of Spinozism' was posed for the first time. F. H. Jacobi was responsible for it; he was also the proper *spiritus movens of* the public debate over the life and work of Spinoza.[4] The debate proved the diversity of the interpretations of Spinozism which was given different labels: from atheism through pantheism, cosmotheism to deism. It is worth remembering that the definitions of these terms in the eighteenth century were not specified yet; it should therefore be an aim of research to reconstruct the then meanings of the concepts, instead of forcing on them terminological distinctions present in contemporary dictionaries and philosophical lexicons.[5]

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[4] Jacobi initiated the controversy over Spinoza by publishing his own conversations with z G. E. Lessing whom he defined as Spinozist. Jacobi's intention was "das Lehrgebäude des Spinoza in seiner wahren Gestalt, *und nach dem nothwendigen Zusammenhange seiner Theile* öffentlich dargestellt würde". See F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, Breslau 1785, in: *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit...*, op. cit., p. 140. In Polish literature for the most detailed presentation of rich factographic material about the Spinoza, see R. Kuliniak, T. Małyszek, *Wprowadzenie*, in: M. Mendelssohn, *Do przyjaciół Lessinga wraz z "Przedmową" Johanna Jacoba Engela*, trans. R. Kuliniak, T. Małyszek, Kraków 2006, pp. 7–58. In recent German-language literature, see, inter alia, *Studien zur Spinozarezeption in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main 1994; *Spinoza in Deutschland des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Spekulation und Erfahrung*, Hrsg. E. Schürmann, N. Waszek, F. Weinreich, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 2002.

[5] A valuable help is *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Hrsg. J. Ritter, Bd. I–XII, Basel 1971–2004; H. Schulz, *Zur ältesten Begriffsgeschichte von Deismus und Pantheismus*, "Preussische Jahrbücher" 142 (1910), pp. 318–325, and the primary sources of the eighteenth-century philosophers, to which I refer in the footnotes. R. Kuliniak and T. Małyszek (in the introduction to: M. Mendelssohn, *Do przyjaciół Lessinga...*) while discussing *Spinoza-Streit* use the contemporary definitions of pantheism and atheism.

In the dispute over Spinoza one can distinguish the following models of interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy: (1) weak anti-Spinozism – M. Mendelssohn, representative of the Wolffian tradition in the so-called Berlin Enlightenment; (2) the strong anti-Spinozism – F. H. Jacobi, thinker of Pempelfort, amateur in philosophy; (3) Weimar neo-Spinozism – J. G. Herder and J. W. Goethe. In this current, termed by the representatives of academic philosophy with a scornful name 'metaphysical-moral day-dreaming" (*Schwärmerei*), the influences of the Cabala, Pietism (especially the Wittenberg one), religious-aesthetic-moral British sensualism and *Sturm und Drang* combine.

The crucial point of the debate over Spinoza can be indicated in model 2 and 3. The position of Mendelssohn defined by me as weak anti-Spinozism did not play an important part. Mendelssohn was convinced that one could 'tame' Spinoza; it would suffice to add a thesis about moral necessity, to grant to what is finite the status of substance (not modes) and to introduce the power of approval (*Billigungsvermögen*). Then one would receive a refined pantheism (*verfeinerter, geläuterter Pantheismus*)[6] which could be reconciled with religion and ethics, avoiding the accusation of atheism and fatalism. It is noteworthy that after such corrections the thought of Spinoza loses its own identity and transforms into a shallow form of Wolffianism.

Before I present the main axis of controversy between strong anti-Spinozism and Weimar neo-Spinozism, it is in order to pose a question: what was the state of knowledge about Spinoza in Germany before *Spinoza-Streit*? *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (Amsterdam 1670) was well-known among the texts of Spinoza, likewise *Opera posthuma*, published by Jarrig Jelles and Johann Rieuwertsz, Amsterdam 1677 (including *Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata et in quinque partes dinstincta, in quibus agitur* I. *De Deo*, II. *De nature et origine mentis*, III. *De origine et nature affectuum*, IV. *De servitute humana*, V. *De potentia intellectus seu de libertate humana*, moreover *Tractatus politicus, Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* and *Epistolae doctorum quorundam virorum ad B. de Spinoza et auctoris responsiones*). A particularly important event in Germany was the Frankfurt publication in 1744 of the work *Benedictus von Spinoza Sittenlehre widerlegt von dem berühmten Weltweisen unserer Zeit Herrn Christian Wolff. Aus dem Lateinisch übersetzt von Lorenz Schmidt.* What was peculiar of this edition was

[6] M. Mendelssohn, *An die Freunde Lessings. Ein Anhang zu Herrn Jacobi Briefwechsel über die Lehre des Spinoza*, Berlin 1786, in: *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit*, op. cit., p. 295. See also, M. Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes*, Berlin 1785.

that alongside the German translation of Spinoza's *Ethics* it contained the an annex placed at the end with the critique of Spinoza by Ch. Wolff. At the beginning Jarrig Jelles's preface (reprinted from *Opera posthuma*) was placed, which was to protect Spinoza from the accusation of theoretical and practical atheism. Jelles juxtaposed Spinoza's statements with quotations from the Acts (17: 28) which have it that 'in him [God] we live, and move, and have our being'; Jelles emphasized the unselfish love of God and neighbour constituted the ethical ideal of both Spinoza and John the Evangelist.[7]

It is worth adding that Jacobi read this publication in the 1760s. This could have influenced his ambivalent attitude towards Spinoza, whom he both admired and fought: *Spinoza ist mir gut genug: aber doch ein schlechtes Heil, das wir in seinem Namen finden!*.[8] The following excerpt is even clearer: "Den Spinoza zu fassen, dazu gehört eine zu lange und zu hartnäckige Anstrengung des Geistes. Und keiner hat ihn gefaßt, dem in der Ethik Eine Zeile dunkel blieb: keiner, der es nicht begreift, wie dieser große Mann von seiner Philosophie die feste innige Ueberzeugung haben konnte, die er so oft und so nachdrücklich an den Tag legt. Noch am Ende seiner Tage schrieb er: *...non praesumo, me optimam invenisse philosophiam, sed veram me intelligere scio.* Eine solche Ruhe des Geistes, einen solchen Himmel im Verstande, wie sich dieser helle reine Kopf geschaffen hatte, mögen wenige gekostet haben".[9] The statement illustrates the fact that German intellectuals valued Spinoza more as author of the fifth (and not the first) part of his *Ethics*. Spinoza's utterances about God evoked a critical distance and refusal in the thinkers steeped in the Protestant tradition, whereas the motif of *amor Dei intellectualis* attracted them considerably.

The endeavour of a Spinoza rehabilitation (half a century earlier than J. Jelles's preface) was also the work of Gottfried Arnold, *Unpartheyische*

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[7] See H. Timm, *Gott und die Freiheit. Studien zur Religionsphilosophie der Goethezeit, Die Spinozarenaissance*, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 162–163. On the spiritual affinity between Spinoza and Paul the Apostle see J. Ch. Edelmann, *Abgenötigtes jedoch Andern nicht wieder aufgenötigtes Glaubens-Bekenntnis*, in: W. Barnikol, *Das entdeckte Christentum im Vormärz*, Jena 1927, pp. 167–168 (the quoted text was authored in 1745); on the affinity between Spinoza and John the Apostle see J. G. Herder, *Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele* (1778), in: *Sämmtliche Werke*, Hrsg. B. Suphan, Bd. VIII, Berlin 1877, p. 202.

[8] F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 77.

[9] Ibid., p. 88. "Cf. J. G. Herder, *Gott. Einige Gespräche*, in: *Sämmtliche Werke*, Hrsg. B. Suphan, Bd. XVI, Berlin 1887, p. 438. Philolaus in the conversation with Theophron after reading *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* notes that Spinoza sees in the cognition and love of God all perfection, virtue and happiness of human being. This makes him revise the earlier position that Spinoza was an atheist, pantheist, teacher of blind necessity, enemy of religion and society (p. 412). Surprised, he says: "instead of an atheist, I find a metaphysical-moral dreamer (*Schwärmer*)" (p. 430).

Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments biß auff das Jahr Christi 1688[10] (I–II, Frankfurt am Main 1699–1700), unusually popular in Pietist circles, read among others by J. G. Herder and J. W. Goethe. It was an effective revision of the negative image of Spinoza in widely circulated also in German culture P. Bayle's *Dictionnaire the historique the et the critique* (Amsterdam 1695) whose translation into German by J. Ch. Gottsched appeared in the years 1741–1744.[11] Arnold (like Johann Christian Edelmann) was convinced that only from the point of view of ungodly, that is apparent, seeming Christianity (*Maul-Christenheit* which does not realize evangelical values) could Spinoza be called an atheist. Neither his highly ethical way of life nor his convictions give any reason to such labelling the philosopher who proclaimed God as active *causa immanens*, persistently present in creation; with distance he treated only the metaphor of the divine craftsman who turns away from his work after the end of working. Let us remember that according to J. G. Walch's dictionary, *Historische und theologische Einleitung in die vornehmsten Religion-Streitigkeiten* (1728) practical atheism (a way of life without assuming the existence of God as source of morality) was distinguished from theoretical atheism (an unorthodox concept of God) in four variants: Aristotelian, Stoical, Epicurean and Spinozian.[12] It results in the fact that the atheist in the latter sense was identified with a heretic, and not with a thinker who denied the existence of God.

As H. Timm demonstrated that a particularly important part in the reception of Spinoza's thought in the German Enlightenment was played by Johann Georg Wachter's work published in 1699 and entitled *Der Spinozismus im Jüdentumb, oder die von dem heutigen Jüdentumb und dessen Geheimen Kabbala Vergötterte Welt.*[13] The author noted that the divine defined in Jewish Cabala as En-sof, in a necessary way manifests itself or

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[10] On this issue see H. Jakuszko, *Idea wolności w niemieckiej myśli teologiczno-filozoficznej od Lutra do Herdera*, Lublin 1999, pp. 47–56. The excerpts devoted to Spinoza, see G. Arnold, *Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer- historie*, Schaffhausen 1741, Bd. II, p. 220–226, 1152–1154.

[11] See H. Jakuszko, *Inspiracja Pierre'a Bayle'a w oświeceniu niemieckim*, in: *Rekonesanse filozoficzne. Człowiek, wartości, historia. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona Profesorowi Zdzisławowi Jerzemu Czarneckiemu*, ed. H. Jakuszko, S. Jedynak. A. L. Zachariasz, J. Zdybel, Lublin 1999, pp. 127–137.

[12] See S. Wollgast, *Theoretische Grundlagen des Atheismus in der Philosophie zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung*, in: S. Wollgast, *Philosophie und Religion*, Weimar 1981, p. 121; S. Wollgast, *Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung 1550–1650*, Berlin 1988, pp. 604–605.

[13] H. Timm, *Gott und die Freiheit*, op. cit., pp. 156–158. See also E. Hirsch, *Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie*, Gütersloh 1949, Bd. II, p. 311.

reveals itself in the world, subject to change like Proteus – even risking its own annihilation. There is no place for religion in this concept: on extramundane Christian Creator who undertakes rational decisions and is not determined by blind impulse; there is no place for the moral freedom of the finite spirit that is subject to the necessity of nature.

The reading of Jacobi's texts testifies to the fact that Jacobi estimated the position the Spinoza through the lenses of Wachter. In the work *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn* (Breslau 1785), to Lessing's question what Jacobi meant by the spirit of Spinozism, one gets the following answer: "Das ist wohl kein anderer gewesen, als das Uralte: *a nihilo nihil fit*; welches Spinoza, nach abgezogenern Begriffen, als die philosophirenden Cabbalisten und andre vor ihm, in Betrachtung zog. Nach diesen abgezogenern Begriffen fand er, daß durch ein jedes Entstehen im Unendlichen, mit was für Bildern oder Worten man ihm auch zu helfen suche, durch einen jeden Wechsel in demselben, ein *Etwas aus dem Nichts* gesetzt werde. Er verwarf also jeden *Uebergang* des Unendlichen zum Endlichen; überhaupt alle Causas transitorias, secundarias oder remotas; und setzte an die Stelle des emanirenden ein nur *immanentes* Ensoph; eine inwohnende, ewig *in sich* unveränderliche Ursache der Welt, welche mit allen ihren Folgen zusammengenommen – Eins und dasselbe wäre".[14] Jacobi's interlocutor, Lessing, noticed that this model of thinking could also be found in Leibniz's thought, according to whom God "befände sich in einer immerwährenden Expansion und Contraction: dieses wäre die Schöpfung und das Bestehen der Welt".[15] In the second edition of the work *Über die Lehre des Spinoza* (Breslau 1789) Jacobi affirmed empatically that "the Die Cabbalistische *Philosophie* ist, als *Philosophie*, nichts anderes, als *unentwickelter*, oder *neu verworrener* Spinozismus".[16]

According to Jacobi, Spinoza's system is a model example of the circular character of the philosophy of reflection which moves in a closed circle of its own concepts produced in a necessary way. All modifications, that is ways of improving Spinozism lose the clearness of Spinoza's thought but do not violate its principal structure whose consequence must be atheism in the sense that Spinozism puts aside the *ens extramundanum of* Christian theism, i.e., it gives up Creator-personal God, administering free decision. In lieu of creationism, he introduces the logical emanatism, in lieu of supranaturalism

[14] F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, Breslau 1785, in: *Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit*, op. cit., pp. 78–79.

[15] Ibid., p. 84.

[16] Ibid., p. 176.

– naturalism (anti-supranaturalism), in lieu of indeterminism – determinism, in lieu of realism – idealism (anti-realism).

Jacobi claimed therefore that *'Spinozismus ist Atheismus'*;[17] he regarded the terms such as pantheism or cosmotheism applied by his contemporaries-philosophers or historians of philosophy as euphemisms which mask the truth of the system, realizing the intention of the defence of the moral integrity of the author of *Ethics*. As he noticed, "Ich bin weit entfernt, alle Spinozisten für Gottesläugner zu erklären. Gerade deßwegen scheint mir der Erweis nicht überflüssig, daß die *rechtverstande* Lehre des Spinoza keine Art von Religion zulasse. Ein gewisser Schaum von Spinozismus ist hingegen sehr verträglich mit allen Gattungen des Aberglaubens und der Schwärmerey, und man kann die schönsten Blasen damit werfen. Der entschiedene Gottesläugner soll sich unter diesem Schaume nich verbergen; die andern müssen nicht sich selbst damit betrügen".[18]

Jacobi disputed with Dietrich Tiedemann (author of the textbook *Geist der speculativen Philosophie*, Marburg 1793, Bd. III) who termed Spinozism cosmotheism, possible to reconcile with the assumptions of theism about the divine rule over the world, opposed only to the deistic interpretation of God as idle craftsman. In the view of Jacobi, if Dietrich Tiedemann called Plotinus a seemingly devout thinker because of his thesis about blind necessity (which brings him nearer to the system of Strato), Tiedemann should with the same consequence treat the system of Spinoza which leaves neither reason nor free decision to God. Jacobi estimated equally critically the position of Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann who – like Tiedemann – in his work *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipzig 1814, Bd. IX) opposed considering Spinozism to be atheism, although he perceived its fatalism, according to which all finite things result necessarily from the Divine Being, and not according to ideas and aims.[19] Jacobi wrote: "so kann ich unmöglich eingestehen, daß derjenige, dessen höchstes Wesen das blinde, wenn auch *lebendige*, Fatum selbst ist, einen Gott glaube und lehre. Das Fatum vertilgt nothwendig den Gott; der Gott nur das Fatum. Also beharre ich auf dem Urtheil, daß Spinozismus Atheismus sey".[20]

In the passage *Beylage VII: Zur Kritik des Spinozistischen Rationalismus* (published in *Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit*) we encounters the development and justification of the thesis that atheism constitutes the

[17] Ibid., p. 173.
[18] Ibid., pp. 173–174.
[19] Ibid., p. 175.
[20] Ibid., p. 176.

inevitable consequence of the epistemological assumptions of the system of Spinoza. According to Jacobi, this system is a model example of the realized possibilities of the philosophy of intellect (*Verstand*), which was initiated by R. Descartes, author of *Discours de la méthode* (Leyden 1637). As Jacobi affirmed, "Wir eignen uns das Uniwersum zu, indem wir es zerreissen, und eine unseren Fähigkeiten angemessene, der wirklichen ganz unähnliche *Bilder-Ideen* und *Wort*-Welt erschaffen. Was wir auf diese Weise erschaffen, verstehen wir, in so weit es unsere Schöpfung ist, vollkommen; was sich auf diese Weise nicht erschaffen läßt, verstehen wir nicht; unser philosophischer Verstand reicht über sein eigenes Hervorbringen nicht hinaus. Alles Verstehen geschieht aber dadurch, daß wir Unterschiede *setzen* und wieder *aufheben*; und auch die aufs höchste ausgebildete menschliche Vernunft ist, explicite, keiner andern Operation, als dieser, worauf alle übrige sich zurückführen lassen, fähig".[21]

In the opinion of Jacobi, this led to locking thought in itself, that is to the loss of true reality which should be sought beyond the circular structure of reflection. An additional consequence was the deification of the human intellect which creates or constructs a world according to the rules of the method adopted by itself, disregarding the world of everyday experience, and reducing the supernatural to the natural, subject to the laws of mechanics. In the view of Jacobi, the system of Spinoza is the most clear and consistent example of this tendency. Striving to overcome the difficulties of Cartesianism in the description of the qualitative properties of thinking being, coexisting with the quantitative properties of corporeal being. Spinoza referred to ancient thinkers' formula *'hen kai pan'*. He recognised that what is first, is one substance (containing matter together with form); from it – directly in a natural way, i.e., *necessary and mechanical* way isolated things result together with their concepts.[22] Rejecting as absurd the concept of chaos (which would have to produce order only from itself), Spinoza was forced to accept the infinite sequence of individual things, from which one after the other gains reality. He looked for help in mathematical concepts, which however do not concern the objective and real consequence, but only the subjective and ideal one. Jacobi noted that "Absonderung und Wiedervereinigung des Subjectiven und Objectiven, und Verwechselung ihrer gegenseitigen Verhältnisse der Ursache und Wirkung, um, nach Bedürfniß, an der einen oder der andern Seite aufzuheben, was die Vollendung des

[21] Ibid., p. 265.
[22] Ibid., p. 266.

bezielten Begriffes hinderte, hat hier eine Täuschung zuwege gebracht, wodurch mehrere Philosophen von der ersten Größe hintergangen worden sind, und noch wirklich hintergangen werden".[23]

Spinoza's central difficulty consists in the confusion of the concept of cause (*Ursache*) with the concept of foundation (*Grund*). According to Jacobi, cause is a concept of experience, related to the consciousness of human possibility of causing definite results; cause cannot be therefore reduced to the logical concept of foundation. The principle of sufficient right of combines both concepts: (1) the principle of foundation according to which all that is conditioned depends *on something*; (2) the principle of cause according to which all that was produced, was produced *by something*.[24] In the case of losing the essential difference a danger arises of balancing between those concepts, of applying one instead of the other, which leads to a peculiar language, e. g., to formulations that things can to come into being, not coming into being; that they change, not changing; that they can exist in the order of time, not existing in this order.

From there Jacobi inferred that the real existence (*Dasein*) of the infinite successive sequence of isolated and finite things cannot be explained in a *natural* (conceptual) way because an absurd concept of eternal time would have to be accepted then. If one accepts the beginning of a sequence, then it lacks the possibility from which such a beginning could be worked out. This does not mean an agreement to scepticism. In the opinion of Jacobi, it is necessary to break out of the circular structure of philosophical reflection – *salto mortale* from the realm of philosophy to the realm of non-philosophy (*Unphilosophie*), called the realm of belief, direct certainty, life, feeling, fact, revelation and reason (*Vernunft*), distinguished from intellect (*Verstand*). The condition of the possibility of the existence of the world should be sought in this realm – *outside* nature – because "die gesammte Natur aber, der Inbegriff aller bedingten Wesen, kann dem forschenden Verstande mehr nicht offenbaren, als was in ihr enthalten ist; nämlich mannichfaltiges Daseyn, Veränderungen, Formenspiel; nie einen *wirklichen* Anfang, nie ein *reelles* Princip irgend eines *objectiven* Daseyns".[25]

Jacobi compared Spinoza's thesis about the immemorial production of things and their concepts with the position of scholastics who claimed that one cannot think creation in time, therefore they situated the truth about the creation of the world in time in the group of suprarational truths of

[23] Ibid., p. 267.
[24] Ibid., p. 271.
[25] Ibid., p. 274.

belief. The difference consisted in that Spinoza inferred from the fact of the changeability of things that they must be everlastingly in movement, whereas the scholastics inferred about unchanging God from the fact of created nature about invariable God-Creator who is not *natura naturans*, but extramundane being (*ausserweltliches Wesen*), distinguished from nature in a real way.[26]

Thus Jacobi uncovered two antithetical models of thinking: Spinozism (atheism) and anti-Spinozism (Christian theism), rejecting any possibility of their mediation at a purely philosophical level because – as he affirmed it – there cannot be a natural philosophy of what is supernatural.[27] Emancipated from the scholastic tradition, modern philosophy headed from the necessity of one's own immanent nature to Spinozism. This tendency can be traced both in the systems prior to the theory of Spinoza (called by historians of philosophy the symptoms of Spinozism before Spinoza) and in later systems which were the endeavours to overcome or improve the thought of Spinoza (that is, Spinozism after Spinoza or neo-Spinozism).

Distinguishing *Vernunft* from *Verstand*, although in a different sense than in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* by I. Kant (1781), Jacobi affirmed that in modern times reason was degraded to instrumental intellect (*Verstand*) which is closed in the realm of nature together with (proper to it) operations of analysis, synthesis, judgement and inference, capable of understanding of only what this intellect produces itself according to the rules of logical or geometrical necessity. However, if one is to understand by reason (*Vernunft*) the spiritual principle of cognition, it is a form revealing real existence rather than a tool over which human being has power. According to Jacobi, it should be regarded as absurd to attempt "Bedingungen des Unbedingten entdecken, dem absolute *Nothwendigen* eine Möglichkeit *erfinden*, und es *construiren* zu wollen, um es *begreifen* zu können".[28]

Reason (*Vernunft*) does not need to prove the existence of the One God-Creator; rather, it exposes this existence to human being as supernatural, directly certain fact (*Tatsache*) which expounds the passage from what is unconditioned to what is conditioned as regards form and matter.[29] In the view of Jacobi, the resistance of philosophers to the thesis about

[26] Ibid., p. 269. (Jacobi drew on the knowledge of Scholastic philosophy principally from the textbook of J. A. Cramer which continued the work of Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, *Einleitung in die allgemeine Geschichte der Welt und Religion*, Bd. I–VII, 1748–1786).

[27] Ibid., p. 92.

[28] Ibid., p. 275.

[29] Ibid., p. 276.

the substantial creation of the world by act of divine will results from the fact that the finite human mind is incapable of understanding of the formation other than mechanical. It will suffice, however, to refer to the direct consciousness of our own activity in the realization of our will to obtain an analogon of non-mechanical, that is supernatural causation. We need not, therefore, think the Highest Intelligence as impersonal mechanical necessity, but as independent existence, personal, extramundane and also as first, only, real primal existence (*Urwesen*)[30] that is the active cause of all created results (existing both over them and in them).

The system of Spinoza constitutes the antithesis of such a picture of God. The Spinozian God is a philosophical construction, and not the God of Christian religion. As Jacobi noted, "diese inwohnende unendliche Ursache hat, als solche, explicite, weder Verstand noch Willen: weil sie, ihrer transcendentalen *Einheit* und durchgängigen absoluten Unendlichkeit zufolge, keinen Gegenstand des Denkens und des Wollens haben kann; (...). Und daraus folgt denn wieder, da jeder einzelne Begriff aus einem andern einzelnen Begriffe entspringen, und sich auf einen *wirklich vorhandenen Gegenstand unmittelbar* beziehen muß: daß in der ersten Ursache, die unendlicher Natur ist, weder einzelne Gedanken, noch einzelne Bestimmungen des Willens [angetroffen werden können]; sondern nur der innere, erste, allgemeine Urstoff [derselben]".[31]

In the opinion of Jacobi, the only infinite substance of Spinoza has no existence of only one's own – beyond individual things. If it were an individual reality, it would have personality, life and reason;[32] it would not only be a general primal stuff (*Urstoff*) of its own modifications in the order of extension and thinking. Scholastics linked the only nature of God with the dogma of the Trinity of Divine Persons, impressing the trace on substances created by the act of the will of God. In scholastic philosophy the real difference between the Creator and creation was kept, whereas Spinozism recognises only the thought difference between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*; for in reality they are identical like a logical premise and a conclusion.

As the conversation with Lessing (published by Jacobi) testifies, also in Leibniz who strove to create a system in competition to Spinozism, looking for the representation of a personal extramundane (*extramundane*) God would be to no avail, as the created monads are characterized as fulgurations

[30] Ibid., p. 278.
[31] Ibid., pp. 79–80.
[32] Ibid., p. 83.

(*Fulgurationen*) of a deity, the stress falls on intramundane (*intramundane*) cause of the world.[33] In keeping with what Lessing reported, Leibniz argued, similarly to Spinoza, that "das Denken ist nicht die Quelle der Substanz; sondern die Substanz ist die Quelle des Denkens. Also muß vor dem Denken etwas Nichtdenkendes als das Erste angenommen werden; etwas, das, wenn schon nicht durchaus in der Wirklichkeit, doch der Vorstellung, dem Wesen, der inneren Natur nach, als das Vorderste gedacht werden muß. Ehrlich genug hat deßwegen Leibnitz die Seelen, des *automates spirituels* genannt".[34]

Also Lessing – as Jacobi noted – was inclined to Spinozism, affirming: "Die orthodoxen Begriffe von der Gottheit sind nicht mehr für mich; ich kann sie nicht genießen. *Hen kai pan*! Ich weiß nichts anders".[35] He referred to the concept of the soul of the world which was rather the than the cause of the organic whole, called the world.[36] According to Jacobi, "Mit der Idee eines persönlichen schlechterdings unendlichen Wesens, in dem unveränderlichen Genusse seiner allerhöchsten Vollkommenheit, konnte sich Lessing nicht vertragen. Er verknüpfte mit derselben eine solche Vorstellung von *unendlicher Langerweile*, daß ihm angst und weh dabey wurde".[37] Because of that, he preferred the dynamic approach to God that as *omnitudo realitatis* contains in oneself opposed tendencies: centrifugal (of expansion or exteriorization) and centripetal (of contraction or interiorisation). Lessing's God – thus understood – in order to save one's own life must "von Zeit zu Zeit, sich in sich selbst gewissermassen zurückziehen; Tod und Auferstehung, mit dem Leben, in sich vereinigen".[38] This representation of God (richer than the orthodox one) was supposed to have to a larger degree satisfied Lessing who

[33] Ibid., p. 85.

[34] Ibid., p. 87. Leibniz in his *Theodicy* drew attention to the dark spot in the philosophy of Spinoza who ascribed thinking to God, depriving Him of reason, *cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo*, which led to a conclusion that Spinoza based everything on the blind necessity of the nature of God, devoid of reason and will. On his issue see G. W. Leibniz, *Teodycea. O dobroci Boga, wolności człowieka i pochodzeniu zła*, trans. M. Frankiewicz, Warszawa 2001, pp. 282–283.

[35] F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza...*, in: *Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit*, op. cit., p. 77. Jacobi noted that before the conversation with Lessing in Wolfenbüttel in 1780, he regarded Lessing incorrectly as orthodox theist (ibid., p. 100). Opinions on the Spinozism of Lessing are divided among the contemporary historians of theology. See, e.g., R. Schwarz, *Lessings "Spinozismus"*, "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche" 65 (1968), pp. 271–290; F. Regner, *Lessings Spinozismus*, "Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche" 68 (1971), pp. 351–375. Schwarz defends the thesis that the thought of Lessing keeps a clear distance towards the God of Spinoza, but Regner is convinced of a spiritual affinity of both thinkers.

[36] F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza...*, op. cit., pp. 92–93.

[37] Ibid., pp. 95–96.

[38] Ibid., p. 95.

drew inspirations from both *theologiae crucis* and the native theosophical tradition, influencing Weimar thinkers – Herder and Goethe as well as Jena Romantics attached to the organic metaphor of the polarization of forces and their reconciliation in a higher synthesis.

Jacobi forced the participants of the Spinoza debate (continued later in the Weimar milieu) to a clear declaration for theism or for atheism; he did not recognise a middle way. Therefore he criticized the Herderian concept of God which was to testify to an improved Spinozism. Herder indicated difficulties in the personal understanding of God, although he did not refuse reason to God, like Lessing. In his opinion, "Der Ausdruck *Person*, selbst wenn ihn die Theologen gebrauchen, die ihn aber nicht einmal der Welt entgegen setzen, sondern nur als Unterschied im Wesen Gottes annnehmen, ist, wie sie selbst sagen, bloß anthropopathisch; philosophisch konnte also hieruber nichts ausgemacht werden".[39] Herder noted that the religious prohibition of creating of God's images in the Law of Moses should also be the first commandment for philosophers.

According to Jacobi, either the first cause of the world is *natura naturans* – eternal, infinite source (*Wurzel*) of all things, or Intelligence that acts through reason and freedom. Jacobi granted that it he cannot comprehend intelligence without personality (an "I" durable, identical with the "I" that exists in oneself and knows about oneself).[40] Hence he inferred that the poetic philosophy of Herder which introduces he concept of impersonal God defined as primal force (*Urkraft*) examplifies the total failure of an attempt to find a midway between theism the centre and Spinozism; however, this is really a Spinozian model of thinking, which does not need to be call euphemistically pantheism, but rather atheism.

Herder began with a correct assumption that the divine reason is not the human reason, while the divine will is not the human will, but he – by the error of excessive extrapolation – lost the source of all rational thinking and acting as well as the principle of all intelligence, that is personal existence. He did not want to claim after the consistent Spinoza that the highest cause of things cannot be intelligence. In the view of Jacobi, intelligence that has nothing in common with what was can be thought about

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[39] J. G. Herder, *Gott. Einige Gespräche*, op. cit., Bd. XVI, p. 498. F. H. Jacobi quotes this utterance of Herder in Beylage IV, see F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 236. In the literature on it, see M. Heinz, *Herdera z Jacobim spór o Spinozę*, trans. P. Dehnel, in: M. Heine, M. Potępa, Z. Zwoliński (ed.), *Rozum i świat. Herder i filozofia XVIII, XIX i XX wieku*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 25–40.

[40] F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza*, op. cit., p. 237.

a rational creature, means a word devoid of sense. In the philosophy of Herder one accepts "verständige, ja auch *weise* und *gütige* Ursache der Dinge, die weder extramundan, noch supramundan, auch nicht die Natur selbst, am allerwenigsten aber ein persönliches Wesen ist".[41]

Jacobi did not accept the Herderian compromise between Spinoza and Leibniz. In the opinion of Herder, if Spinoza had developed the concept of power identical with existence, he would have reached the system of forces acting in both attributes: extension and thinking. Combing the infinite force of thinking and acting, he would have discovered that "*die höchste Macht nothwendig auch die weiseste Macht, d. i. eine nach inneren ewigen Gesetzen geordnete, unendliche Güte sey*".[42] He was close to understand that the highest principle is existence (*Dasein*) which not only goes beyond all concepts, but lies – admittedly not beyond (*ausser*) but over (*über*) *and* before (*vor*) every concept.[43] Jacobi noticed accurately that if existence were to be – according to Herder – the whole of all forces, including the force of representation (*Vorstellungskraft*) she, then the latter could not be the force steering the remaining forces strength; rather it would be one of them.[44] This, in turn, means that the position of Herder is very close to Spinozism; the term "Christian Spinozism" would therefore be baseless.

In the opinion of Jacobi, Herder did not speak of the theory of Spinoza, but of a different one which Spinoza should have had to be saved from the accusation of atheism. Jacobi threw aside – as contradictory – the possibility of reconciling the Herderian God with a corrected (cleaned from difficulties) God of Spinoza. He was convinced that it impossible to build a middle system (*Mittelsystem*) between the system of causative causes (assuming a mechanism) and the system of purposeful causes (assuming freedom). Jacobi required making a choice between the modules of the alternative: either one recognises that reason and will are something subaltern or what is the first and the highest.[45] He situated Herder's solution in the former answer. An additional argument was that Herder spoke critically on the Leibnizian distinction of necessity – moral and metaphysical in God,

[41] Ibid., p. 238.

[42] J. G. Herder, *Gott. Einige Gespräche*, op. cit., p. 479. F. H. Jacobi quotes his utterance in Beylage V entitled *Kritik der Herderschen Spinozismus*, in his *Über die Lehre des Spinoza...*, op. cit., p. 242.

[43] J. G. Herder, *Gott*, op. cit., p. 502. Cf. F. H. Jacobi, op. cit., p. 241.

[44] F. H. Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 243–244.

[45] Ibid., p. 245.

demonstrating that just from the nature of God must have followed the choice of the world – the best of the possible ones.[46]

It can be recognised that the *Spinoza-Streit*, initiated by Jacobi, was an attempt to create a typology of Weltanschauungs in opposition to each other like thesis and antithesis. At stake was a decided opposition – on the one hand, pantheism, atheism, 'intramundanism'; on the other, personalism, theism, 'supramundanism'. The former chain of associations refers to Spinozism (together with all the forms of neo-Spinozism), the latter refers to anti-Spinozism. It is noteworthy that in the dispute over atheism of J. G. Fichte which took place in the 1790s, Jacobi noticed accurately that the Fichtean system was an Spinozism turned over (*umgekehrter*) in which the same principle of constructive monism rules, although *deus sive natura* was defined as absolute self. In fact, entire idealistic pantheism from Lessing and Herder to F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel represents the same type of Weltanschauung which W. Dilthey numbered among objective idealism, distinguished from the idealism of moral freedom which Jacobi declared.[47]

The merit of Jacobi was that he contributed to the intensive interest in the thought of Spinoza and its continuations and – contrary to his own intentions – to the strengthening of the Spinozian current on which representatives of post-Kantian idealism drew richly.[48] Jacobi presented also a definite model of interpreting Spinozism, presented also, bringing to the light of day the hidden assumptions of the system and its inevitable consequences, such as atheism, fatalism and even nihilism. Although some thinkers were prone to call this position a kind of a deification of the world (cosmotheism) or world piety (*Weltfrömmigkeit*), Jacobi regarded it as pseudo-religion (*Aberglauben*) which is in essence a masked disbelief (*Unglauben*).

Abstract

The 1780s in German culture witnessed the phenomenon of Spinoza's revival, which was an important generational experience of the fourth philo-

[46] J. G. Herder, *Gott*, op. cit., pp. 480–485.

[47] See W. Dilthey, *Typy światopoglądów i ich rozwinięcie w systemach metafizycznych*, in: W. Dilthey, *O istocie filozofii i inne pisma*, trans. E. Paczkowska-Łagowska, Warszawa 1987, pp. 160–175.

[48] H. Timm, *Die Bedeutung der Spinozabriefe Jacobis für die Entstehung der idealistischen Religionsphilosophie*, in: K. Hammacher (Hrsg.), *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Philosoph und Literat der Goethezeit*, Frankfurt/Main 1971, pp. 35–82; M. Heinz (Hrsg.), *Herder und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Amsterdam 1997.

sophical generation of the German Enlightenment, called by Werner Schneiders the generation of I. Kant. Initiated by F. H. Jacobi Spinoza-Streit (Pantheismusstreit) introduced a new quality to the knowledge on the life and work of Spinoza because the question about the 'spirit of Spinozism' was posed for the first time. In the debate over Spinoza the following models of interpretation can be distinguished: (1) weak anti-Spinozism – the Berlin Enlightenment (M. Mendelssohn); (2) strong anti-Spinozism (F. H. Jacobi); Weimar neo-Spinozism (J. G. Herder, J. W. Goethe). The crucial controversy was that between strong anti-Spinozism and neo-Spinozism. In the view of Jacobi, Spinozism is an atheism which eliminates the God of religion (ens extramundanum) depriving him of personal character and free decision. Jacobi argued that the definitions of Spinoza's philosophy as pantheism or cosmotheism are of euphemist character which obscure the essence of Spinozism. He criticized Weimar neo-Spinozism as an inconsistent endeavour of mediation between theism and Spinozism.

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PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF THOMAS HOBBES

Hobbes formulates his task as a description of the artificial man, the great Leviathan, also called *civitas*. In this respect he considers: (1) "*Matter* thereof, and the *Artificer*" (2) "*How*, and by what *Covenants* it is made"; (3) "what is a *Christian Common-wealth*"; (4) "what is the *Kingdom of Darkness*".[1] To solve the first problem, says Hobbes, the maker of the artificial man, the natural one, should read in himself. Moreover, who is "to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man, but Man-kind". The philosopher adds that "this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration".[2]

However, the proper text of *Leviathan* begins with the sensory perception. "(...) there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense."[3] Sensory perceptions are reactions of sensory organs to external pressures: the motion of

[1] *Leviathan*, "Introduction", p. 10 [*EW*3, x]. *Leviathan* is quoted after: *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991. For all Hobbes' works, we indicate the part, the chapter, and if needed the paragraph. The location in Molesworth's edition (*The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. William Molesworth, John Bohn, London 1839–45) is given in square brackets, the Arabic number indicating the volume.

[2] Op. cit., "Introduction", p. 11 [*EW*3, xii].

[3] *Leviathan*, I.1., p. [*EW*3, 1]. We are not considering the foundational problems of the Hobbes' system which is commonly classified as "materialism". It was already noticed (e.g. by Mary Whiton Calkins *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics Through the Study of Modern Systems*, Macmillan, New York 1907, p. 64–69), that his theory of space, an consequently of bodies – is "idealistic" or even "phenomenalistic". Hobbes based his concept of body on the concept of extension which in turn is related to ideal, not real, space. See our *Od materii Świata do materii Państwa. Z filozofii Tomasza Hobbesa* [The Stuff of the Universe and the Matter of the State: Essays on Hobbes] Universitas, Cracow 2000, Ch. III.5. A recent paper on extension in Hobbes: Robert Pasnau "Mind and Extension (Descartes, Hobbes, More)", (in:) Henrik Lagerlund (ed.) *Forming The Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment*, Springer, Dordrecht 2007, p. 285–289.

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external matter is first *im*pressed, and then *ex*pressed as the motions inside our bodies.[4] Man, like other animals displays two types of motion: lifelong vegetative (as we can guess it is initiated in the embryonic stage), and deliberate, starting with fancies, that is diminishing traces of sensory perceptions. A man is a body in dual motion, one received form the mother's body, the second starting from imperceptible movements caused by external pressures. Consciously, or not, we are causing movements in our environment, and our deliberate actions are sums of our "Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears",[5] thus some internal movements. The process of summing up is called deliberation, and the sum itself, namely the act of volition "*is the last Appetite in Deliberating.*"[6] And so we are 'determined':

> (...) *A* Free-Man, *is he that, in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to.* But when the words *Free*, and *Liberty* are applyed to any thing but *Bodies*, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion is not to subject to Impediment (...).[7]

Further:

> *Liberty*, and *Necessity* are consistent; as in the water that hath not only *liberty*, but a *necessity* of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed their will, proceed from *liberty*; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes), they proceed from *necessity.*[8]

It is difficult to comment upon this succinct phrase not being involved in the centuries-old argument over free will, in which the quoted passage figures prominently.[9] Thus we only raise two points. Firstly, "that series of thoughts which is called *deliberation*"[10] occurs in other animals, too. Hobbes would probably agree that humans are distinguished not by the character of determination of their acts but by the illusion of free will, which in turn

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[4] *Leviathan*, I.1., p. 13–14 [*EW*3, 1–2].

[5] Op. cit., I.6., p. 44 [*EW*3, 47].

[6] Op. cit., I.6., p. 45 [*EW*3, 49], also *De Corpore*, IV.25.13. [*EW*1, 409].

[7] Op. cit., II.21., p. 146 [*EW*3, 196–197].

[8] Loc. cit. [*EW*3, 197–198]; this is determinism classified as "ontological".

[9] E.g. Joseph Rickaby, *Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill)*, Burns & Oates, London 1906.

[10] *De Corpore*, IV.25.13. [*EW*1, 408].

stems from being a spectator of deliberations terminating in decisions. The spectator must be completely passive,[11] as any attempt to change "the last appetite in deliberating" would itself mean some internal movement thus being included into the combination of movements resulting in action. That by the way resembles contemporary arguments over the mind-body relation.

Secondly, the Malmesburian is routinely labeled as "compatibilist", namely an adherent of compatibility between free will and universally binding natural laws.[12] Whereas Hobbes wholly embeds volition the universal causal net, which in turn alters the meaning of 'compatibility'. He also lists free will as one of "absurdities" or "words were without meaning" like round quadrangle, accidents of bread in cheese (maliciously alluding to Transubstantiation) and a free subject.[13] The issue is not resolved by identifying two oppositions and two respective notions of (in)determination of actions: (a) universal determination vs. universal indetermination; (b) external (in)determination *vs.* internal (in)determination. It is clear that in the first sense (a) all actions are subject to universal determination. In the sense (b) all animal actions are internally determined. As there is no causal border between the outside and inside matter, then internal determination is merely a conditionally delimited part of the universal causal net.

So we have summarised Hobbesian determinism which is complemented by selfishness,[14] already noticeable in children.[15] Hobbesian selfishness is

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[11] In a different context, it has been remarked upon by Leszek Kołakowski who wrote that in the framework of mechanistic determinism action is not influenced by self-knowledge – see his "Determinizm i odpowiedzialność" [Determinism and Responsibility], (in:) Janina Kotarbińska & al. (ed.) *Fragmenty filozoficzne. Seria druga*, PWN, Warsaw 1959, p. 38.

[12] See e.g. John Martin Fischer "Compatibilism", (in:) idem & al., *Four Views on Free Will*, Blackwell, Oxford 2007, p. 44–84; Ishtiyaque Haji "Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility", (in:) Robert Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, p. 202–227.

[13] *Leviathan*, I.5, p. 34 [*EW*3, 32–33].

[14] Some claim that Hobbes did not hold the universal validity of egoism *sensu strito*, eg. that all men were solely motivated by selfishness; see Bernard Gert "Hobbes's Psychology", (in:) Tom Sorell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 166–167. Gert tries to prove that in a peculiar manner, pointing a passage in *Leviathan* (I.6.) where Hobbes *listed* names and definitions of non-selfish traits. We do not deny that 'selfishness' should be carefully defined, especially if philosophers seemingly defending universal selfishness are concerned. The same is valid for other abused terms taken from common ethical discourse.

[15] "Unlesse you give Children everything they aske for, they are peevish, and cry, I, and strike their Parents sometimes, and all this they have from nature."; *De Cive*, "The Authors Preface to the Reader", p. 33 [*EW*2, xvi]. *De Cive* is quoted after the Clarendon editon: *De Cive: The English Version*, ed. Howard Warrender, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983.

a process parallel to the mechanical determination. It is a continual passage from one desire to another. Achieving one item leds to appetite for the next one.[16] However, such a comparison between physical and ethical determinism neglects the constant desire of "power after power"[17] in the course of acquiring more and more goods which are defined according to the individual.[18] The Hobbesian ethics was justly classified as *possessive individualism*.[19]

The merger of selfishness and imagination should give rise to unselfish behaviour. E.g. compassion arises from one's imagining that something like may befall himself. John Aubrey reported:

> He was very charitable (...) One time, I remember, goeing in the Strand, a poor and infirme old man craved his almes. He, beholding him with eies of pitty and compassion, putt his hand in his pocket, and gave him *6d.* Sayd a divine (...) that stood by – 'Would you have donne this, if it had not been Christ's command?' – 'Yea,' sayd he. – 'Why?' – quoth the other. – 'Because,' sayd he, 'I was in paine to consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my almes, giving him some reliefe, doth also ease me.'[20]

And Hobbes himself:

> *Griefe*, for the Calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe (...).[21]

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[16] "Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire." – *Leviathan*, I.11., p. 70 [*EW*3, 85].

[17] "So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death." Loc. cit.

[18] "But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth *Good*; And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, *Evill*; And of his Contempt, *Vile* and *Inconsiderable*. For these words (...) are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves (...)", *Leviathan*, I.6., p. 39 [*EW*3, 41].

[19] Crawford Brough Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1962. The name is accurate, however, Macpherson, a convinced Socialist, has identified *possessive individualism* with the main current of English political doctrine linked by a claim that people are sole proprietors of their capacities, which in turn are exchanged (*posessive market*), without any further obligations to the society as a whole (*The Political Theory...*, p. 3). On the one hand, Hobbes has a place in the development towards 19th-century liberalism, on the other, Hobbesian contract is *not* a free-market deal. Macpherson himself admits that the whole Hobbesian doctrine was not needed by the English possessing class, they "had come to terms with the more ambiguous, and more agreeable, doctrine of Locke" (*The Political Theory...*, p. 106).

[20] *Aubrey's Brief Lives*, vol. 1., ed. Andrew Clark, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1898, p. 352.

[21] *Leviathan*, I.6., p. 43–44 [*EW*3, 47].

In a similar way, so by the lack of a potential self-reference of a calamity, he explains cruelty. Thus he does not recognise a possibility of unselfish wrongdoing – malice:

> *Contempt*, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens great harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.[22]

Such an explanation by a deficiency of imagination is obviously unsatisfactory (not only because a cruel phantasm could be pleasurable), however it says something about the Malmesburian.

The link between determinism and selfishness is interesting, all the more so as determinism comes in *Leviathan* first, then we have an interluding analysis of religion (Ch. XII) which is considered as specifically human form of the fear of the future. Human felicity depends on knowledge "of the Beginning of things"[23] – things past and future. This is the seed of religion present "but in Man onely."[24] Other animals enjoy supplying their everyday needs. In the case of humans, the curiosity about causes leads from the absence of visible agents to fancying invisible ones.

Only in Ch. XIII we have the (in)famous Hobbesian inference[25] – justification of social contract and bowing to the sovereign due to universal selfishness, and the claim that "Naturall Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery"[26] is war of every man against every man:

> Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known (...).[27]

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[22] Loc. cit.

[23] *Leviathan*, I.12., p. 75 [*EW*3, 94], the analysis of religion starts already at the end of I.11.

[24] Loc. cit.

[25] Of course, a 'inference' *sensu largo*.

[26] The title of Ch. 13.

[27] *Leviathan*, I.13., p. 88 [*EW*3, 112–113], also *De Cive*, I.1.2–12.

Here, the question of human liberty resurfaces, namely how liberty is at all possible after transferring own rights to the sovereign. In other words, how to reconcile liberty of subjects with sovereign rights?[28]

Hobbes presents the condition of men who entered the contract just after the above-quoted statement liberty in general. It is other well known passage about "Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth" and "Artificiall Chains, called *Civill Lawes*".[29] The artificial chains are fragile, being protected rather by the imagined perils of breaking them, nonetheless, only the chains enable us to speak about the freedom of the subject. Similarly, the freedom of man as a natural being is possible only in the context of natural laws. So the freedom of a social man is possible only when the laws are silent.[30] As we already know, human freedom consists of performing an act without external limitations of any kind.

Hobbesian physics of passions is an internal portrait of man, the external image being taken from the careful survey of the state of nature. An actual reconciliation of both is to be achieved by a comparison of two kinds of motive tendency (*conatus*, *endeavour*): mechanical and biological. A kind of declarative and taxonomic reconciliation indeed takes place at the beginning of *Leviathan*. The table of branches of science (I.9.), simply has ethics in the compartment of physics. "Tendency" should not been taken literally, as in both cases Hobbes means not a potentiality but an actual, however minimal, motion.[31]

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[28] The question can be formulated as the following trilemma: (1) "the monarch alone of all the inhabitants of the realm is in any sense free"; (2) "the monarch is more free than his subjects"; (3) "monarch and subjects are equally free" – Rickaby, *Free Will...*, op. cit., p. 44. We agree with Rickaby, that the last statement (3) is what Hobbes meant. Rickaby adds that there is no use arguing the point, giving an appropriate example: "If anyone is pleased to say that a Russian goes to Siberia because he likes to go wherever the Tsar may send him, we can afford to let that whimsical thinker enjoy his own humour without contradiction". (Loc. cit.)

[29] *Leviathan*, II.21, p. 147 [*EW*3, 198].

[30] Op. cit., II.21, p. 152–153 [*EW*3, 206].

[31] "(...) I define ENDEAVOUR *to be motion made in less space and time than can be given* (...), *motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or a point of time.* (...) by a point is not to be understood that which has no quantity, or which cannot by any means be divided; for there is no such thing in nature; but that, whose quantity is not at all considered, that is, neither quantity nor any part is computed in demonstration; so that a point is not to be taken for an indivisible, but for an undivided thing; as also an instant is to be taken for an undivided, and not for an indivisible time. In like manner, endeavour is to be conceived as motion; but so as that neither the quantity of time in which, not of the line in which it is made, may in demonstration be at all brought into comparison with the quantity of that time, or of that line of which it is a part." – *De Corpore*, III.15.2. [*EW*1, 206].

Endeavour is understood as mechanical (M) or biological (B):

$conatus_{\mathrm{M}}$	$\supset$	$conatus_{\mathrm{B}}$
pertaining to all bodies		pertaining to animate bodies
motive tendency of undivided parts of matter in general		motive tendency of indivisible parts of living matter

Thus $conatus_{\mathrm{M}}$ denotes small movements occurring in all matter. The category of $conatus_{\mathrm{B}}$ is distinguished according to the fact that some bodies, the animate ones, can reflect other things: "Of all the phenomena or appearances which are near us, the most admirable is apparition itself, $\tau o\ \phi\alpha\iota\nu\varepsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$; namely, that some natural bodies have in themselves the patterns almost of all things, and others none at all."[32] The reflections are then remembered, and not as passive imprints but as durable movements in sensory organs. Biological *conatus* appears as a distinctive form of memory reaction. The concept of memory as durable excitement was clearly much ahead of Hobbes' time.[33]

$Conatus_{\mathrm{B}}$ at once characterises living beings, and separates them. Therefore it serves as a dynamic principle of individuation. Due to its fundamental role in emergence of perceptions it is the basis of phantasms and desires, too. According to what we said about Hobbesian determinism, we could set up a scheme analogous to the scheme of endeavours, including physical (mechanical), animal, and human determination.

$\mathrm{determinism}_{\mathrm{M}}$	$\supset$	$\mathrm{determinism}_{\mathrm{A}}$	$\supset$	$\mathrm{determinism}_{\mathrm{H}}$
all bodies		animal bodies		human bodies
Universal causal network bifurcating from the Prime Mover		chain of desires		chain of desires subject to the principle of maximisation of power

On the basis of both Hobbes' texts,[34] and similar accounts of contempo-

[32] Op. cit., IV.25.1. [*EW*1, 389].

[33] Op. cit., IV.25.5. [*EW*1, 393–4]. Importance of this statement has been acknowledged eg. by Gert – "Hobbes's Psychology", op. cit., p. 157–8. He writes "Many of Hobbes's philosophical views about psychology appear quite up-to-date". Hobbes made another pioneering remark, namely equating reasoning with calculation (*De Corpore*, I.1.2. [*EW*1, 3]), thereby predating Leibniz and mathematical logic. Of course, he was not able to say more, so Father Bocheński rightly describes his remark as "rather *jeu d'esprit* of a dilettante than a theory of mathematical logic", mixed with poor "mathematicism" (*A History of Formal Logic*, tr. I. Thomas, Chelsea Publ. Co., New York, 1970, §38.04.).

[34] Especially interesting is the passage from the Hobbes-Bramhall dispute where Hobbes points to the cleverness of animals: "For bees and spiders, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only election but also art, prudence, and policy in them very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle says their life is civil." – *Of Liberty and Necessity*, (in:) *Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity*, ed. Vere Chappell, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 19 [*EW*4, 244–245].

rary philosophers and naturalists, we could argue whether there is any strict limit between determinism$_A$ and determinism$_H$, however, it is another topic. We only emphasise that any attempt to form a subclass of determinism$_H$, namely determinism$_S$ (social) would be at best conditional due to the weakness of social contract. The M, A, and H-series of determination are extended infinitely by nature. Determination of type S, or self-perpetuating sovereign,[35] is impossible in the long run.

Hobbes knows no permanently socialised human being, only natural men displaying temporarily limited or directed movements. The universal war continually starts in human body and can be silenced only for a short time.[36] We know this not only because Leviathan is mortal – while there is life there is internal movement as we are constantly exposed to external pressures. In fact social determination is precluded by the natural[37] one acting like noise, despite the philosopher's claim that natural determination somehow gives rise to the social. The only way to set up the eternal peace would be to transform humans into plants or to throw them into vacuum.

And this is both the glory and the poverty of the Hobbesian physical anthropology.

Summary

The construction of Hobbesian anthropology is sketched with emphasis on these points of his philosophy which seem inconclusive. We focus on: determinism, the notion of conatus/endeavour (which in turn splits into a purely mechanic kind, and a biological one), and on the duality of an-

[35] *Self-perpetuating sovereign*, another Macpherson's term – *The Political Theory...*, op. cit., p. 90–95.

[36] "Yet the most sudden, and rough bustling in of a new Truth that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another (...)", *Leviathan*, II.18., p. 125 [*EW*3, 164–165]. The remark concerning the dormant war is placed inside a clear recommendation to subject science and education to the sovereign – or to introduce and to willingly accept political correctness: "For Doctrine repugnant to Peace can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature." (*Leviathan*, II.18., p. 125 [*EW*3, 164]).

[37] The adjective "natural" is ambiguous. It can denote something "inborn", as well as something "calculated". The latter sense occurs in the case of some twenty rules called "laws of nature" in *Leviathan* I.14.–15. and in *De Cive* I.2–3. "Therefore the *Law of Nature*, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of Life, and Members as much as it lyes." – *De Cive*, I.2.1., p. 52 [*EW*2, 16].

thropological description in Hobbes. In fact, the philosopher attempted to portray human beings both from inside and from outside. The "inside" view equals to a physics of passions which are in turn rooted in biological conatus (*De Corpore*, Ch. IV.25.), the "outside" view is the grim landscape of the state of nature and then the famous "deduction" of the need of absolute power (*Leviathan*, Ch. XII). In fact there is no other man than the natural born egoist, as the Hobbesian citizen is simply a tamed beast.

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THE LAW AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES AND H. L. A. HART

Law and language are notions which are closely interconnected and language is a natural tool of law since it renders its manifestation possible. Law is 'at anchor' in language; it is a conveyor of notions and legal institutions and therefore it became a subject of a clear-sighted analysis of the theory of law. The study of language in which law is expressed can not only aim at extracting the 'real' meaning of words from a specific text, at understanding the communiqué carried by a specific legal text but it can also contribute to formulation of general statements concerning the nature of law, statements from the field of philosophy of law. That is exactly the analysis of legal notions that became for H. L. A. Hart the starting point to answer the most fundamental question: 'what is the law?' and what are the ways of cognising it in his work 'The Concept of Law'[1] (1961).

One of the first thinkers whose output concerning the language is connected indissolubly to considerations on legal subjects is Thomas Hobbes. He is the precursor of modern philosophers-lawyers who became aware of the meaning of the first rank of language in explaining the basic problems of jurisprudence and in defining the very notion of law.

The aim of the present study is to compare the remarks of T. Hobbes and H. L. A. Hart concerning theories of language, the emphasis of the role of linguistic questions in the ideological systems of the two philosophers; demonstrating that their views on the language are considerably related to considerations concerning the law. Presentation of Hart's beliefs regarding the law and language in the context of Hobbes' achievements is to show that despite 300 years separating the two thinkers, there is one timeless idea that

[1] This work gained the name of the 'bible of the modern positivism' and became the most frequently quoted position in legal philosophy literature of the 20th century.

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connects them: they both try to reach the essence of law through analysis of linguistic locutions.

In this article I want also to demonstrate Hobbes' contribution to the development of law and emphasise the adherence of the philosopher to the trend of legal thought called today legal positivism[2] (the excellent representative of which proved to be H. L. A. Hart).

Hobbes is the thinker who is quite commonly credited with the name of precursor of legal positivism[3] (though there are many statements connecting his concepts with the natural law[4]). Thoughts related to the nature of law occupy a lot of place in his most important works in the field of political philosophy: *The Elements of Law*, *Natural and Politic*, *De Cive* and *Leviathan*, they are present in *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* and appear in other works. The notion of laws of nature was the starting point of Hobbes' considerations on the subject of state law, which he defines as unchangeable and eternal commands of reason. The founders of philosophy before Hobbes recognized the laws of nature as rules of unique importance which condition the recognition of the state law and which have priority in case of conflict with the norms of positive law. While according to the philosopher, the laws of nature, even though they are obvious demand to be incorporated to the law order by the sovereign in order to operate.

The most important of Hobbes' statements on the subject of the character of positive law is: law is a command. *'Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of that is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule'*[5] – he writes in *Leviathan*, a similar definition he formulates in *Dialogue*.[6] In the light of the above mentioned statement Hobbes appears

[2] See M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes on law*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. T. Sorell, Cambridge 1996, p. 276.

[3] Precursors of legal positivism were ancient sofists who first separated proclaimed law (nomos), valid independently of its moral value, Wilhelm of Okham may be given this name as well, see J. Woleński, *Wprowadzenie*, in: H. L. A. Hart, *Pojęcie prawa*, translated by J. Woleński, Warszawa 1998, p. XX, see also K. Doliwa, *Wilhelm z Ockham i Tomasz Hobbes o naturze pojęć ogólnych*, in: *Filozofia i myśl społeczna XVII wieku*, ed. J. Kopania, H. Święczkowska, Białystok 2006, p. 5.

[4] Compare L. Strauss, *Natural Law and History*, University of Chicago Press, 1971, and N. Bobbio, *Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition*, Chicago 1993.

[5] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, displayed at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~rbear/hobbes/leviathan2.html.

[6] T. Hobbes, *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England*, displayed at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=770&layout=html.

as a pioneer of the order law theory and of legal positivism, but it should be emphasised that the conception he proposes differs from later theories in numerous details.[7]

It is possible to ascribe the two philosophers to this trend of thinking about the law since understanding of the term 'legal positivism' is extensive enough.[8] According to Hart himself it is applied in Anglo-Saxon literature with reference to one or more of the following statements: 1) human laws are orders, 2) the lack of necessary relation between law and morality or the law as it is and the law as it should be, 3) studies on legal notions are a question fundamental in character and are different from historical sociological studies and from critical estimation of law from the point of view of morality or social goals 4) legal system is a closed logical system and a given decision can be derived from it on the strength of the rules previously defined and with help of logical tools, 5) moral convictions can be established on the basis of rational argumentation, evidence.[9] Continental positivists supplemented this list with the following statements: 6) legal order is the order of the statute law, 7) a bill is the only source of the law, 8) a bill is the expression of unlimited will of sovereign, 9) a lawyer is subject to the bill unconditionally.[10] Depending on which of the above-mentioned thesis a given theory propagates we can speak about hard or moderate positivism. J. Boyle proposes a definition which is wide enough to include Hobbes as well as Hart among positivists, and so a positivist is everyone who when referring to the notion of law, minimises, denies or disregards the role of religion whereas emphasises the role of state and its authorised representatives.[11] The positivist propagated that the law is in force independently from its substance also moral. It is though a doctrine aimed against ideas of the laws of nature according to which the importance of law depends on its fulfilment of basic moral norms. Defenders of the law of nature reproach the positivists with tolerating each, even an immoral law whereas the last-mentioned referring to multitude of moral systems, point out the uselessness of moral laws in estimation of state law.

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[7] See M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes on law*, publisher qutd., p. 275–298.

[8] See L. Morawski, *Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa. Prawo w toku przemian*, Warszawa 1999, p. 15–18.

[9] H. L. A. Hart, *Pojęcie prawa*, ed. qutd., p. 399–400.

[10] See J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, *Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku*, Kraków 1999, p. 23–24.

[11] J. Boyle, *Thomas Hobbes and the invented tradition of positivism: reflections on language, power, and essentialism*, displayed at: http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/hobbes.htm.

I will hereunder try to make a thorough study of how did Hobbes, who observed and emphasised the role of definition in reasoning and scientific cognition, get to explain the nature of law by creating in the 17th century the fundaments of legal positivism, the theory which flourished thanks to John Austin – the Hart's master only in the 19th century.

Questions concerning the language appear in the works of T. Hobbes early[12] and come back repeatedly. The invention of language called speech constituted for the philosopher the subject of detailed reflection; Hobbes devotes much space to explaining the genesis and the nature of words basing himself on conventionalism.[13] According to the philosopher *the first truths of all arose from the wills of those who first imposed names on things, or accepted names imposed by others*,[14] they are though characterised by arbitrariness of a certain kind. These 'have a function of' namely initial premises of reasoning which by virtue of the fact that they established arbitrarily are not subject to evidence.[15]

After having determined the origins of language and first definitions Hobbes tried to present a method which enabled to create a cohesive and uniform scientific system, a method which has, it seems, a specific application also in relation to his 'social philosophy' that is to say to the theory of law among others. Fascinated by Euclid's geometry he arrived at the conclusion that the method of defining mathematical terms consisting in explaining designations is the only one that is just, universal and should apply in all fields of science. Rejecting Aristotle's conception of definition understood as revealing the essence of the defined thing Hobbes judged defining as a manipulation executed on language, concerning words.[16] The term 'definition' means in his opinion designation of the sense of words.

The fundamental role of definition in science is elimination of ambiguities and vagueness – precise determination of significance of the defined name (word).[17] The name, clarified from all significances different from the one of the definiens becomes entirely clear and intelligible – *clearly presents the idea of the thing considered* and can fulfil a function of *principium* in

[12] Linguistic questions are dealt in logics manual prepared from yet 1636 – *Computatio sive logica*, published only in 1655 as first part of the first section of philosophy entitled *De Corpore*.

[13] T. Hobbes, *On body*, displayed at: http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/hobbes/decorpore/decorp1.html#top.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] See T. Hobbes, *On body*, publisher qutd.

[17] Ibidem.

argumentation. Definitions of denominations are a measure enabling to reveal the falseness of an utterance.[18] In Hobbes' philosophy argumentation and science appear to be consequences of definition.[19]

According to Hobbes, language in a way constitutes reason and has a role of the initial condition for the development of science, for cultivating it and transferring its achievements to posterity. Apart from this extremely important role or function of language another one, equally essential, can be mentioned: for Hobbes language is also a necessary condition to the birth of a state. Men who have a command of language and are guided by the voice of reason aim at leaving an extremely uncomfortable state of nature in which they remained to date and at passing to guarantying peace state conditions even though artificial.

One of the fundamental conditions of people's leaving the state of nature according to Hobbes is to enter a community contract specifically understood. The philosopher writes about the nature of this contract surprisingly little; what is known about it is that every man agrees to pass the authorisation to dispose of one's own person to the sovereign under one condition: that every future member of a given community will do exactly the same.[20]

The aim of the community contract is to constitute a state and the aim of the state is to ensure the security of its citizens. The basic guarantor of security is settlement of uniform moral principles binding everyone. Then a sovereign appointed by virtue of the community contract introduces binding differentiation of moral and immoral actions and distinguishes the right and the wrong. In the state of nature, previous to state conditions, the objective criterion of the right and the wrong did not exist, what was right for one might have been wrong for another. Everyone wanted to be the 'source' of moral judgement and everyone wanted to give the words 'right' and 'wrong' a different meaning. *For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves* (...).[21] In the state of nature there exist an enormous number of particular laws, each devoid of attribute and even relative durability. The one undoubtedly worth seeing

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[18] See ibidem.

[19] St. Kamiński, *Hobbesa pojęcie definicji*, (in:) *Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk*, Lublin 1994, p. 47. Acceptance of a given appellation with definite significance in one of the sections of philosophy does not exclude the possibility of a different definition in a different domain of science.

[20] T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, publisher qutd.

[21] Ibidem.

is the question of how a sovereign establishes common norms concerning moral problems. It seems that here as well Hobbes' philosophy of language is in close relation with his social and political philosophy.

A sovereign chosen by the will of citizens and acting on their behalf executes more than a simple expression of his opinion in moral questions. His declaration may be called, according to the theory of speech acts of J. L. Austin, a performative utterance.[22] A distinctive feature of performative utterances is the fact that they are connected to execution of a given action. Saying given words only in specific conditions and by chosen persons decides that a given action takes place. Specific character of performative utterances makes impossible to attribute to them a category of truth or falseness – they do not describe the reality but they form it.[23]

Giving names to certain actions by a sovereign constitutes a legislative act, a point of reference for estimation of future behaviour of citizens. This operation resembles extraordinarily the process of defining – and so it is indeed. Since, as it was observed before, the defining process is characterized by arbitrariness then it characterizes legislative acts of the sovereign as well. And since a correctly, even if arbitrarily formulated definition should not excite controversy or discussion, legislative acts of a sovereign should not become subjects of public dispute.[24] Similarly to correct definitions giving birth to reasoning and building of a system of scientific knowledge legislative acts forming a legal system – laws in which sovereign denominates what is good and lawful and what is wrong and beyond the law order – constitute a fundament of a secure state. Questioning these acts by citizens is subversive and highly dangerous for the state order, though every critic of law laid down by a sovereign is excluded in Hobbes' system. There is no room for it also because Hobbes propagated a positivist credo: he excludes possibility that an established law was unjust or faulty.[25] Just as first definitions (the first truths), basic legislative acts of a sovereign are not subject to argumentation and should be recognized as a fundament for creation of a system of norms.

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[22] See J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's system of ideas*, London 1965, p. 153.

[23] See J. L. Austin, *Jak działać słowami*, (in:) *Mówienie i poznawanie*, translated by B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa 1993. John L. Austin, to the views of whom I'm referring while reporting Hobbes' ideas is the major representative of the philosophy of colloquial language, a friend of H. L. A. Hart having a decisive influence on formation of his philosophy of law, see J. Woleński, *Wprowadzenie*, (in:) H. L. A. Hart, *Pojęcie prawa*, publisher qutd., p. XVII.

[24] See T. Hobbes, *Lewiatan*, publisher qutd.

[25] See ibidem. See also J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's system of ideas*, publisher qutd., pp. 153–157.

It can be judged from Hobbes opinions about the nature of language, from the role of definition in scientific cognition and construction of unquestioned, uniform knowledge systems and the genesis of law that he would be partisan of a conception formulated by positivist lawyers of the 19th century which emphasized the importance of formulation of definition in explaining legal notions.

A loyal disciple of Hobbes appeared to be professor John Austin (1790–1859) commonly known as creator of legal positivism[26] and the author of command theory of law. Desirous to arrange English law terminology he decided to analyse basic notions of British legal science. This ambitious intention he preceded with a question about what exactly is law, how it should be defined and he answered it as follows: *'Every Law (properly so called) is an express or tacit, a direct or circuitous Command. By every command, an Obligation is imposed upon the party to whom it is addressed or intimated. Or (changing the expression) it obliges the party by virtue of the corresponding sanction'*.[27] It should be added as a supplement to this definition that the rule is an order of a sovereign for the subjects, though the law may be understood as a set of orders of a ruler. It is essential that Austin takes the sociological understanding of a sovereign – it is a person who commands obedience and who rules on a given territory, and not the one who was given the title by the law regulations. Such an understanding implies primordiality of a sovereign authority as related to the law[28] and generated a number of problems connected with indication of a sovereign.[29]

Austin deserves the credit for the attempt to define the notion of law precisely and for a purposeful separation of metaphysical enunciations on law from scientific in character settlements. His methodology is based on assumptions of British analytical philosophy and consists of an analysis of law notions by means of logical tools. Just as Hobbes did earlier Austin

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[26] The name of 'the father of legal positivism' was given to Austin despite of the fact that basic thesis of this theory were formulated by Jeremy Bentham, Austin's teacher. Bentham's works lay in manuscript for over 100 years and were published only in 1945 under the title *The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined* when Austin's lectures being its repetition or a creative development had already been known to everybody, see J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, *Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku*, publisher qutd., p. 25.

[27] J. Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, London 1977, p. 5.

[28] J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, *Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku*, publisher qutd., pp. 25–32.

[29] When indicating the way of appointing the sovereign, Austin writes, he should be given hearing from the great part of the society according to custom – such definition is not precise and such expressions as 'according to custom' or 'the great part' make it difficult to unequivocally recognise a given subject a sovereig, J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, *Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku*, publisher qutd., p. 30.

also created definitions of notions seeking to create a uniform and coherent system.

The continuator of Austin's thoughts and also a constructive critic proved to be Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. Hart was presented in philosophy of law manuals as an ideological successor of J. Austin and J. Bentham and revised comprehensively the conceptions of his predecessors. A fundamental reproach he made to Austin's theory concerned the omission of an essential differentiation between usage of a given behaviour and a rule. It was the analysis of the notion of rule (norm) Hart recognized as a key one in relation to the answer for the question 'what is law?'. What differentiates legal rules from other rules is the fact that the first ones impose an obligation of a certain behaviour and thus are necessary to proper functioning of a society. A feature which makes it possible to distinguish legal rules among moral norms is their connection to an intense social pressure and physical sanctions.

Another Hart's reformatory suggestion was an observation that next to the norms imposing an obligation of a given behaviour, the norms of secondary nature should be singled out, that is rules of change which name the rules of change of primary norms, rules of decision giving the tools of analysis of significance or of the way a given norm should be applied and rules of recognition which permit to establish whether a given rule belongs to the law at all. Only by uniting the primary rules and the secondary ones creates a coherent legal system – 'the law' by Hart. The system functions if the rules of primary nature are actually observed and secondary rules are treated as a model of behaviour by authorised state representatives.[30]

Another characteristic of Hart's theory is expression 'minimum content of the law of nature' – because law and morality regulate the same domain of human activity and have common goals, each legal system should include certain conditions resulting from the human nature and should respect rules protecting health and life of an individual, property and ensuring functioning of a given society.[31]

As far as the method of philosophising is concerned Hart is a representative of the so-called 'Oxford philosophy' or in other words 'philosophy of

[30] H. L. A. Hart, *Pojęcie prawa*, publisher qutd., pp. 114–139.

[31] Ibidem, pp. 261–269. Similar understanding of this problem is visible in Hobbes: the philosopher admittedly assumes that sovereign acting in agreement with the orders of reason will include laws of nature within the sphere of legal order, however a decisive importance in the process of proclaiming the law is actually sovereign's will connected to his power. Hobbes cognitive nominalist universalism current also on the grounds of state science created by him assumes multitude of possibilities of 'right' legal orders.

colloquial language' a trend started by J. L. Austin[32] which developed in opposition to analytical philosophy which was to be a remedy to a crisis in philosophy in general.

Creators of analytical philosophy recommended either philosophising in accordance with common sense[33] or in accordance with requirements of formal logics (B. Russell). Even though methods proposed by them were decidedly different they were connected in terms of perceiving a particular role of language and notions in the process of coming to the truth in philosophy, emphasising that this process has a vital linguistic aspect. Hard formalism appeared to be the winning current for a moment – philosophers, especially those assembled in the so-called Vienna Circle believed that it is possible to discover world's structure through cognising the logical structure of language.

Suppressing the supremacy of analytical philosophy is connected with late works of Ludwig Wittgenstein who having abandoned his previous beliefs proved that a real cognition of significations of expressions is possible only through study of individual contexts in which they appear. The cognition of the significance does not equate the cognition of definition but the acquiring of a skill of adequate use of significance in various linguistic situations. To describe the operation Wittgenstein created a notion of 'linguistic game'. According to the philosopher the significance of expressions consists of its use. There is no one and unique universal language the analysis of which gives a complete knowledge about reality, there are many coexisting and intertwining languages – that is 'linguistic games'.[34] What is important is that even if a linguistic game is located in language we have to take into consideration the extra linguistic factor – factual situations where the 'player' is situated – when using it. The topical meaning of a given expression is determined only when a specific field of functioning of the expression, the so-called usage family[35] is set.

The reception of a very popular conception of 'linguistic games' on the ground of philosophy of law was done by Hart giving another uncovering of informal language analysis. Hart after his master J. L. Austin, thought that

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[32] Two thinkers who the most influenced Hart have the same surname. The first one whose views were signaled here was John Austin, a lawyer, and the second one – is Hart's contemporary, the philosopher John Langshaw Austin.

[33] Creative development of Moore's conception was done in the United States, where it fund a breeding ground and found numerous continuators.

[34] L. Wittgenstein, *Dociekania filozoficzne*, translation and introduction B. Wolniewicz, Warszawa 2000.

[35] Ibidem.

if in the colloquial language the experience of all generations is reflected so it should become the starting point for philosophical analysis. Even if colloquial language does not have to bring a certified knowledge it is where the philosophy is born.

In his work 'Definition and theory in jurisprudence' (1954) Hart rejected the J. Austin's methodology of studying legal phenomena. He recognised that on the grounds of jurisprudence we are not authorised to ask 'what is?' a given notion and to build a definition in answer; such an operation did not take into account the rootedness of legal notions in a specific context.[36] The aim of a philosophical study should be, not as so far construction but – seemingly a thing of lesser importance – the account of an existing status quo. Studying the law based on fixed definitions as e.g. *'per genus proximum et differentiam specificam'* depriving the notion of the context, is creating an artificial 'linguistic game'.

According to Hart it should be investigated with insight how a given notion functions in language (also colloquial) and what are its functions. Only a detailed analysis of a given expression in a specific context gives knowledge about its significance.[37] Hart realised the fact that the significance of legal notions changes depending on the context of their use and that there is lack of sufficient premises to favour a given significance and to ignore others.[38]

The method of studying legal notions worked out by Hart consisted in indicating a model case of application of a given notion and determining the limits of expanding it. A well-known example concerns the study of notion 'international law' where the philosopher considers the question whether the international law is still *law* and recognising internal law of a given country a model case he points out features that make it resemble the state law. Hart observes such similarity in the very structure of international law – it imposes entitlements and obligations on specific subjects and this is enough to recognize international law as ultimate *law*.[39]

Hart would probably agree with Hobbes in the matter concerning performative language use – in his opinion this question is of special importance for the theory of law. As all philosophers of colloquial language, he noticed clearly that performatives were present in law almost always and are a phe-

[36] H. L. A Hart, *Eseje z filozofii prawa*, translated by J. Woleński, Warszawa 2001, pp. 21–47.

[37] Ibidem, p. 26.

[38] Ibidem, p. 5.

[39] H. L. A Hart, *Pojęcie prawa*, publisher qutd., pp. 286–317.

nomenon that occurs quite often. Hart emphasises that they are present not only in the phase of legislation but also accompany agreements and activities based on law.[40]

Both philosophers that is Hobbes – considered by some a precursor of positivist methodology, and by many the founder of legal positivism and Hart – legal positivist revisionist-minded, have one of the positivist thesis in common: law is proclaimed by man, the only law which is subject to law theory is positive law, both of the philosophers share the conviction about fundamental significance of linguistic research for legal considerations. However, different are their views on how the law should be expressed in linguistic matter and how to 'extract' it from linguistic expressions. Hobbes appears as advocate of definition also when it comes to the study of law and emphasises its importance in building a coherent legal system while the method of analysis of legal notions worked out by Hart is genetically anti-definition and is marked by planned lack of trust in definition as a way to explain significance of expressions.

translated by Marta Jastrzębska

[40] H. L. A Hart, *Eseje z filozofii prawa*, publisher qutd., pp. 88–118.

STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 15 (28) 2009

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEIBNIZ'S CONSIDERATIONS IN JOHN YENCH'S PROJECT

In the title above it is a declared conviction that John Yench's universal language (Idirl) has its provenance in G. W. Leibniz's project. The problem is thus located in a precisely determined conceptual framework: what is, or should a universal language be? However, in order to ask responsibly whether Yench's modern-day project is a development of the considerations of this German philosopher. It is first required to define how the term "universal language" is used in this text. This will enable us to explore the topic clearly and unambiguously and make it possible to present the *Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language* as a continuation of Leibniz's idea.

In philosophical or linguistic literature the term "universal language" often appears in different contexts and therefore a coherent definition is difficult to reach. At the moment the first questions about the origins of language arose, there also arose questions about the causes of the multiplicity of languages and of evaluating their variety. Along with the first contacts with *other* language users our language begins to become a barrier – an inaccurate, malfunctioning tool. Both cognition and communication (which are legitimized by language) prove to be imperfect.

In European Culture a dual attempt to cope with this problem has appeared. The first was reconstruction: the Adamic language (a return to the order of Paradise and the language received from God) or the reconstruction of the protolanguage (inspired by comparative linguistics). Obviously each of these attempts originated from completely different understanding of the origin of language. Although it should be noted that it is meant to be a return to, with certain reservations, a natural language.

When these two kinds of reconstruction are compared, then some terminological problems appear. In professional literature the linguistic projects of e.g. Leibniz, John Wilkins or George Dalgarno are (sometimes interchangeably) designated: universal languages or perfect languages. However, this is

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imprecise because not every perfect language has to be a universal language – and sometimes perfect languages were understood (even by their constructors) as not ultimately universal. One example of an attempt to reconstruct this situation will be discussed in detail: The reconstruction of the Adamic language and certain nationalistic hypotheses associated with this imply the perfection and universality of this language. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of protolanguage (within the confines of comparative linguistics) presumes the universal character of these languages (on the assumption of the monogenetic hypothesis) but do not imply the paralanguage's perfection, which was very often considered as wholly imperfect.

The second means of dealing with the multiplicity of languages, which the projects of both the thinkers in the title belong to, is connected with the construction of a language. Such projects are often called artificial languages, which causes some misunderstandings. It is possible to come across the view that all languages are artificial, because "they emerge in society and undergo its active influence".[1] Or, as Barbara Stanosz considers: "the detailed construction of any language is not biologically determined; it is invented – for better or worse – by our ancestors, and in this sense all human languages are 'artificial'".[2]

However, it must be stressed that determining which language projects are constructed languages (as opposed to those which are reconstructed), is not an easy task. There is a problem even with such projects as: cosmic languages, mathematical languages and logical languages. Also any attempt at systematizing constructed languages can add many problems and uncertainties because it is possible to divide them from many points of view: whether they are pasigraphical (universal writing and alphabet) or pasilalical projects (designed also for speech).[3] It is possible to distinguish them into unilinguas or paninterlinguas – the first term concerns languages which are intended to be the sole language in general use; the second concerns common languages which would function on a basis of full equality of rights with natural languages.[4]

In the division below a different set of characteristics, in order to situate the considerations of Leibniz as well as to indicate the degree to which John

[1] M. Susskin, *Paninterlingwa. Powszechny język międzynarodowy*, PWN, Warszawa 1990, p. 16. (fragment translated by E. K.).

[2] B. Stanosz, *Wprowadzenie do logiki formalnej*, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 91. (fragment translated by E. K.).

[3] See about this distinction: M. Jurkowski, *Od wieży Babel do języka kosmitów*, KAW, Białystok 1986, p. 34.

[4] See M. Susskin, op. cit.

Yench's project is a continuation of the thought of the German philosopher, has been used.

Constructed universal languages are created by individuals or groups of people. From the beginning they have designated functions and roles (true cognition and/or unlimited communication), are ahistorical and not spontaneous. The universal character of such projects depends on the degree to which people can learn and use such a language. All such projects can by divided into two main classes:

1) Universal *a priori* languages – whose vocabulary is not based on existing (national) languages. The grammar and vocabulary of such projects are based on philosophical reasoning and try to categorize the whole of human knowledge and experience.
2) Universal *a posteriori* languages – whose vocabulary is based on existing (national) languages. Such languages have simplified grammar and do not try to categorize the whole of human knowledge.

Almost all the attempts at creating universal languages made thus far were connected with constructing philosophical languages (in first half of the XIX century) and the XVII century is sometimes called the age of such languages (because of the number of constructed projects). Since the creation of the first a posteriori language *Volapük* (in the second half of the XIX century) which gained international prominence an era of international a posteriori languages began.

The projects of the thinkers in the title – Leibniz and Yench – are a priori languages. However, the *Idirl* project published in 2003 is peculiar against the background of other modern ideas. The activity of a priori language constructors almost entirely ceased along with the appearance of the first a posteriori languages. All activity in this area has been based on natural languages – suffice it to mention The International Auxiliary Language Association (IALA) founded in 1924, whose first director of the Department of Linguistic Research was Edward Sapir, or the *Toki pona* language, which was intended to confirm the truth of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Sapir-Whorf hypothesis).

Presenting the full development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's view on universal language and his considerations on the role of language in his metaphysical system is beyond the scope of this text. So, of necessity we must limit ourselves to a description of the most important elements.[5]

[5] See an interesting and exhaustive study about the role of language in philosophy of G. W. Leibniz: H. Święczkowska, *Harmonia linguarum. Język i jego funkcje w filozofii Leibniza*, Białystok 1998.

The German philosopher has never presented a completed project of a universal language. However his ideas exerted a strong influence on subsequent constructors. From beginning of his scientific activity the idea of creating a universal language accompanied him. Unlike his predecessors (who mainly saw universal language as a tool for the exchange of information and a means of improving travel and trade) it is possible to find in Leibniz's projects a sensitivity to religious issues and universal language (as instrument of discovering truth) could serve the achievement of peace and European unity.[6]

Leibniz knew the projects of George Dalgarno or John Wilkins when he sketched different attempts at constructing universal languages.[7] He also referred to the work of Descartes as mentioned in a 1629 letter to Mersenne. The project which he spent his entire life working on was a powerful philosophical-linguistic construction. The overall shape of Leibniz's project is presented by Umberto Eco as a set of four major aspects:[8]

1) identification of a system of primitives, organized in an alphabet of thought;
2) the elaboration of an ideal grammar, of which simplified Latin is one example;
3) the formulation of a series of rules governing the possible pronunciation of the characters;
4) the elaboration of a lexicon of the real, which would automatically lead to the formulation of true propositions.

The German philosopher realized the diversity of natural language but he considered that each national language to be the expression of an interior language of thoughts. Through research on existing languages it is possible to reach the structure of mind and single out primary ideas through universal language.

In 1666 Leibniz published the dissertation *De arte combinatoria* and obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy. He wrote that all concepts (even compound ones) are only combinations of simple concepts. These concepts (just as words are compounded from letters) are extremely differentiated combinations.

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[6] U. Eco, *The Search for the Perfect Language*, trans. J. Fentress, Blackwell Publishing, 1995, p. 271.

[7] In the III vol. of *New Essays on Human Understanding* Leibniz wrote: "Perhaps there are some artificial languages which are wholly chosen and completely arbitrary, as that of China is believed to have been, or like those of George Dalgarno and the late Bishop Wilkins of Chester". G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 279.

[8] See U. Eco, op. cit., p. 270.

He thought that each compound concept can be reduced to simpler concepts by its definition and in this way it is possible to achieve indivisible components. These components through applying the appropriate calculus will serve to encompass all of human knowledge. He considered that the set of simple concepts is complete and constitutes an "alphabet of thoughts" which can be arranged as in calculus. Leibniz presented a sketch of combinatorics and a means to establish numerical calculus. He treated combinatorics as a "science of possible forms or objective structures".[9] Using this method, and simple concepts, people can construct totally true sentences. Through the discovery of simple concepts and a method of fitting them together people can make a foolproof tool for acquiring knowledge and to model the order of ideas contained in the mind. Leibniz tried to construct a practical language but arrived at a language intended only for logical calculus, which over time became the language of modern symbolic logic. The philosopher rejected semantics and reduced his language to pure syntax. He considered that his project could be applied anywhere where reasoning could be employed.

Leibniz wrote in the *Preface to the General Science*:

> It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs suited for expressing all our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry expresses lines, we could do in all matters insofar as they are subject to reasoning all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry. For all investigations which depend on reasoning would be carried out by transposing these characters and by a species of calculus.[10]

The dissertation included only the general principles of the calculus. In 1679 Leibniz wrote the treatise *Elementa characteristicae universalis* in which he presented trial constructions inspired by mathematical symbolics. He developed the principles presented in *De arte combinatoria* and suggested the use of prime numbers to mark simple concepts.

Leibniz noticed that a language based on the art of combinatorics could create problems. In the work *Lingua Generalis* he suggested replacing the nine Arabic numerals with the first nine consonants of the Latin alphabet. He wanted to use vowels to mark the decimal unit.

But such experiments did not give him what he intended: the discovery of the calculus of thought – a universal language which would be consistent

[9] H. Święczkowska, *Harmonia linguarum*, op. cit., p. 134. (fragment translated by E. K.).

[10] After N. Jolley, *The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 234.

with the system of ideas. Leibniz was discouraged by the lack of progress in constructing a universal language so he tried solve the problem differently.

He entered the ongoing debate on the reconstruction of the language of Adam: he argued that the priority of language doesn't imply its perfection. However, Adam received language from God, so it must have been a perfect language which underwent a process of decay. He explained this ambiguity through the doctrine of inborn ideas – Adam, as the first man, was made aware of all ideas through the grace of God. However current natural languages are a result of the work and effort of everyone.

Leibniz also considered rebuilding natural language. He wanted to construct a universal Latin grammar which would combine the advantages of different languages' grammars. In one letter Leibniz writes that the new language, which he was planning, would be a continuation of the sign system included in the Chinese *I Ching*;[11] however while working on this he visibly drew away from his purpose.

Leibniz's dream finally crystallized in the project called *characteristica universalis* which is connected with another of his ideas: a calculating machine (*calculus ratiocinator*) which would be a tool for creating an encyclopedia of all human knowledge. The project had to be based on the rationalized principles of Chinese ideograms because, as he wrote, progress in the art of reasoning depends on signs and that ideas of things cannot be clearly perceived by mind. So signs (characters) are used to replace them.

Leibniz considered that if a language as precise as that of Adam was constructed or at least a true philosophical writing founded on the "alphabet of human thoughts" it would be possible to conduct a process of under standing using a kind of calculus, in exactly the same way as problems are solved In arithmetic or geometry. He believed that the realization of this project was possible if he could assemble a group of scholars for cooperation.

He thought that then he would be able to create the first stage of such a calculus, which would contain axioms in the form of ontological statements.[12] Only in this way could mankind gain a new instrument which would intensify the power of thoughts more than the microscope or telescope intensified the power of our eyes.[13]

From the beginning Leibniz wanted to construct such a language as would discover the order of the system of ideas and would be a useful instrument to expand knowledge. However, he came to the conclusion that

[11] U. Eco, op. cit., p. 285.

[12] M. Gordon, *Leibniz*, op. cit., p. 100.

[13] U. Eco, op. cit., p. 281.

people cannot arrive at prime concepts – they never will be certain that it is not possible to further reduce it into its component parts. Therefore, it is necessary to use those concepts which are most general and which people can recognize as "primary".

The philosopher wrote that primary concepts could not be preceded by *characteristica universalis* because this language was not to be a precise instrument of expressing thought, rather it was to be a calculating machine which would serve to find these thoughts.

Already Leibniz's purpose was not the construction of such a language which would discover the system of the order of ideas. He desired to create a logically perfect language which would lead from the known to the unknown (as in mathematics) through the application of calculus to characters.

He considered that signs (characters) did not have to be put in place of some concept but should be used instead of it. *Characteristica universalis* was not to help with reasoning – it was to substitute it.[14] It would be a kind of mathematical calculus and the result would be isomorphic with the order of ideas (and so with the world) because Leibniz thought that God was a mathematician.

In the *Preface to the General Science* he wrote:

> I dare say that this is the highest effort of the human mind, and when the project will be accomplished it will simply be up to men to be happy (...). It is one of my ambitions to accomplish this project if God gives me enough time.[15]

Leibniz did not manage to fully complete his project. Those scholars which continued the ideas of the German philosopher headed towards logical semantics and formalization of the language of mathematics.[16]

He had no outstanding followers which could continue the project of constructing the universal language. In this way Idirl (the Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language) – John Yench's[17] project merits discussion as a modern a priori language. The book in which the project is included: *A Universal Language for Mankind* was published in 2003 but the author has been working on artificial language since the middle of the XX century.

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[14] Ibidem, p. 282.

[15] After R. Chrisley, S. Begeer, *Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts*, Taylor & Francis, 2000, p. 192.

[16] The project anticipated programs of formalization of mathematical language as well as modern considerations on artificial intelligence.

[17] John Yench was an American writer (born in Russia, raised in China).

Idirl is typical of an a priori language project which sets up classification on the basis of "things" existing in the world; grouping them into eighteen categories (e.g. matter, form, relation, place, law). The key idea behind the project is that "the sound sequence of a word reveals its meaning, and there is no need for a dictionary".[18] The base categories on which Idirl is based are selected arbitrarily because, as Yench wrote, as yet it is not possible to get "God's point of view". Eighteen categories have been selected so as to construct a self-indexing language and they are based on Kant's categories: *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, *modality*. Construction and organization of the project consisted in carrying out three main postulates: the creation of a rational phonemic system, basic semantic meaning – morphemes, principles of grammar.

Yench directly referred to Leibniz as his precursor. He wrote:

> Idirl theoretically does more than Leibniz expected of his vision. Leibniz referred to combinatorial analysis as a script but Idirl is also a speakable language. Applied to this day, Idirl is designed for voice command, of computers and of servo-mechanisms.[19]

Idirl's author considered that the German philosopher did not pore enough over the nature of human language and a purely mathematical approach was not conducive to its exploration. Yench has suggested that he has managed to realize Leibniz's dream "approaching the idea from a combined phonemic-semantic view".[20] Phonemic – because pronunciation will be consistent everywhere; semantic – because the ordinary expressions used by people would carry the intended sense. He thought that Leibniz in his dissertation was writing about construction of a universal language in which "... words would explain themselves. The 'letters' (phonemes) making a Word would tell you its meaning".[21]

In his dissertation Leibniz only lay the foundations of his ideas. The application of the art of combinatorics did not serve making words self-explanatory. First, Leibniz wanted to reveal the "alphabet of human thoughts" which could model the system of the order of ideas and permit the creation of wholly true propositions. What is more, he never wanted to make "self-explanatory words". Second, in *De arte combinatoria* Leibniz did not

[18] J. Yench, *A Universal Language For Mankind*, Writers Club Press, New York 2003, p. 99.

[19] Ibidem, p. 19.

[20] Ibidem, p. 11.

[21] Ibidem, p. 1.

use "letters" but rather he used numbers which represented simple concepts. Thirdly, Leibniz did not identify graphic signs (letters) with smallest structural unit of speech (phonemes). Yench, in relation to Leibniz's considerations, referred only to the ideas included in *De arte combinatoria*. It seems that he did not acquaint himself with the subsequent writings of Leibniz, such as *Horizon de la doctrine humaine* or *Lingua Generalis* in which Leibniz developed his considerations.

Yench wrote that many modern attempts at constructing a universal language failed, because a posteriori projects are entangled with the same problems as natural languages. Also he criticized some of the purposes which the languages' constructors assumed: unification of scientific terminology and the achievement of world peace. He considered that a new language is a way to enrich human life. He needed a new language because:

> I wanted to know the name of the grass on which I trod; I wanted to understand the different textures of rock and their histories (...) I wanted to be sure that my ideal language would be versatile enough for poetry and humor.[22]

The first task in constructing the project was to cope with how to write the phonemes in the new language. Yench proposed "a phonetic formation" to get through this problem (something corresponding to Mendeleev's table of elements in chemistry). This formation would create a connection between ideas. Adjustment of phonemes would lead to a sound or printed word and would communicate their meaning. Such a language would not need a dictionary and the system of morphemes would need no syntax if "a phonetic formation" would be established in a "natural" and logical way. Yench considered that "the morphs would supply the mood, the tense, the number, the case, the person, the gender, the aspect and the punctuation".[23] He assumed *implicite* that universal meanings really exist. However, much modern research has shown that identifying even an elementary group of such universals is an extremely difficult undertaking.

The technical side of Idirl is quite highly-developed and complex. Yench's considerations are supported by questionable argumentation and examples. Idirl was to be a constructed language, which, however, has the characteristics of the language of paradise. Yench, creating the words of the New language, assumed further that they are names not merely by convention but as a result of the relationship between the sound of the name and

[22] Ibidem, p. 4.
[23] Ibidem, p. 11.

the meaning of the thing. He believed that due to the curse of the Tower of Babel language experienced a "break" between sound and meaning. Yench's project was to be a remedy in which "words mean what they mean".

Yench's idea should be read rather as writing down the dream of a language which could solve all human problems than an authentic project. In "the utopia of a universal language" a step forward was to be a posteriori languages which abandoned "the ballast of artifice". However Idirl appears to be a step backwards. Yench repeatedly emphasized that his project is more perfect than Leibniz's project. Such an opinion is highly unfounded. From the very beginning both "constructors" have a completely different idea about how such a project should look and they wanted to realize different purposes by it. Yench's dream was never Leibniz's dream.

Leibniz desired to create a language based on the system of ideas contained in human minds. It would constitute a calculus which is used instead of names in the process of reasoning. However, he came to the conclusion that it is not possible to indicate simple concepts (Yench considered that Idirl's words are just such concept-roots which incorporate the roots of all languages). The German philosopher abandoned this idea and spent time on a language project which would lead from the known to the unknown through its perfect calculus.

Idirl's strongly underlined destiny as a tool for international communication conflicts with Leibniz's opinion that artificial languages can no more aspire to the role of a universal language of communication than that of a philosophical language in which is possible to express the logical relationships between concepts.

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to present John Yench's a priori language as a continuation of Leibniz's idea. Before I proceed to show the project of the Inter-Disciplinary International Reference Language, I would like to discuss the development of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's view on artificial languages. I will try to show the evolution of Leibniz's universal language: from its ideal conception to a tool which formalizes the whole of human knowledge. Also, I will show Leibniz's influence on further ideas of artificial language. I will compare his projects with Yench's language – *Idirl*. An analysis of Idirl's main assumptions will be useful to show the degree of continuation of Leibniz's ideas in the a priori language of John Yench.

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NATURAL SIGN AND PAINTING

Today, when aesthetics, in the sense closely related to the one given to the term by its "founder" A. Baumgarten, i.e. the study of beauty and at the same time the philosophical reflection upon the fine arts, is a well grounded philosophical discipline, one tends to forget that before this discipline emerged in an explicit way, intersections of visual arts and philosophy had been rare. Even if we assume that modern contemplations on fine arts (predominantly visual ones) which J. Białostocki[1] named "reflection on art" or "aesthetics-program" (different from aesthetics-science) whose expression we may find in *Kunstliteratur* or *critica d'arte* is a kind of anti-plationism, i.e. an attempt to prove that artists do not have to – in fact must not – leave the ideal city, that is, even if we suppose that the basis of modern way of thinking about art is essentially philosophical, we have to admit that in the majority of cases artists, as well as theoreticians of art, did not venture into philosophical circuitous routes repeating only from time to time some commonplace theories. On the other hand, philosophers, with some exceptions I will dicuss later, did not pay much attention to artistic themes, only occasionally treating them as illustrative motives or reference points dictated by the obligatory model of good education.

We may find a good account of how fine arts functioned within philosophical reflection in the following quotation from Lockean *Some Thoughts on Good Education*: *When he* [the child] *can write well and quick, I think it may be convenient not only to continue the exercise of his hand in writing, but also to improve the use of it farther in drawing, a thing very useful to a gentleman in several occasions* (...) *I do not mean that I would have your son a perfect painter; to be that to any tolerable degree will require*

[1] See J. Białostocki, *Estetyka obrazu*, in: *Refleksje i syntezy ze świata sztuki. Cykl II*, Warszawa 1987, p. 45–48.

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more time than a young gentleman can spare from his other improvements of greater moment.[2] In other words, a superficial familiarity with rudimentary techniques of depiction may turn out to be useful, although a deepened knowledge is simply a waste of time. What is more, visiting a picture gallery is – as one of the articles in *Spectator* claims[3] – enjoyable entertainment only when poor weather does not favour open-air plays. Summing up, one ought to remember that we should not overestimate connections between philosophy and visual arts in the early modern period. However, that makes pointing out moments in which such intersections took place more salient. One such instance is the problem of natural sign. It is a problem which perhaps may seem to be of marginal importance, at least from the point of view of the art theory of that time, but which paradoxically turns out to be crucial. The nature of this paradox merits a separate discussion.

At the outset, we have to underscore that the first modern treatise on painting, written in the 1st half of 15th c. begins by formulating a definition of sign – Leon Battista Alberti writes: *I call a figure (signum) here anything located on a plane so the eye can see it.*[4] However, it is not the meaning of this term that theoreticians active in subsequent periods will be interested in. A sign is, for Alberti, the smallest visible element of a picture which may be combined into larger unities. In the posterior period the term *sign* acquires a broader meaning: painting still uses signs, but now *sign* means the represented, painted object. Here one may quote the definition of pictorial sign given by A. Arnauld and P. Nicole in *The Art of Thinking*: *but when we view a certain object merely as representing another, our idea of it is an idea of sign, and the first object is called a sign. This is how we ordinarily think of maps and paintings. Consequently the sign includes two ideas, one of the thing which represents, the other of the thing represented. Its nature consists in prompting the second by the first.*[5] The authors of *The Art of Thinking* use a widely contemporarily acknowledged classification dividing signs into the natural and the conventional. In the *Discourse on Saint and Profane Images* we may read as follows: *there are two kinds of signs: natural ones, like smoke coming out from a fire or an imprint of a foot* (...) *or artificial ones, assumed thanks to an agreement among people* (...) *and these are letters,*

[2] J. Locke, *Some Thoughts on Good Education*, eds. R. Weissbound Grant, N. Tarcov, Indianapolis 1996, § 161, p. 119.

[3] *Spectator*, nr 83, Tuesday, June 5, 1711, in: The Spectator, vol. I, London 1822, p. 322.

[4] L. B. Alberti, *On Painting*, trans. J. R. Spencer, New Haven 1993, p. 42.

[5] A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, *Logic, Or, The Art of Thinking*, trans. J. V. Buroker, Cambridge 1996, part II, chap. 4, p. 35.

notes, lines, numbers etc. which can be understood only by those few who study them. For this reason, in order to fulfill the desire and common need to communicate one's ideas to others, the art of creating pictures has been invented and those pictures may be easily recognized and serve as a common language for all the nations.[6] The above described signs are natural for two reasons: first, they are established by the nature itself, second, man may read them thanks to his natural skills. *There is no problem with natural signs* – we read further on in already quoted *The Art of Thinking* – *because the obvious connection between this kind of sign and things clearly indicates that when we affirm the thing signified of the sign, we mean not that the sign is this thing in reality, but only metaphorically, and in signification. Hence, without any introduction or ceremony, we will say about a portrait of Ceasar that it is Ceasar, and about a map of Italy that it is Italy.*[7] The idea that it is possible to define picture as a sign which easily enables everyone to identify that which it refers to may be found in other texts, too – it is enough to mention the first of the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* written by G. Berkeley, who, using this example illustrates how it is viable to perceive the outer world through ideas in the mind and at the same time through the senses.[8] *Nota bene*, if we define natural sign as transparent and performing a sort of "self-effacement" while being a "pure" transmitter (medium), thanks to which the beholder's attention is directly drawn to what the sign signifies, then we quite probably have to treat rationalists' ideas as natural signs as well.[9] In the same vein, i.e. describing the reaction of the viewer who immediately identifies the representation performing syllogism *hoc est hoc*, Sperone Speroni, a 16-century Italian philosopher, logician and poet, in his *Apology of Painting* describes the pleasure resulting from a successful imitation.[10] The fact that painting, thanks to the traits being analyzed, is accessible to everyone (which is not true as we now know), makes it superior to other arts, mainly poetry. Moreover, painting appeals

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[6] G. Paleotti, *Discorso intorno alle immagini sacre e profane*, Bologna 1582, chap. III (quoted in: *Trattati d'arte del cinquecento. Fra manierismo e controriforma*, a cura di P. Barocchi, Bari 1960–1962, vol. 2, p. 138–140).

[7] A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, op. cit., part II, chap. 14, p. 120.

[8] G. Berkeley, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous In Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists*, *I Dialogue* (see G. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, ed. R. Woolhouse, New York – London 1988, p. 152.

[9] See L. Marin, *La critique du discours*, Paris 1975, p. 73–74.

[10] Sperone Speroni [1500–1588], *Discorso in lode della pittura*, Venezia 1740 (post mortem edition), quoted in: *Scritti d'arte del cinquecento*, a cura di P. Barocchi, Milano – Napoli 1971, t. 1, s. 1002.

to the highest sense, i.e. that of sight. For this reason, painting's influence on man is the most decisive. We may quote here the words of J.-B. Dubos that establish the difference between painting and poetry by referring to the difference between natural and conventional signs (this differentiation was later on adopted by G. E. Lessing[11]): *I am of opinion, that the effect which painting produces on men, surpasses that of poetry; and am induced to think thus for two reasons. The first is, that painting operates on us by means of the sense of seeing. The second, that it does not employ artificial signs, as poetry, but natural ones; by which it makes imitations.* (...) *Painting makes use of natural signs, the energy of which does not depend on education. They draw their force from the relation which nature herself has fixed between our organs and the external objects* (...) *Perhaps I do not express myself properly, in saying, that the painter makes use of signs; 'tis nature herself which he exhibits to our sight.* (...) *The most tender verses can affect us only by degrees, and by setting the several springs of our machine successively work. Words must first excite those ideas, whereof they are only arbitrary signs.*[12] Dubos adds to the already known characteristic of natural sign a new, essential feature – not only does a picture show a natural sign to the beholder, but it also displays nature itself. The identification, as it were, reaches its climax. At the same time, the danger that threatens those seeing natural signs becomes clearly visible. *The Art of Thinking* reads: *It is quite possible for the same thing both to conceal and to reveal another thing at the same time. So those who say "nothing appears by means of that which conceals" have asserted a highly questionable maxim. For since the same thing can be both a thing and a sign at the same time, it can as a thing conceal what it reveals as a sign. Thus the hot cinder, as a thing,*

[11] See G. E. Lessing's letter to Nicolai dated 26.05.1769: *Both [signs existing in time and signs existing in space] can be either natural or arbitrary; consequently there must be two sorts of painting and two sorts of poetry, a higher and a lower kind. Painting requires co-existing signs, which are either natural or arbitrary; and this same distinctions is also to be found in the consecutive signs of poetry. For it is not true that painting uses only natural signs, just as it is not true that poetry uses only arbitrary signs. But one thing is certain: the more painting departs from natural signs, or employs natural and arbitrary signs mixed together, the further it departs from its true perfection; just as conversely poetry draws all the closer its true perfection, the closer it makes its arbitrary signs approach the natural. Consequently the higher kind of painting is that which employs only natural signs in space, and the higher kind of poetry is that which employs only natural signs in time.* (...) *and the highest kind of poetry is the one that turns the arbitrary signs wholly into natural signs. Now that is dramatic poetry, for in drama the words cease to be arbitrary signs, and become* natural signs *of arbitrary things.* [quoted in: D. Simpson, *The Origins of Modern Critical Thought: German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel*, Cambridge 1988, p. 65–66].

[12] J.-B. Dubos, *Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music*, vol. 1, trans. Th. Nugent, London 1748, chap. XL, p. 321–323.

hides the fire and, as a sign, reveals it.[13] In other words, natural sign may be equivalent to idolatry; it may falsely bring out nature before man. It must be underlined that, contrary to Plato for whom visual arts displayed shadows of shadows or mirror images of sensual world i.e. they showed falseness instead of truth, for Dubos that power of painting is rather positive. He writes as follows: *In fine, there is no body hardly but what has had several occasions during his life-time, of observing, how much easier it is make men apprehend, what we are desirous of conveying to their imagination or understanding, by means of the eye, that by the help of the ear. A design which exhibits the elevation of a palace, makes us instantly comprehend the nature of the building; and the plan thereof gives us immediately an idea of the distribution of apartments.*[14] A similar thought may be found in the following part of Locke's above quoted paragraph on the profits resulting from knowledge of perspective, which, he thinks, is useful *especially if he* [the child] *travel, as that which helps a man often to express in a few lines well put together what a whole sheet of paper in writing would not be able to represent and make intelligible. How many buildings may a man see, how many machines and habits meet with, the ideas whereof would be easily retained and communicated by a little skill in drawing, which being committed to words are in danger to be lost or at best but ill retained in the most exact descriptions?*[15] The most elaborate expression of the view that the only perfect way to gain knowledge is to use sight and natural sign may be found in J. Comenius' precepts contained in *The Great Didactic* where he perceives learning things as getting an insight that is analogous to external viewing, and therefore *if we wish to implant a true and certain knowledge of things in our pupils, we must take especial care that everything be learned by means of actual observation and sensuous perception.* (...) *If the object themselves cannot be procured, representations of them may be used. Copier or models may be constructed for teaching purposes, and the same principle may be adopted by botanists, geometricians, zoologists, and geographers, who should illustrate their descriptions by engravings of the objects described. The same thing should be done in books on physics and elsewhere. For example, the human body will be well explained by ocular demonstration if the following plan be adopted. A skeleton should be procured (either such an one as is usually kept in universities, or one made in wood), and on this framework should be placed the muscles, sinews, nerves, veins, arteries, as well as the*

[13] A. Arnauld, P. Nicole, op. cit., part II, chap. 4, p. 36.

[14] J. B. Dubos, op. cit., p. 324–325.

[15] J. Locke, op. cit., § 161, p. 119.

intestines, the lungs, the heart, the diaphragm, and the liver. These should be made of leather and stuffed with wool, and should be of the right size and in the right place, while on each organ should be written its name and its function.[16] It is clear that here what we are confronted with is a natural sign which identifies itself with the signified object and, what is more, learning is said to base on the syllogism *hoc est hoc*, i.e. on the same syllogism on which Speroni based pleasure resulting from looking at a work of art – pleasure which was at its highest when its source was sculpture which *imitates better* [than painting] *as in this case there is no similarity, but essential identity for both of them* [sculpture and model] *are bodies* in genere substantiae.[17]

Now, taking up the purely artistic questions, first of all we have to underscore the fact that artistic practice as well as theory was driven by a particular way of thinking of art, defined by several ancient anecdotes, predominantly those which were known thanks to Pliny's the Elder *Natural History*. These stories form, as it were, a kind of modern artistic "mythology". One of them is about the two greatest mythical artists, Zeuxis and Parrhasios, who competed in order to establish which of them was capable of painting a more realistic picture. Zeuxis painted grapes in such an illusionistic way that birds flew to peck at them and, convinced that he was the winner, asked his rival, Parrhasios, to remove the veil covering the picture which the latter brought to Zeuxis' studio. At that very moment Zeuxis realized that he had been fooled as the veil was painted, too, and so was forced to acknowledge the superiority of the other.[18] This story defines the early modern way of thinking of the nature of painted images. What follows is an exemplary definition of image (*nota bene* almost literally repeated in Diderot's *Encyclopaedia*) given by *Dictionnaire universel* by *A. Furetière* (1690): *Image is a natural and very trustworthy painting of objects that is created whenever they are placed next to a very smooth surface. We see images of all objects in mirrors* (...) *Image also means artificial representations which are made by men in painting or in sculpture* (...) *Image means moreover pictures which we make ourselves in our souls by mixing a variety of ideas and impressions which we have acquired through our senses.*[19] And this is how a picture was defined by one of the major 17-cen-

[16] J. A. Comenius, *The Great Didactic*, trans. M. W. Keatinge, New York 1967, p. 185–186 (XX.8,10).

[17] Sperone Speroni, op. cit., p. 1002.

[18] See Pliny the Elder, *Natural History: A Selection*, trans. J. F. Healy, London – New York 1991, p. 330 (XXV.65).

[19] Entry "image", in: A. Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel*, Haga, Rotterdam 1690 (Genève 1970).

tury French theoreticians of art (*nota bene* this definition repeats Leonardo da Vinci's famous phrase): *A picture is a flat surface which one has to annihilate deceiving the eyes.*[20] The idea of picture is closely connected to that of representation – *To represent means to create an image or picture of an object which lets us know it as it is. A mirror represents objects in a natural way.* (...) *To represent means also to let something know through figures or signs* (...) *To represent means also to take someone's place, to have his authority.*[21] It is worth noting in this definition the connection between the idea of natural representation (i.e. representation the characteristic of natural signs) and mirror. In a mirror (and mirror together with window are the two most frequently used metaphors describing painting) one can easily identify what is reflected as the mirror displays a faithful image and on the other hand a mirror does not draw the beholder's attention to itself, but to the mirrored object.[22] A picture-mirror being based on the mimesis principle shows forms and colours. *The essence and definition of painting* – states *Cours de la peinture* written by R. de Piles – *is, the imitation of visible objects, by means of form and colours*: *Wherefore the more forcibly and faithfully painting imitates nature, the more directly and rapidly does it lead us to its end; which is, to deceive the eye.*[23] Therefore, the more a picture resembles a mirror, the better it is. *It* [*painting*] *is in general the Art of Imitating and its Perfection is that the Imitation is so Natural that the Picture makes the same Impression as the Object itself that the Painter would imitate*[24] – we read in one of manual from the beginning of the 18th century offering a popular explanation of the art of perspective. Pleasure results from a pleasant deceit, from taking the image for its model. If that happens, one may say that the painted pictures are veracious. *The veracity in painting consists in such a perfect imitation of that which we want to represent as to create illusion.*[25] What we are dealing with here is a baroque conceit, because deception becomes the measure of truth (*a good*

[20] R. de Piles, *Abregé de la vie des peintres*, Paris 1699 [Hildesheim 1969], p. 46, book I, chap. XVI.

[21] Entry "representation", in: A. Furetière, op. cit.

[22] See U. Eco, *Sugli specchi e altri saggi*, Milano 1985, p. 9–37.

[23] R. de Piles, *The Principles of Painting* (*Cours de la peinture*), London 1743 [quoted in: *Art in theory 1648–1815: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, ed. Ch. Harrison, P. Wood, J. Gaiger, Oxford 2000, p. 308].

[24] B. Lamy, *Perspective Made Easie*, London 1710 [Alburgh 1987], p. 11.

[25] Entry "truth", in: A.-J. Pernety, *Dicitionnaire portatif de peinture, sculpture et gravure*, Paris 1757 (Genève 1972).

Picture is nothing else in it selfe but a delusion of our eyes[26]) – picture is but a sincere lie, a righteous deception. Of course, it has to be underlined once more, it is only a way of looking at pictures, a mere convention which finds its clearest expression in *ekphrasis*, a literary description of a work of art.[27] In his *Essay des merveilles de nature* E. Binet we find a statement that confirms the conventional aspect of aesthetic reception of pictures: *It is not a picture, but nature and those human figures look so naturally at all those who are looking at them, that you would swear that they are alive. 2. Look at the fishes over there, if you poured some water on them, they would start to swim, because they lack nothing* (...) *4. When Painting was still in the cradle and was toddling, the brush was so stupid, the works so heavy, that you had to write on them "this is a bull", "this is a donkey", because otherwise, you would have thought them to show a quarter of veal; now you have to write below that it was painted by such a such painter lest you should think that these are dead men stuck to the canvas or living persons lacking life, so well they all are painted.* (...) *Speaking of great Paintings you have to talk about them as if the objects were real, and not painted.*[28] The progress of art leads then from an early, as it were, primitive stage, in which imitation was clumsy, to a developed stage, in which a picture is so truthful as to be identified with the thing represented in it.

The above quoted story of the two Greek painters, so important to the modern reflection on arts, is sometimes interpreted as showing that art may deceive not only animals, but man as well. Both of them painted pictures belonging to a *genre* which became extremely popular in 17th and 18th centuries and was called *trompe-l'oeil*.[29]

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[26] F. Junius, *The Painting of the Ancients (De pictura veterum)*, London 1638 [Berkeley 1991], p. 50–51, vol. 1, book I, chap. 4.

[27] See N. E. Land, *The Viewer as Poet. The Renaissance Response to Art*, Pennsylvania 1994, passim.

[28] E. Binet, *Essay des merveilles de nature, et des plus nobles artifices*, Rouen 1632, p. 314, chap. XL; a similar phrase may be found earlier, see F. Bocchi, *Eccellenza del San Giorgio di Donatello*, Firenze 1592, after: *Trattati d'arte del cinquecento. Fra manierismo e controriforma*, a cura di P. Barocchi, Bari 1960–1962, vol. 3, p. 160, 178. *So the sculpture, if it wants to be much praised, should be active, almost moving and alive* (...) *the first artists have possessed so little skill and been so rough that one could not recognize nor discern what they have painted and it was necessary to write names right next to the painted objects such as: "this is a horse", "this is a tree"* (...).

[29] The bibliography on *trompe-l'oeil* is quite rich; here we mention only the most important books and catalogues: *Le trompe-l'oeil: plus vrai que nature?*, Musée de Brou, Bourg-en-Bresse 2005; *Sinn und Sinnlichkeit. Das Flämische Stillleben 1550–1680*, Villa Hügel, Essen 2002 [entries U. Kleinmann, p. 111–130]; *Deceptions and illusions: five centuries of trompe l'oeil painting*, ed. Sybille Ebert-Schifferer, National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C. 2002; *Illusions. Gijsbrecht. Royal Master of Deception*, ed. O. Koester, Sta-

Trompe-l'oeil is typically a still life painted in such a way as to delude the viewer and make him believe that he is not looking at a 2-dimensional picture, but a 3-dimensional object. In order to succeed, the painter has to use some easy technical tricks, but – and this is even more important – has to conceal marks of his activity. *Trompe-l'oeil* is a hyper-realistic image in which such factors as style or *maniera* are totally absent – in other words, *trompe-l'oeil* destroys artistry. A picture of this kind is really like a mirror: smooth, impersonal, truthful. This is one of the main reasons why 19th and 20th century painters did not like or esteem *trompe-l'oeil* and did not think of it as art – in their view it was not artistic, but artificial. The rivalry between Zeuxis and Parrhasios shows to what extent the threat of idolatry is serious. On the other hand, Pliny mentioned in other tales all that which is omitted in the quoted one, i.e. artistic genius, capability of making right choice, of displaying *la belle nature* – of showing nature which is more beautiful than the real one, and therefore different from it. Hence, the mimetic dimension of art was as often underlined as its deceptive character: *Sculpture and painting are essentially imitators and not creators of things; when a painter using colours creates St. Paul, and a sculptor makes him of marble, it does not mean to me that they create St. Paul in flesh, but that they imitate and counterfeit him in such a way that what they have created should resemble him in terms of body, face, weight etc.* (...) *Imitating him or, to use our terms, counterfeiting him is nothing but a desire to show that a thing is that which in reality it is not; this is the proper end of both of these arts.*[30] Imitation, then, implies difference between image and model and if pleasure results from the eye being deceived, it combines error and consciousness of being erroneous. *Therefore I conclude* – writes Ch. Batteux – *that Arts, in that which is essential to Art, are but imitations, resemblances*

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tens Museum for Kunst, Kopenhaga 1999; A. Chong, W. Kloek, *Still-Life Paintings form the Netherlands 1550–1720*, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, The Cleveland Museum of Art, Zwolle 1999; *Trompe-l'oeil. L'arte dell'inganno*, Galleria Silva, Milano 1998; *Disguised Vision*, Tokyo – Hiroshima – Kamakura – Koriyama 1994–1995; William M. Harnett, eds. D. Bolger, M. Simpson, J. Wilmerding, New York 1992; *More Than Meets the Eye: The Art of Trompe l'Oeil*, Columbus Museum of Art, Ohio, 1985–1986; A. Frankenstein, *The Reality of Appearance. The Trompe-l'oeil Tradition in American Painting*, New York 1970; *Illusionism and Trompe-l'Oeil*, Palace of the Legion of Honor, San Francisco, 1949; *Le Trompe-l'oeil. De l'Antiquite au XXe siècle*, [ed. P. Mauriès], Paris 1996; M. Monestier, *Le trompe-l'oeil contemporain. Les maitres du realisme*, Paris 1993; M. Milman, *Trompe-l'oeil. Painted Architecture*, Geneve 1986; M. Milman, *Trompe-l'oeil Painting. The Illusions of Reality*, Geneve 1982; C. Dars, *Images of Deception. The Art of Trompe-L'oeil*, Oxford 1979; M. L. d'Otrange Mastai, *Illusion in Art. Trompe-l'oeil. A History of Pictorial Illusionism*, New York 1975; M. Battersby, *Trompe-L'oeil. The Eye Deceived*, London 1974.

[30] V. Borghini, *Selva di notizie*, 1564 [quoted in: *Scritti d'arte del cinquecento*, a cura di P. Barocchi, Milano – Napoli 1971, vol. 1, p. 614].

which are not Nature but seem to be; and thus the matter of Arts is not verity but verisimilitude.[31] In other words, even in the case of *trompe-l'oeil* – which tends to be forgotten by those who criticize and have criticized illusion in art[32] – pleasure has double source: error and recognition (an ideal *trompe-l'oeil*, i.e. one that is not recognized by anyone, does not give pleasure just because nobody pays any attention to it). In my view, only once we accept this thesis, are we able to understand the outwardly contradictory precepts which ordered either to imitate reality so as to deceive the beholder, or to give its idealized picture.

So, first of all, we are dealing then with a concept of natural sign (as exemplified by painting) which is a sign based on "natural" similarity and makes it easy to recognize that which it refers to (the painted object). It is a sign, which performs a sort of self-effacement by being totally transparent but which still preserves the nature of sign – we may quote here once again *The Art of Thinking*: *the sign includes two ideas, one of the thing which represents, the other of the thing represented.* Second of all, we are dealing here with a particular *genre* of painting, *trompe-l'oeil*, pictures which are what they are not, deceive the beholder, counterfeit the object they represent. We shall then think of *trompe-l'oeil* as of an ideal embodiment of natural sign – *trompe-l'oeil* is and is not what it represents. At the same time it is a proof of what has been called *the semiotic desire for natural sign*[33] typical of early modern art. It is a desire whose highest expression may be found in debates on tragedy (and aesthetic illusion) in 18th century which is the highest art for – as Lessing says – *and the highest kind of poetry is the one that turns the arbitrary signs wholly into natural signs. Now that is dramatic poetry, for in drama the words cease to be arbitrary signs, and become* natural signs *of arbitrary things.*[34] This desire continues in a way, on the one hand, the problem raised by Plato in his *Cratylus* (432b-c) where he inquires whether it is possible to make an image identical with its model, and on the other the myth of Pygmalion, a sculptor whose work turned into a living person. The aim of the aforementioned metaphor of mirror was to point out the mimetic function of art. Now, it may be interpreted in terms of natural sign.

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[31] Ch. Batteux, *Ch B. Les beaux arts reduit a un meme principe*, Paris 1746, p. 14, chap. 2.

[32] See E. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion. A Study in Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, New York 2002, passim.

[33] M. Krieger, *The Semiotic Desire for the Natural Sign: Poetic Uses and Political Abuses*, in: *The States of "Theory". History, Art and Critical Discourse*, ed. D. Carrol, Stanford 1990, p. 222.

[34] See footnote 11.

T. Hobbes in *Elementa Philosophiae* (*De corpore*, I.3) notes that although truthfulness refers to the sentence, it is sometimes used as meaning "that which is contrary to what is apparent or fictional". Therefore, the sentence 'the reflected image is man" is not true, but we cannot deny that the reflection itself is a true (real) reflection. Thus, saying in front of a portrait "this is Caesar" instead of "this is a portrait of Caesar" is true – if one may say so at all – only thanks to a convention just like describing painted persons as "alive" is a conventional rhethorical figure.

Summing up, the juxtaposition of painting and natural sign, performed rather from the point of view of artistic theory and of philosophy, reveals the rhetorical character of the former – *trompe-l'oeil* is, as to say, a purely rhetorical *genre*. That it was somehow intuited by its contemporaries is proved by a fragment that can be found in G.W. Leibniz's *New Essays on Human Understanding*: *So when we are deceived by a painting our judgments are doubly in error. First, we substitute the cause for the effect, and believe that we immediately see the thing that causes the image, rather like a dog barking at a mirror.* (...) *Secondly, we are further deceived when we substitute one cause for another and believe that what comes merely from a flat painting actually comes from a body. In such cases our judgments involve both metonymy and metaphor (for even figures of rhetoric turn into sophism when they mislead us).*[35] Following Leibniz's thought, one may say that *trompe-l'oeil* shows that the desire for "naturalness" is something paradoxically conventional. One thing has to be mentioned here. This paradigmatic convention expired in 19th century (in art the leading metaphor, as Abrams would say, was not mirror, but lamp) and started to be denounced for being false and not giving pleasure but disgust: *It is sufficient that philosophically we understand that in all imitation two elements must coexist, and not only coexist, but must be perceived as coexisting. These two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates. The artist may take his point of view where he pleases, provided that the desired effect be perceptibly produced – that there be likeness in the difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in one. If there be likeness to nature without any check of difference, the result is disgusting, and the more complete the delusion, the more loathsome the effect. Why are such simulations of nature, as wax-work figures of men and women, so disagreeable? Because not finding the motion and the life which we expected,*

[35] G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. P. Remnant, J. F. Bennett, Cambridge 1996, p. 136, book. II, chap. 9, § 8.

we are shocked as by a falsehood, every circumstance of detail, which before induced us to be interested, making the distance from truth more palpable. You set out with a supposed reality and are disappointed and disgusted with the deception; while, in respect to a work of genuine imitation, you begin with an acknowledged total difference, and then every touch of nature gives you the pleasure of an approximation to truth. The fundamental principle of all this is undoubtedly the horror of falsehood and the love of truth inherent in the human breast.[36]

The story of Zeuxis and Parrhasios ceased to define the summit of artistic possibilities and the way a competent viewer should response to the work of art. It rather started to be a funny anecdote showing how one should not react because such a reaction is typical of primitive viewers and animals like the monkey described by G. W. F. Hegel: *There are, no doubt, as well, examples of completely deceptive imitation. Zeuxis' painted grapes have from antiquity downward been taken to be the triumph of this principle of the imitation of nature, because the story is that living doves pecked at them. We might add to this ancient example the modern one of Büttner's monkey, which bit in pieces a painted cockchafer in Rösels "Diversions of the Insect World", and was pardoned by his master, in spite of his having thereby spoilt a beatiful copy of this valuable work because of this proof of the excellence of the pictures. But when we reflect on these and similar instances, it must at once occur to us that, in place of commending works of art because they have actually deceived even pigeons and monkeys, we ought simply to censure the people who mean to exalt a work of art by predicating, as its highest and ultimate quality, so poor an effect as this.*[37]

[36] S. T. Coleridge, *On Poesy as Art* [quoted in: *English Essays from Sir Philip Sidney to Macaulay*, ed. Ch. W. Eliot, New York 1909–1914, p. 271–272].

[37] Quoted in: G. W. F. Hegel, *The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Art*, trans. B. Bosanquet, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886, p. 81–82, Chap. III, $\gamma\gamma$.

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